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dc.rights.licensehttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/ar/es_AR
dc.contributor.authorKienzle, Bertrames_AR
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-22T20:19:51Z
dc.date.available2024-08-22T20:19:51Z
dc.date.issued1998-04
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/12979
dc.description.abstractEverything in nature works either according to laws or according to the representation of laws. In the first case the effect is made to happen, independently of will; it pertains to the context of natural causality. In the second case the effect occurs if and only if the cause wants it to happen; it pertains to the context of causality from freedom. In this context the laws by which one lets oneself be determined to act are self-chosen so that one acts sua sponte. There are two versions of this kind of spontaneity: either one lets oneself be determined to act by a moral law or by something else. Acts which are cases of causality from positive freedom are derived from a moral law. Every other act could be called a causal act from natural causality, if this weren't highly misleading. For if every act is a result of freedom, so is an act which is performed because we let ourselves be determined by sensory stimuli. Therefore, classifying this kind of act as an act from natural causality would be as misleading as the case appears to be clear: Causality from freedom does not occur because what one does is derived from~~ practical law, but because one lets oneself be determined to act.es_AR
dc.description.sponsorshipEste Documento forma parte de la serie Working Papers (ISSN 0327-9588), publicada por la Universidad Torcuato Di Tella entre 1993 y 2001es_AR
dc.format.extent16 p.es_AR
dc.format.mediumapplication/pdfes_AR
dc.languageenges_AR
dc.publisherUniversidad Torcuato Di Tellaes_AR
dc.relation.ispartofWorking Papers (ISSN: 0327-9588)es_AR
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_AR
dc.subjectFilosofía del Derechoes_AR
dc.subjectPhilosophy of lawes_AR
dc.subjectNatural causalityes_AR
dc.titleA kantian conception of causality from Freedomes_AR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperes_AR
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_AR


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