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ARTICLE

Crafting Policies Together: Citizen Preferences After Crisis

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Abstract

Do citizens prefer national policies that are designed collaboratively over those produced by national government alone? The question is relevant, especially in Latin America, where citizens are sceptical of government's capacity to address complex problems. In this article, we hypothesize that collaboratively crafted policies will be preferred over those produced by government alone in Argentina and Chile. We design conjoint experiments that ask respondents to choose among three pairs of policies, each of which varies randomly in terms of whether and with whom the government collaborates. We find that citizens in both countries tend to prefer collaboratively produced policies. This is especially the case when citizens have higher levels of trust in the actors with whom the national government collaborates. One important insight of our study is that, despite the costs of collaborative approaches to policymaking, citizen preferences for it could incentivize national governments to invest more resources in collaborative governance.

Keywords: collaborative policy design; conjoint experiment; public opinion; behaviour; public trust

Do citizens prefer policies that the government has designed in collaboration with other stakeholders? Recent scholarship has found that collaborative governance may be more effective than government-only models of policymaking at addressing 'wicked' problems, or problems that are 'dynamic and complex, with no clear definition and no obvious solution' and that 'involve multiple stakeholders in multiple organizations across multiple jurisdictions' (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015: 7). By working with, for example, local political leaders, civil society organizations and/or private-sector firms, national governments may harness additional resources, expertise and experience that

can help forge more responsive policies (Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; Scott 2015; Stoker 2006).

Citizen support for collaboratively designed policy will be vital for sustaining this approach to governance. There are multiple reasons for this. For one, ‘wicked’ policy problems, such as immigration, climate change, illicit trafficking and global pandemics, are not going away. Additionally, governments *qua* policymakers face increasing pressures to innovate (Ansell and Torfing 2021) and to ‘democratize’ policy governance (Heo 2022).

Collaborative governance may be more effective than traditional governance models; in practice, however, collaborative governance is not easy. It requires extensive buy-in in terms of time, energy and resources. Governments may be too short-lived and short-sighted to earnestly engage in collaborative policymaking. Moreover, the benefits of collaboration may be too diffuse – the government may not reap the benefits of a policy that was designed in collaboration with other actors. Finally, power asymmetries among actors can inhibit effective collaboration (Mancilla García and Bodin 2019). These barriers to collaborative governance are especially prominent in regions like Latin America (Cyr et al. *forthcoming*).

Policymakers, therefore, face a conundrum. A collaborative governance model may design policies that are better poised to address the myriad complex problems that governments face today. But the costs of collaboration may be perceived as too high. If citizens prefer collaboratively designed policy, it may be possible to mitigate these costs and incentivize actors to take collaboration more seriously.

We know very little about how citizens perceive collaboratively designed policies (Cain et al. 2021: 901). This article seeks to fill this gap. It tests whether citizens prefer collaboratively designed policies compared to policies created by government alone. It also takes initial steps to theorize the variations in citizen support for collaborative policy design. In focusing on how citizens comparatively perceive collaboration, we answer Ellen Rogers and Edward Weber’s (2010) call to think harder about the impact of collaborative governance. We go beyond the specific products of objective collaborative practices to measure whether citizens might actually prefer them – a specific outcome that is itself crucial for incentivizing further collaborative governance.

To measure perceptions of collaboratively designed policies, and specifically whether citizens prefer them to policies that have been created by government alone, we run a set of conjoint experiments with individuals in Argentina and Chile, asking them to rank and rate an education policy, a health policy and a policy to mitigate violence against women. Participants are exposed to different descriptions of those policies, which vary randomly in terms of whether and with whom the national government collaborates. Respondents must then rank and rate each policy pair. We therefore can measure whether and by how much individuals in each country will be more likely to prefer a policy designed in collaboration with non-national government stakeholders.

As far as we know, our article offers first-of-its-kind data on citizens’ relative perceptions of collaborative governance in Latin America – specifically, whether they prefer collaborative policy designs or government-only designs. We choose to focus on Latin American countries because in this region government institutions on their own tend

to inspire low confidence (Ardanez et al. 2023). Moreover, Latin America tends to be disproportionately vulnerable to the kinds of wicked problems that collaborative governance models are well poised to address (Blofield et al. 2020). The inability of Latin America governments to address complex policy challenges has led to at times extended social and political crises (Somma et al. 2021). Consequently, collaborative policy design and implementation can be particularly impactful in the region (Cyr et al. [forthcoming](#)). Understanding how citizens perceive collaboratively designed policy is, therefore, especially important.

We argue that, in general, respondents in both countries will tend to prefer policies designed collaboratively. Citizens will prefer collaboratively designed policies because their trust in government alone is quite low. By contrast, non-national government political actors, including local government officials, civil society and the private sector, tend to elicit higher levels of trust. By involving these other, more trusted actors in policy design, the overall evaluation of those policies will improve.

In what follows, we provide a brief overview of the literature from which our hypotheses are derived. We then explain our research design, before reporting and analysing the results of the conjoint experiments. We find that, on balance, collaboratively produced policies are preferred slightly over government-produced policies in Argentina and Chile. We also find that citizens prefer some combinations of collaboration over others. In particular, citizens seem to most consistently prefer policies that are the result of collaboration between national and local government. Support for collaboration with other stakeholders, including the private sector or civil society, is more unstable and driven by other factors, such as ideology. Despite these nuances, we provide initial evidence that citizens prefer collaborative governance models in Latin America – a fact that could help to incentivize greater investment into this type of policymaking.

