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dc.rights.licensehttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=eses_AR
dc.contributor.authorPincione, Guidoes_AR
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-21T15:08:12Z
dc.date.available2018-06-21T15:08:12Z
dc.date.issued2003-06
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/11004
dc.description.abstractGaus’ paper argues that social coordination is legitimate only if it satisfies the following two requirements: (a) there should be no Pareto-superior outcomes, and (b) “the authority of law derives from its role in improving everyone’s lot” (p. 9, Gaus’ emphasis). The former requirement may be thought to warrant legal activism whenever this leads to Pareto optimal equilibria. But this inference would be a mistake, since the costs of moving to one such equilibrium may be greater than the benefits accruing from being in it.es_AR
dc.format.extent4 p.es_AR
dc.format.mediumapplication/pdfes_AR
dc.languageenges_AR
dc.publisherUniversidad Torcuato Di Tella. Escuela de Derechoes_AR
dc.relationComentario a Gaus, Gerald F. (2003). "Waldron y el juego de la coordinación jurídica" disponible en: https://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/6284
dc.relation.ispartofRevista Argentina de Teoría Jurídica. Vol. 4, n. 2, (jun. 2003). ISSN: 1851-6844es_AR
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccesses_AR
dc.subjectDemocraciaes_AR
dc.subjectGobiernoes_AR
dc.titleGaus on legal coordinationes_AR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_AR
dc.subject.keywordJuegos de coordinación directaes_AR
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_AR


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