Intergovernmental transfers and public sector expenditures : a game theoretic approach
Metadatos:
Mostrar el registro completo del ítemAutor/es:
Sanguinetti, Pablo
Fecha:
1994Resumen
The purpose of this paper is to present a simple theoretical
framework that captures this coordination problem and its
implications in terms of public finances. The framework adopts a
game-theoretic point of view to investigate the consequences of
different modes of interaction between Federal and Provincial
jurisdictions for the determination of the overall public sector
expenditure and taxes. In this sense, the exercise offers another perspective through which the old question regarding the forces
behind the observed growth of the public sector can be looked at1 .
More specifically, the types of questions we deal with can be
stated in the following way: Does the institutional framework which
regulates the fiscal relationship among -different government
jurisdictions matter in terms of the overall level of public sector
expenditure and taxes? Do intergovernmental grants and
decentralization of expenditure decisions imply inefficiencies in
the provision of public goods, at both the central and provincial
levels?