Preferences for collaborative policy design

Extensive research has shown that citizen support for policy impacts the policy process. Citizen support can increase the likelihood that a policy will be implemented (Page and Shapiro 1983). A lack of support, by contrast, can lead to innovation and change (Ferretti et al. 2019). Politicians are especially responsive to the policy preferences of specific groups, including their supporters (Barberá et al. 2019) and higher-income constituents (Persson and Sundell 2024). Citizen support can also be quite complex and nuanced (Stoutenborough et al. 2014). Their views on different policy options can vary extensively (O'Connor et al. 2002).

Just as citizen support can help determine policy content, it may also be crucial for shaping *who* is involved in policy design. Collaborative governance (CG) is ‘a collective decision-making process based on more or less institutionalized interactions between two or more actors that aims to establish common ground for joint problem solving and value creation’ (Douglas et al. 2020: 498).¹ Collaborative governance differs from polycentric governance. The latter recognizes that decision-making in governance is complex and involves multiple, (semi-)autonomous actors/organizations working in cooperation but also in competition (Carlisle and Gruby 2019: 928).

Collaborative governance posits that deeper engagement among actors is required to address complex policy problems (Emerson 2018). Unlike network governance, which emphasizes the process by which different stakeholders address a policy problem (see e.g. Provan and Kenis 2008), CG is problem focused and oriented towards how collaboration yields policies that are different from those produced by any single actor. Collaborative governance can reasonably be juxtaposed with government-only designed policy when it comes to addressing a particular problem.

Indeed, public policy scholars have suggested that collaborative governance can be a more effective approach to creating policies that address ‘wicked’ problems (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015), because no single public or private actor – including the national government itself (Abers and Keck 2009) – can effectively address complex problems on their own (Ansell and Gash 2008; Emerson and Nabatchi 2015; Huxham and Vangen 2013). The COVID-19 pandemic, for example, was a concern for public health, education, the economy and several other policy areas. By pooling the knowledge, resources and experiences of actors from the public and private spheres, collaboratively designed policies can better address complex problems (Bryson et al. 2006: 44). When carried out successfully, CG can lead to higher-quality, more transparent, and more legitimate policies (Ansell and Gash 2008; Johnston et al. 2021). Given these outcomes, CG has been viewed as inclusive, deliberative and, therefore, democratic.²

To be sure, the actual effectiveness of CG remains largely speculative. We lack the capacity to know if CG works, since the ‘empirical literature still struggles to produce robust generalizations and cumulative knowledge that link contextual, situational and institutional design factors to processes and outcomes’ (Douglas et al. 2020: 495). Still, governments and policymakers are increasingly turning to CG in response to growing frustration with top-down policy design processes. For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), together with the Andean Development Bank (CAF in Spanish), promotes collaborative governance as one way for national governments to achieve better development outcomes in Latin America and the Caribbean.³ The heads of several multilateral development banks recently committed to promoting collaboration in their efforts to address multifaceted crises.⁴ These trends suggest that collaborative governance is here to stay.

Do citizens prefer collaboratively designed policies over those crafted via more conventional (read: government-only) policymaking processes? A wealth of literature explains why citizens tend to support different types of (traditionally produced) policies. Policy content matters (Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Burgoon et al. 2022; Huber and Wicki 2021), as do a series of citizen-level traits, including ideological positioning and support for the government (e.g. Huber and Wicki 2021); proximity to the policy at hand (Bechtel et al. 2019); knowledge about the policy (Rhodes et al. 2014); and level of altruism more generally (Bechtel et al. 2019).

Understanding why citizens might prefer collaboratively designed policy involves considering an additional factor: governments created the policy in conjunction with other actors. Might the other actors’ participation impact citizen support? The answer is not given. Citizens may reject policies designed in collaboration with actors outside




Figure 1. Levels of Citizen Trust in Latin America (2020)
 Sources: Latinobarómetro (2020); Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP 2021).

of national government. There are clear concerns about transparency and accountability. Collaborative governance includes actors who are not publicly vetted in an election (see e.g. Norris 2011). Concerns that certain groups disproportionately influence policy design can compel citizens to view collaboration with suspicion and/or mistrust (Nabatchi 2010). Citizens in the United States, for example, viewed collaboration with organized groups negatively (Cain et al. 2021).

Despite these concerns about the non-democratic nature of collaborative policy design, it is nevertheless the case that contextual features are likely to shape how citizens perceive collaboratively designed policy. In Bolivia, for example, where social movements have used the politics of the street to pressure the government (Valdivia Rivera 2021), citizens may be more supportive of policies designed in collaboration with social movements. Despite the importance of context, the great majority of work on CG has occurred in the Global North, especially the United States (see Koontz and Thomas 2006 for an overview). We know much less about how collaborative governance operates in regions like Latin America, including whether citizens might prefer collaboratively designed policy.⁵

We suspect that, despite identified concerns about transparency, accountability and the undue influence of unelected actors in policymaking, citizens in countries like Argentina and Chile will nonetheless prefer policies designed in collaboration over those designed by government alone. One key driver of this preference is the fact that national political institutions on their own tend to inspire very low levels of confidence.

