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dc.rights.licensehttp://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=eses_AR
dc.contributor.authorClerici, Paulaes_AR
dc.contributor.authorDemeco, Lucíaes_AR
dc.contributor.authorGaleano, Francoes_AR
dc.contributor.authorNegri, Juanes_AR
dc.date.accessioned2023-11-27T22:52:05Z
dc.date.available2023-11-27T22:52:05Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/12160
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12820
dc.description.abstractIn federal presidential democracies, discretionary transfers are often mentioned as a tool used by the national executive to build and strengthen subnational support, typically governors. Funds to local mayors, however, have been much less studied. With original data, in this study we analyze the distribution of a particular discretionary transfer (ATN) to the Argentine municipalities during two periods: 1997–2000 and 2016–2019. We show that the main driver for transfers is the mayor's political alignment. Indeed, the president is more likely to reward loyal mayors, but especially when both the latter and the President oppose the provincial governor. By this token, we highlight a nested political game, in which the President considers the loyalty of both mayors and governors combined to decide when to reward (or when not to reward) municipalities. Furthermore, we find that the Executive provides aid to smaller municipalities to circumvent the possibility of funding mayors from larger cities who may pose a threat as political rivals in the future. Since this pattern is more evident in localities with aligned mayors, we can infer that the President's strategy is aimed at preventing future challengers from within their own coalition.es_AR
dc.format.extent20p.es_AR
dc.format.mediumapplication/pdfes_AR
dc.languageenges_AR
dc.publisherGovernance: An international Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutionses_AR
dc.publisherWileyes_AR
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccesses_AR
dc.subjectCiencia Políticaes_AR
dc.subjectPolitical Sciencees_AR
dc.titleMudding the playing field. Fiscal contributions to municipalities as a political constructiones_AR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_AR
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_AR


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