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dc.rights.licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/ar/es_AR
dc.contributor.authorSanguinetti, Pabloes_AR
dc.date.accessioned2024-07-30T21:12:39Z
dc.date.available2024-07-30T21:12:39Z
dc.date.issued1994
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/12921
dc.description.abstractThe purpose of this paper is to present a simple theoretical framework that captures this coordination problem and its implications in terms of public finances. The framework adopts a game-theoretic point of view to investigate the consequences of different modes of interaction between Federal and Provincial jurisdictions for the determination of the overall public sector expenditure and taxes. In this sense, the exercise offers another perspective through which the old question regarding the forces behind the observed growth of the public sector can be looked at1 . More specifically, the types of questions we deal with can be stated in the following way: Does the institutional framework which regulates the fiscal relationship among -different government jurisdictions matter in terms of the overall level of public sector expenditure and taxes? Do intergovernmental grants and decentralization of expenditure decisions imply inefficiencies in the provision of public goods, at both the central and provincial levels?es_AR
dc.description.sponsorshipEste Documento forma parte de la serie Working Papers (ISSN 0327-9588), publicada por la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella entre 1993 y 2001es_AR
dc.format.extent33 p.es_AR
dc.format.mediumapplication/pdfes_AR
dc.languageenges_AR
dc.publisherUniversidad Torcuato Di Tellaes_AR
dc.relation.ispartofWorking Papers (ISSN: 0327-9588)es_AR
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_AR
dc.subjectGame Theoryes_AR
dc.subjectTeoría de Juegoses_AR
dc.subjectAnálisis matemáticoes_AR
dc.subjectMathematic analysises_AR
dc.subjectFederalismo Fiscales_AR
dc.subjectFiscal Federalismes_AR
dc.subjectHacienda Públicaes_AR
dc.subjectPublic Statees_AR
dc.titleIntergovernmental transfers and public sector expenditures : a game theoretic approaches_AR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes_AR
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_AR


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