Take, for example, the presidency, Congress and political parties – three institutions that participate in national policymaking (Figure 1). In 2020, only 32% of citizens in Latin America expressed a lot (14.1%) or some (17%) trust in the presidency; 65.5%, by

contrast, had little (25.7%) or no (39.9%) trust. Regarding Congress, 19.7% of citizens in the region had a lot (5.0%) or some (14.7%) trust, while 76.1% had little (34.1%) or no (42.0%) trust. Finally, 13.5% had a lot (2.9%) or some (10.3%) trust in political parties, and 84% had little (28.9%) or no (55.1%) trust (Latinobarómetro 2020). Large majorities of citizens have little to no trust in several national policymaking institutions.

Non-state and local actors, by contrast, are more trustworthy, and far fewer citizens express little or no trust in these groups. Using the same 2020 Latinobarómetro (2020) survey, we find that 38.2% of Latin American citizens have a lot (11.0%) or some (27.2%) trust in NGOs, while 49.3% had little (30.2%) to no trust (19.1%) in these groups. There was limited data on citizen trust in the private sector, and so we use trust in banks as a proxy. Here, 41.9% had a lot (12.6%) or some (29.3%) trust in banks, while 54.6% had little (33.5%) to no trust (21.1%). While no question on trust in local government was included in the 2020 Latinobarómetro (2020) survey, a similar question asked in the same Latin American countries in the 2021 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP 2021) survey reveals that, on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 denotes no trust and 7 denotes a lot of trust, 43.3% of citizens responded with 1, 2 or 3, while 42.9% responded with 5, 6 or 7, suggesting that nearly as many citizens have some or a lot of trust in local government as does not.

Overall, then, Latin American national government institutions elicit low levels of trust. At the same time, they have historically been perceived as highly corrupt (Canache and Allison 2005). Non-national-government actors, by contrast, elicit higher levels of trust. If low levels of trust can negatively impact support for government actions and policies (Agle 2020; Alessandro et al. 2021), it follows that, in countries where large majorities of the population do not trust national government, collaboration may actually be less risky when it comes to governance accountability. Deeply distrusted policymakers have little to lose when it comes to collaborating with others – especially when these ‘others’ elicit higher levels of trust. This leads to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *People will prefer collaboratively designed policies over those produced by government alone.*

Non-state and local actors have influence across a wide variety of policy domains in Latin America, including in education, health and policies against gender-based violence (Birn et al. 2016; Chambers-Ju 2021; Fahlberg et al. 2023). A focus on these three policy sectors is theoretically and empirically appropriate. For one, collaborative governance models have been used to address education (Eldridge et al. 2018), health (Emerson 2018) and anti-gender-based violence (Raftery et al. 2022). It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that collaborative governance might also be used to design these particular policies. Additionally, we specifically chose policies that were, broadly speaking, largely neutral or, at the very least, not highly polarizing. An experiment that measures support (or not) for appropriately equipped hospitals, tutors in public schools and safe spaces for victims of violence is less likely to capture and subsume preferences based on higher-order religious or social values, as might be the case with abortion policy,

or highly politicized issues, such as climate change. It is therefore useful to understand whether preferences for collaboratively designed policies obtain across different sectors. We hypothesize it will:

Hypothesis 2: *People's preference for collaboratively designed policies over government-only produced policies will be consistent across different policy domains.*

Different groups elicit different levels of trust. In [Figure 1](#), more citizens had less trust in banks and NGOs than in local government.⁶ Citizens should not *equally* value collaboration with *all* types of actors. Individual preferences when it comes to collaborative policy design are likely to correspond with other, individually held political and policy preferences (Bechtel and Scheve 2013; Burgoon et al. 2022; Huber and Wicki 2021; Rhodes et al. 2014).

Our last set of hypotheses test these claims. Citizens who express more trust in one type of non-national-government actor are likely to prefer policies designed in collaboration with that actor. This means that citizens with higher levels of trust in the private sector will prefer collaboration with the private sector over collaboration with civil society or the local government. The same will be likely, we posit, for citizens who express higher levels of trust in civil society and local government.⁷

Hypothesis 3a: *People who exhibit more trust in the private sector are more likely to prefer policies that have been designed in collaboration with the private sector than with civil society organizations or local government.*

Hypothesis 3b: *People who exhibit more trust in social movements are more likely to prefer policies that have been designed in collaboration with civil society organizations than with the private sector or local government.*

Hypothesis 3c: *People who exhibit more trust in local government are more likely to prefer policies that have been designed in collaboration with local government than with the private sector or civil society organizations.*

Despite their simplicity, these hypotheses are not obvious. Even if citizens find certain actors to be more trustworthy, their role in policy creation may not be welcome. Non-state actors are unelected. Few mechanisms exist to hold them accountable (Halachmi 2014; Nabatchi 2010). Additionally, early research suggests that citizens can reject collaborative policy design with certain stakeholders (Cain et al. 2021).⁸ Collaborative governance can exacerbate the accountability gap that plagues government, especially in newer democracies (Mayer et al. 2005).

