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dc.rights.licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/ar/es_AR
dc.contributor.authorSigman, Marianoes_AR
dc.contributor.authorComay, Nicoláses_AR
dc.contributor.authorDella Bella, Gabrieles_AR
dc.contributor.authorLamberti, Pedroes_AR
dc.contributor.authorSolovey, Guillermoes_AR
dc.contributor.authorBarttfeld, Pabloes_AR
dc.date.accessioned2023-06-16T22:13:51Z
dc.date.available2023-06-16T22:13:51Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/11886
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105377
dc.description.abstractConfidence in perceptual decisions is thought to reflect the probability of being correct. According to this view, confidence should be unaffected or minimally reduced by the presence of irrelevant alternatives. To test this prediction, we designed five experiments. In Experiment 1, participants had to identify the largest geometrical shape among two or three alternatives. In the three-alternative condition, one of the shapes was much smaller than the other two, being a clearly incorrect option. Counter-intuitively, confidence was higher when the irrelevant alternative was present, evidencing that confidence construction is more complex than previously thought. Four computational models were tested, only one of them accounting for the results. This model predicts that confidence increases monotonically with the number of irrelevant alternatives, a prediction we tested in Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, we evaluated whether this effect replicated in a categorical task, but we did not find supporting evidence. Experiments 4 and 5 allowed us to discard stimuli presentation time as a factor driving the effect. Our findings suggest that confidence models cannot ignore the effect of multiple, possibly irrelevant alternatives to build a thorough understanding of confidence.es_AR
dc.description.sponsorshipEste documento es una versión del artículo que se encuentra publicado en Cognition, 234, 105377es_AR
dc.format.extent42 p.es_AR
dc.format.mediumapplication/pdfes_AR
dc.languageenges_AR
dc.publisherCognitiones_AR
dc.relation.isversionofComay, N. A., Della Bella, G., Lamberti, P., Sigman, M., Solovey, G., & Barttfeld, P. (2023). The presence of irrelevant alternatives paradoxically increases confidence in perceptual decisions. Cognition, 234, 105377. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2023.105377
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_AR
dc.subjectConfidencees_AR
dc.subjectPerceptuales_AR
dc.subjectDecision makinges_AR
dc.subjectMultiple alternativeses_AR
dc.subjectBayesian confidence hypothesises_AR
dc.subjectComputational modelinges_AR
dc.subjectOpen dataes_AR
dc.titleThe presence of irrelevant alternatives paradoxically increases confidence in perceptual decisionses_AR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/preprintes_AR
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/submittedVersiones_AR


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