Show simple item record

dc.rights.licensehttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/?language=eses_AR
dc.contributor.authorPincione, Guidoes_AR
dc.date.accessioned2018-06-20T17:57:28Z
dc.date.available2018-06-20T17:57:28Z
dc.date.issued2001-11
dc.identifier.urihttps://repositorio.utdt.edu/handle/20.500.13098/11003
dc.description.abstractI shall argue that constitutional documents (such as the bill of rights) are largely ineffective in fostering liberal freedoms. These primarily depend on main political groups reaching an equilibrium favorable to liberal values. I use here the game-theoretical concept of “equilibrium,” which, roughly, points to a situation where interacting individuals have an incentive to keep behaving as they do. Equilibrium on liberal values, I shall also argue, is in turn the result of factors exogenous to the incentive structure that constitutional rules impose on political actors. The procedural rules of a constitution, rather than its bill of rights, play a central role in promoting liberal freedoms once some such equilibrium is already in place. Or so I shall try to show. Some episodes in Argentine constitutional history will serve to illustrate these theses.es_AR
dc.format.extent10 p.es_AR
dc.format.mediumapplication/pdfes_AR
dc.languageenges_AR
dc.publisherUniversidad Torcuato Di Tella. Escuela de Derechoes_AR
dc.relation.ispartofRevista Argentina de Teoría Jurídica. Vol. 3, n. 1, (nov. 2001). ISSN: 1851-684Xes_AR
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccesses_AR
dc.subjectArgentina. Constitución de la Naciónes_AR
dc.subjectLiberalismoes_AR
dc.subjectDemocraciaes_AR
dc.titleConstitutional government and liberal freedoms : lessons from Argentinaes_AR
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_AR
dc.type.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_AR


Files in this item

Thumbnail

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record