Finally, policymakers may exploit the complexity of collaborative governance models to shift policy failure to other actors (Bache et al. 2015). Citizens, for their part, may perceive that collaboratively designed policies are created to benefit only one group or sector (Huber and Wicki 2021). In both cases, CG contributes to the politicization of governance, a phenomenon that is problematic in Latin America, where public administration is 'characterized by patronage appointments, patrimonialism, and a weak capacity to execute public policies' (Polga-Hecimovich 2019).

Research design

We designed conjoint experiments to measure citizen preferences regarding different types of policies – some designed by the government alone, others designed in collaboration with different actors – in Argentina and Chile. These two countries exhibit many of the structural problems that affect Latin America as a whole, including poverty and inequality. They have also had to endure different types of crises – hyperinflation in Argentina (Perelman 2024), extended social protests in the case of Chile (Somma et al. 2021) – that have complicated policymaking over the past years. Nevertheless, they both also have relatively high levels of democracy and state capacity (Varieties of Democracy Report, Papada et al. 2023). These shared traits make it reasonable to expect that both governments would be capable of proposing the policies included in the conjoint experiments we designed.

Additionally, both countries have fairly stable party systems (Piñeiro Rodríguez and Rosenblatt 2020) anchored by left and right options.⁹ In Argentina, at the time of data collection, the centre-left coalition, called Unión por la Patria (UxP) included the long-running Peronist party. The centre-right coalition, by contrast, was Juntos por el Cambio (JxC). In Chile, the right option was Partido Republicano (PRCH), and the left choice was the Frente Amplio (FA).¹⁰ Given the ideological distinctions between these two parties/coalitions, citizens are likely to have opinions about them – a feature of party politics that is far from common in the region (Kitschelt et al. 2010).

Finally, Argentina and Chile display interesting variations when it comes trust in different institutions and actors, especially vis-à-vis the regional average (see Table 1). For example, Argentines and Chileans have lower levels of trust in the presidency, Congress and political parties, when compared with the regional average. By contrast, Argentines and Chileans had a lot or some trust in NGOs, while fewer said they had a lot or some trust in banks. Argentines with a lot or some trust in local government nearly aligned with the regional average, whereas Chileans were slightly lower. These variations allow us to assess whether trust in non-national-government stakeholders plays a role in preferring collaboratively designed policies.

After Jens Hainmueller et al. (2014), conjoint experimental designs became a prominent method to assess: immigration preferences (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015), bureaucratic behaviour (Oliveros and Schuster 2018), corruption (Klasnja et al. 2021; Mares and Visconti 2020), vote choice (Franchino and Zucchini 2015; Kirkland and Coppock 2018) and perceived polarization in social media (Aruguete et al. 2023). Conjoint experiments provide treated individuals with two competing profiles – in our case, policies – with randomized traits. After exposure, the participants must select the profile they prefer or, in our case, the type of policy they prefer.

Our experiment adapts the traditional conjoint design to compare policy characteristics and evaluate levels of support for the different frame elements. We include three conjoint experiments, each of which presents two vignettes describing the same policy crafted in different ways. In typical conjoint survey experiments, the task is repeated multiple times, exposing a respondent to different combinations of attribute values (levels). In our case, each vignette pair addressed a different policy area, allowing us to test for preferences across policy sectors. Respondents evaluated two vignettes for three different policies: one providing tutors in all public schools; a second seeking

Table 1. Levels of Citizen Trust in Latin America (Average), Argentina, and Chile (%)

	Latin America (Av.)	Argentina	Chile
A lot or some trust in:			
Presidency	32.0	29.2	16.4
Congress	19.7	17.6	12.8
Political parties	13.5	11.0	7.5
NGOs	38.2	54.8	40.1
Banks	41.9	31.7	28.5
Local government	42.9	42.1	36.6
Little or no trust in:			
Presidency	65.5	66.8	80.5
Congress	76.1	76.7	84.8
Political parties	84.0	85.0	91.3
NGOs	49.3	34.4	32.6
Banks	54.6	61.5	69.1
Local government	43.3	44.6	47.4

Source: Latinobarómetro (2020); data on local government came from LAPOP (2021).

to improve medical equipment supply in public hospitals; and a third providing safehouses for women victims of domestic violence.¹¹

These exact policies were not contemplated in Chile or Argentina. However, all three were relevant in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, when data collection occurred. In each country, concerns about children being left behind academically in the public school system, under-equipped hospitals and increasingly vulnerable victims of domestic violence were salient during the pandemic. Therefore, policies on each of these issues might emerge. The presentation of each pair of vignettes was randomly assigned to avoid ordering effects.

Each vignette pair varied randomly in three ways. First, they varied in terms of whether the government collaborated or not. This first attribute had four levels in each country (no collaboration – just the national government; collaboration with civil society; collaboration with the private sector; collaboration with municipal/local government). For operationalization purposes, we treated each level dichotomously. Therefore, we tested preferences over a policy designed by *Government-only* (1) or in collaboration with other actors (0). We tested preferences over a policy designed by national government in collaboration with NGOs (*Organizations*), versus all other options (i.e. by government alone or in collaboration with companies or municipalities). The same occurred with *Companies* and *Municipalities* (collaboration with a certain actor versus others or no collaboration at all).¹²

Second, the vignettes varied in terms of the party in power when the policy was (hypothetically) designed. In Argentina, either the centre-right Juntos por el Cambio or the centre-left Unión por la Patria was in power. In Chile, it was the radical right Partido Republicano or the left Frente Amplio option. Third, they varied in terms of

Table 2. Conjoint Experiment, Policy Attributes

Attributes	Levels
Government party	Juntos por el Cambio (Argentina)/Partido Republicano (Chile)
Collaboration	Unión por la Patria (Argentina)/Frente Amplio (Chile)
	No collaboration (just the national government)
	Collaboration with civil society
	Collaboration with the private sector
Policy cost	Collaboration with municipal government
	0.5% national budget
	1% national budget

cost. This third attribute had two levels (0.5% or 1% of the national budget in each country).

