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dc.rights.licensehttp://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=eses_AR
dc.contributor.authorPowell, Andrew
dc.contributor.authorArozamena, Leandro
dc.date.accessioned2017-04-07T19:07:37Z
dc.date.available2017-04-07T19:07:37Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/6262
dc.description.abstractThis paper develops a simple game between the IMF a county and a set of atomistic private investors. The model is motivated by the case of Argentina. Under reasonable assumptions, the one shot game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Consider- ing an equilibrium in mixed strategies, conditions are derived on whether the IMF should exist. A “cooperative first best” may be supported in a repeated game by a “minimum punishment strat- egy” that may be optimal but may break down if the probability of insolvency rises. This implies that countries are likely to de- viate in bad times placing the IMF in an “impossible position”. It is suggested that the international financial architecture (IFA) remains incomplete.
dc.description.sponsorshipPara cualquier uso del contenido del presente documento debe ponerse en contacto con el autor.es_AR
dc.format.extent31 p.
dc.format.mediumapplication/pdfes_AR
dc.publisherUniversidad Torcuato Di Tella. Escuela de Negocios. Centro de Investigaciones en Finanzas (CIF)
dc.relation.ispartofCentro de Investigaciones Financieras (CIF). Documentos de trabajo 09/2003
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccesses_AR
dc.titleLiquidity protection versus Moral Hazard: the role of the IMF
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
UTDT.rights.PDF
UTDT.rights.AUTNo
UTDT.source.idn49783
dc.audienceResearchers
dc.audienceStudents
dc.audienceTeachers
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersiones_AR
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UTDT.source.originothers
dc.subject.UTDTFMI
dc.subject.UTDTMercado financiero internacional


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