Show simple item record

dc.rights.licensehttp://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=eses_AR
dc.contributor.authorLevy Yeyati, Eduardoes_AR
dc.contributor.authorBroda, Cristianes_AR
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-30T21:04:10Z
dc.date.available2018-03-30T21:04:10Z
dc.date.issued2003-02
dc.identifier.urihttp://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/utdt/10760
dc.description.abstractThis paper explores sources of deposit dollarization unrelated to standard moral hazard arguments. We develop a model in which banks choose the optimal currency composition of their liabilities. We argue that the equal treatment of peso and dollar claims in the event of bank default can induce banks to attract dollar deposits above the socially desirable level. The distortion arises because dollar deposits are the only source of default risk in the model, but dollar depositors share the burden of the default with peso depositors. The incentive to dollarize is reinforced by common banking system safety nets such as deposit and bank insurance. Our findings suggest that regulators in bi-currency economies would potentially benefit by departing from the currency-blind benchmark and di.erentiating among currencies in a way that prevents undesirable currency mismatches.es_AR
dc.description.sponsorshipPara cualquier uso del contenido del presente documento debe ponerse en contacto con el autor.es_AR
dc.format.extent33 p.es_AR
dc.format.mediumapplication/pdfes_AR
dc.languageenges_AR
dc.publisherUniversidad Torcuato Di Tella. Escuela de Negocios. Centro de Investigaciones en Finanzas (CIF)es_AR
dc.relation.ispartofCentro de Investigaciones Financieras (CIF). Documentos de trabajo 01/2003
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccesses_AR
dc.subjectTipo de cambioes_AR
dc.subjectAnálisis financieroes_AR
dc.subjectPolítica monetariaes_AR
dc.titleEndogenous deposit dollarizationes_AR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.subject.keywordDolarización de la economíaes_AR
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersiones_AR


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record