For each policy, participants received two vignettes, which varied the three attributes in [Table 2](#) randomly, uniformly (i.e. with equal probabilities for all levels in a given attribute), and independently from one another. [Figure 2](#) presents examples of the rotation of vignettes in the Argentine survey (the only difference with the Chilean survey is that the government parties rotated between Partido Republicano and Frente Amplio).¹³

The three conjoint designs were included in nationally representative surveys that were carried out online in June and July 2023, through panels conducted by Netquest. Each included approximately 2,500 respondents. The entire sample was profiled with demographic filters applied for gender and geographic distribution. The number of participants met national representative samples for each country and held enough statistical power for the different experimental treatments in the survey.¹⁴

Regarding the number of attributes in a conjoint experiment, there is a trade-off between masking and satisficing (Kirk et al. 2018). With too few attributes, respondents may associate those provided with others omitted from the design. To avoid this, we include the additional attributes of party in power and policy cost in our vignettes. Too many attributes in a conjoint design can increase the cognitive burden for participants (Krosnick 1999). We sought to mitigate this burden, because our vignettes contained a substantial amount of text.

After reading each of the policy pairs, participants were asked to identify the one they preferred (see [Table 3](#) below), allowing us to directly test our hypotheses. We also introduced a second measure of *support* for the individual policies in each pair. Participants rated each policy description on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 denoted ‘no support’ for a particular policy, and 10 denoted ‘total support’ for that policy. This second measure added nuance to the respondent’s expressed preference. One may prefer one policy over the other but still exhibit quite low levels of support altogether. For ease of presentation below, we only present models for the question on policy preference, since these directly address the hypotheses.

To test Hypothesis 2, we included a variable with three categories to test preferences on collaboration in the design of the different types of policies (education – our

Tutors for public schools

Policy 1

Imagine that, following the next presidential election, Juntos por el Cambio assumes control of the national government and announces a new national policy wherein tutoring services will be provided in all public schools across the country. The cost of the program is projected to amount to 1% of the national budget.

Policy 2

Imagine that, following the next presidential election, Unión por la Patria assumes control of the national government and, in collaboration with municipal governments, announces a new national policy wherein tutoring services will be provided in all public schools across the country. The cost of the program is projected to amount to 0.5% of the national budget.

Equipment in public hospitals

Policy 1

Imagine that, following the next presidential election, Unión por la Patria assumes control of the national government and, in collaboration with the private sector, announces a new national policy for updating the medical equipment in all public hospitals in the country. The cost of the program is projected to amount to 1% of the national budget.

Policy 2

Imagine that, following the next presidential election, Unión por la Patria assumes control of the national government and, in collaboration with civil society organizations, announces a new national policy for updating the medical equipment in all public hospitals in the country. The cost of the program is projected to amount to 0.5% of the national budget.

Safehouses for women

Policy 1

Imagine that, following the next presidential election, Unión por la Patria assumes control of the national government and announces a new national policy to inaugurate a series of womens' shelters throughout the country, dedicated to women who have been victims of violence. The cost of the program is projected to amount to 1% of the national budget.

Policy 2

Imagine that, following the next presidential election, Juntos por el Cambio assumes control of the national government and, in collaboration with the private sector, announces a new national policy to inaugurate a series of womens' shelters throughout the country, dedicated to women who have been victims of violence. The cost of the program is projected to amount to 1% of the national budget.

Figure 2. Conjoint Experiment, Examples of Rotations in the Argentine Survey

Notes: Survey respondents were shown two descriptions for each policy. These descriptions randomly portrayed different attributes: Four different combinations of collaborators (including no collaboration), with randomization that ensured the same collaboration was not shown in both descriptions of the same policy; two different government parties; and two different projected policy costs. In the Chilean survey, the government parties randomly rotated between Partido Republicano and Frente Amplio; in Argentina, between Frente de Todos, which today is known as Unión por la Patria, and Juntos por el Cambio.

Table 3. Questions Included after Each Pair of Vignettes

Q1: Which of the two policies do you prefer (Policy 1 or Policy 2)?
Q2: On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘no support at all’ and 10 means ‘total support’, how much do you support Policy 1?
Q3: On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means ‘no support at all’ and 10 means ‘total support’, how much do you support Policy 2?

model’s baseline – as well as health and anti-gender-based violence). This allowed us to examine whether preferences for collaboratively designed policies obtained across three policy domains. Finally, to test Hypotheses 3a–3c, we measured individual preferences for policies designed in collaboration with the private sector, civil society organizations or local government (here we exclude the *Government-only* dummy). These three actors collaborated with different Latin American governments in the design of policies to address the COVID-19 pandemic (Cyr et al. [forthcoming](#)). It is therefore reasonable to expect that they would collaborate with the national government on the policies included in the vignettes. We measured levels of trust in Congress, judges, police, political parties, social movements, the private sector, national government and local government using the following question, ‘On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 denotes “least trustworthy” and 7 denotes “most trustworthy”, how trustworthy do you think these institutions are?’ To avoid ordering effects, the institutions’ order was randomly assigned across respondents. Based on these results, we include the variables *Trust, Private Sector*; *Trust, Social Movements*; and *Trust, Local Government* in different estimations.

We also included controls for other individual-level traits that have been shown to impact citizen preferences for different policies. We included *age* (18–25; 26–35; 36–45; 46–55; 56–65; and older than 65); *gender* (baseline *woman*, including other genders different from man); *level of education* (ranging incomplete primary education to complete, postgraduate education); *subjective income* (ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest income); *self-reported ideology* (ranging from left to right on a scale of 1 to 7); *self-perception of skin colour* (ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 as the lightest); *political knowledge* (we ask how long the Senate term in each country is); and whether the respondent *works*, is *partisan*, has participated in *demonstrations* in the last year, has attended public school for elementary and secondary levels (*public elementary* and *public secondary*, respectively) and has ever received treatment at a *public hospital*. To control for order effects, we included a dummy indicating whether the vignette with the preferred policy was shown on the right side (*PolicySide*).

In half of the surveys, the three conjoint experiments were preceded by a battery of questions on participant attitudes towards government and democracy. In the other half, the same battery of questions came immediately after the conjoint experiments. We include a dummy variable named *treatment* that indicates the former with the value of 1 and 0 for the latter. We segmented some models to separately address intended vote in an eventual runoff between Juntos por el Cambio (JxC) and Unión por la Patria (UxP) in Argentina, and Partido Republicano (PRCH) and Frente Amplio (FA) in Chile.¹⁵

Below, we report logit models and marginal means to detect subgroup frame effects (Leeper et al. 2020). The estimated coefficient represents the difference in the likelihood of an attribute being selected (relative to the baseline) – that is, the marginal effect of one level relative to another. In Figure B in the Supplementary Material, we also present the plot for average marginal component effects (Hainmueller et al. 2014).

Results

Table 4 shows the results for Argentina. Model 3 considers Argentine respondents whose declared vote was for Juntos por el Cambio (JxC), while Model 4 considers those whose declared vote was for Unión por la Patria (UxP). All other models in Table 4 include all respondents.

Table 5 shows the results for Chile. Model 10 considers Chilean respondents whose declared vote was for Partido Republicano (PRCH), and Model 11 includes those who said they would vote for Frente Amplio (FA). All other models in Table 5 include all respondents. Descriptive statistics are available in Table A in the Supplementary Material, including control variables that, although calculated, were omitted from the tables.

Hypothesis 1 expresses our general expectation that respondents in both countries will prefer policies that were designed collaboratively over those designed by government alone. We find support for this argument. When respondents in each country had to choose between two policies, they were more likely to prefer the one designed collaboratively – 4% more likely in Argentina and 5% more likely in Chile.¹⁶ The *Government-only* dummy is negative and statistically significant across the models that consider all respondents in Tables 4 and 5. Figure 3 shows all coefficients based on Model 1 for Argentina and Model 8 for Chile. This preference obtains if we disaggregate by individuals whose intended vote was for the left (UxP in Argentina, Model 4, and FA in Chile, Model 11). By contrast, there is no statistically significant difference regarding the preferences of those who would vote for right options (JxC in Argentina, Model 3, and PRCH in Chile, Model 10).

Table 4 shows us that Argentines in general prefer collaboratively designed policy. Beyond this general outcome, however, patterns about preferences are harder to discern. For example, Argentines have a statistically significant preference *against* collaborations between the government and organizations, on one hand, and for government and companies, on the other. They also do not have clear preferences when it comes to policy cost.

In Chile, the results are slightly different. There is no statistically significant relationship between collaboration with organizations or companies, except with those whose intended vote is for the left coalition, Frente Amplio. These individuals prefer policies that are not designed in collaboration with companies. Chileans are also more likely to prefer policies that are slightly more expensive, representing 1% versus 0.5% of the national budget.

We included an additional attribute regarding which party was in government when the (hypothetical) policy was designed. Policies that were designed by the left coalition – UxP in Argentina and FA in Chile – were less likely to be preferred over those that were produced by the other, opposition party, JxC and PRCH, respectively.¹⁷

Table 4. Estimates of the Likelihood of Support for Collaboratively Produced Policies in Argentina

DV: support	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
	All	All	JxC voters	UxP voters	All	All	All
Government-only	-0.239*** (0.051)	-0.257** (0.079)	-0.118 (0.109)	-0.429** (0.152)			
Organizations	-0.135** (0.052)	-0.138** (0.052)	-0.053 (0.087)	-0.392*** (0.113)	-0.160** (0.054)	-0.110 (0.086)	-0.002 (0.053)
Companies	-0.132* (0.051)	-0.134* (0.051)	0.162+ (0.086)	-0.580*** (0.112)	-0.460*** (0.116)	-0.121 (0.052)	
Municipalities							-0.051 (0.092)
0.5%	-0.059 (0.036)	-0.057 (0.036)	-0.081 (0.062)	-0.125 (0.079)	-0.043 (0.044)	-0.053 (0.043)	-0.045 (0.043)
UxP	-0.394*** (0.036)		-1.371*** (0.071)	1.075*** (0.092)	-0.395*** (0.044)	-0.417*** (0.043)	-0.405*** (0.043)
Gender	0.018 (0.045)	0.0054 (0.051)	0.019 (0.076)	0.0115 (0.097)	-0.001 (0.053)	0.011 (0.052)	0.013 (0.053)
Health	0.043 (0.045)	0.035 (0.051)	-0.022 (0.076)	0.034 (0.097)	0.026 (0.053)	0.043 (0.052)	0.038 (0.052)
Treatment	-0.017 (0.037)	-0.014 (0.036)	0.013 (0.062)	-0.010 (0.080)	-0.005 (0.044)	-0.004 (0.043)	-0.003 (0.043)
PolicySide	-0.109** (0.036)	-0.108** (0.036)	-0.073 (0.062)	-0.2104** (0.079)	-0.130** (0.044)	-0.135** (0.043)	-0.116** (0.043)
Gender × Government-only		0.032 (0.103)					
Health × Government-only		0.014 (0.104)					
UxP × Government-only			-0.195 (0.146)	-0.028 (0.186)			
Trust, Private Sector					-0.025 (0.018)		
Trust, Social Movements						-0.000 (0.016)	
Trust, Local Government							-0.026 (0.016)
Companies × Trust, Private Sector					0.087** (0.029)		
Organizations × Trust, Social Movements						-0.008 (0.027)	
Municipalities × Trust, Local Government							0.067* (0.027)
Constant	0.476* (0.189)	0.263 (0.187)	1.022* (0.355)	0.201 (0.394)	0.782*** (0.226)	0.719* (0.228)	0.549* (0.224)
Observations	12210	12210	4764	2796	8548	8894	8836

Notes: Controls were calculated but omitted from the table. In models 1 to 6, collaboration with *municipalities* is omitted from the table. In model 7, collaboration with *companies* is omitted from the table. *Government-only* is excluded from the analysis in models 5 to 7. Education category is the baseline in *type of policy*. Standard errors in parentheses. + $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 5. Estimates of the Likelihood of Support for Collaboratively Produced Policies in Chile

DV: support	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
	All	All	Rep. voters	FA voters	All	All	All
Government-only	-0.225 ^{***} (0.050)	-0.240 ^{**} (0.076)	0.011 (0.106)	-0.433 ^{***} (0.128)			
Organizations	-0.048 (0.050)	-0.046 (0.050)	-0.050 (0.081)	-0.075 (0.095)	-0.0452 (0.051)	-0.124 (0.10)	-0.008 (0.051)
Companies	-0.044 (0.050)	-0.044 (0.050)	0.051 (0.081)	-0.230 [*] (0.096)	-0.280 ^{**} (0.101)	-0.050 (0.051)	
Municipalities							-0.100 (0.100)
0.5%	-0.103 ^{**} (0.035)	-0.102 ^{**} (0.035)	-0.093 (0.058)	-0.056 (0.067)	-0.061 (0.042)	-0.087 [*] (0.04)	-0.068 (0.042)
FA	-0.064 ⁺ (0.035)		-1.016 ^{***} (0.066)	1.201 ^{***} (0.078)	0.001 (0.042)	-0.056 (0.042)	-0.067 (0.042)
Gender	-0.012 (0.043)	-0.003 (0.050)	-0.047 (0.071)	-0.026 (0.082)	-0.008 (0.051)	-0.018 (0.051)	-0.002 (0.051)
Health	0.026 (0.043)	0.007 (0.050)	-0.002 (0.071)	0.011 (0.082)	0.007 (0.052)	-0.004 (0.051)	0.012 (0.051)
Treatment	0.003 (0.035)	0.003 (0.035)	0.009 (0.058)	0.049 (0.068)	0.031 (0.042)	0.035 (0.042)	0.035 (0.042)
PolicySide	-0.089 [*] (0.035)	-0.090 [*] (0.035)	-0.163 ^{**} (0.058)	-0.054 (0.067)	-0.100 [*] (0.042)	-0.099 [*] (0.042)	-0.101 [*] (0.042)
Gender × Government-only		-0.035 (0.101)					
Health × Government-only		0.081 (0.100)					
FA × Government-only			-0.418 ^{**} (0.138)	0.295 ⁺ (0.158)			
Trust, Private Sector					-0.005 (0.016)		
Trust, Social Movements						-0.004 (0.016)	
Trust, Local Government							-0.008 (0.016)
Companies × Trust, Private Sector					0.075 ^{**} (0.03)		
Organizations × Trust, Social Movements						0.027 (0.026)	
Municipalities × Trust, Local Government							0.049 ⁺ (0.027)
Constant	0.167 (0.183)	0.142 (0.183)	0.643 [*] (0.320)	-0.572 (0.353)	0.105 (0.219)	0.0661 (0.224)	0.052 (0.22)
Observations	12894	12894	5202	3918	9111	9187	9296

Notes: Controls were calculated but omitted from the table. In models 8 to 13, collaboration with *municipalities* is omitted from the table. In model 14, collaboration with *companies* is omitted from the table. *Government-only* is excluded from the analysis in models 8 to 11. Education category is the baseline in *type of policy*. Standard errors in parentheses. ⁺ $p < 0.10$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{***} $p < 0.001$.




Figure 3. Conjoint Experiment Results (Likelihood of Support)
 Note: Figure based on models 1 (Argentina) and 8 (Chile).

Notably, at the time of data collection, the president in each country was from the left coalition – Alberto Fernández (UxP) and Gabriel Boric (FA) – and both registered low levels of support. We randomly rotated the party in government in the conjoint experiment. Nevertheless, it may have been difficult for respondents to isolate their

evaluation of hypothetical policies from their (generally negative) evaluation of the current government.

To have a better sense of policy design preferences in each population, we follow (Leeper et al. 2020) recommendations and use marginal means to detect subgroup frame effects in our conjoint analysis. We disaggregate the population by vote intention – specifically, whether an individual said they would vote for the left (UxP or FA), the right (JxC or PRCH) or no one (blank) in a hypothetical runoff election. This filter acknowledges the likelihood that if a policy is designed by one's preferred party it may impact the evaluation of other aspects of the policy design. The marginal means are presented in Figure 4 and include point estimates and confidence intervals. The y-axis contains the attributes and levels from the conjoint. The marginal mean effect is the average probability of a policy being selected given an attribute level, which does not depend on the choice of base or reference level.

When we disaggregate our surveyed population by declared vote intention, we see more statistically significant variation in the stated preferences towards differently designed policies. In Chile, for example, all subgroups were more likely to prefer collaboratively produced policies over those produced by government alone. In Argentina, this preference was statistically significant for those who would vote blank and for those who said they would vote for the centre-right JxC (see Figure 4).

Individuals whose declared vote was for right parties, that is, Juntos por el Cambio and Partido Republicano, tended to prefer policies that were created by their party of choice. They were also more likely to prefer collaboration with the private sector (*Companies*) versus civil society or local government (*Municipalities*). The opposite, however, was preferred by declared voters for the (centre-)left Unión por la Patria and Frente Amplio, who were more likely to prefer collaboration with *Municipalities* over that with *Companies* or civil society *Organizations*. Finally, Figure 4 shows that, generally speaking, more expensive policies are very slightly preferred over those that are less costly (1% versus 0.5% of the national budget). This relationship holds for all subgroups except blank voters in Argentina, for whom the difference is not statistically significant.

Hypothesis 2 posits that the preferences for collaboratively produced policies will be consistent across distinct policy areas. In both countries, in all three policy areas (health, education, violence against women), collaboratively produced policies were more likely to be preferred than those that were created exclusively by government, as Figure 5 shows. However, education policy in Argentina and gender policy in Chile exhibited the smallest differences between collaboratively produced preferences and those generated solely by the government, averaging around three percentage points, while the largest differences were in health and gender policies in Argentina, and education in Chile, with an average of four and six percentage points, respectively.

Our hypotheses suggest that citizens will prefer policies produced in collaboration with other actors when governmental actors on their own elicit low levels of trust. These non-national-government actors may be perceived as more trustworthy. Hypotheses 3a–3c allow us to test this claim more directly. Specifically, we test the notion that citizens who exhibit higher levels of trust in one actor (e.g. private sector) versus other actors with whom the government might collaborate (e.g. social movements or local




Figure 4. Marginal Means

Note: Prepared by the authors with package *cjoint* in R.





Figure 5. Conjoint Experiment Results (Likelihood of Support)

Note: Figure based on models 2 (Argentina) and 9 (Chile).




Figure 6. Likelihood of Support to Policies Produced in Collaboration with Companies/Municipalities According to the Confidence in the Private Sector/Local Government
 Note: Based on models 5 and 7 (Argentina), and 12 and 14 (Chile).

government) will tend to prefer policies that were produced collaboratively with that trusted actor.

We find evidence for many of these claims. Models 5 to 7 (Argentina) and 12 to 14 (Chile) exclude the dummy variable *Government-only*, permitting us to focus on preferences for collaboration with different actors. For example, we find that, as trust in the private sector grows, policies designed in collaboration with *Companies* (Hypothesis 3a) were more likely to be supported than policies designed with civil society *Organizations* or *Municipalities* (see the upper images in Figure 6). The predicted probability of support increases by about 10 percentage points when we consider respondents with the lowest and the highest levels of confidence in the private sector.

Hypothesis 3c posits that citizens who expressed higher trust in local government will tend to prefer policies produced in collaboration with *Municipalities* compared to those produced with *Companies* or civil society *Organizations*. The lower images in Figure 6 demonstrate support for this hypothesis. In both countries, the predicted probability of support increases by around five percentage points when we compare respondents with the lowest levels of trust in the local government versus those with the highest.

Alternatively, we do not find support for Hypothesis 3b. Argentine and Chilean respondents with higher levels of trust in social movements were not more likely to prefer policies designed in collaboration with civil society (*Organizations*). We likely

conflated theoretically civil society organizations with social movements – a common but not necessarily justifiable decision, given recent work on the Global South (Daniel and Neubert 2019; see also Della Porta 2010). Evidence suggests that these two phenomena should be conceptually differentiated. Indeed, in Argentina, social movements tend to be associated with the centre-left, Peronist party, whereas civil society organizations, and NGOs in particular, tend to be associated with the centre-right (Sorj 2007). In Chile, they were fairly integrated into institutionalized politics following the first constitutional assembly (Rozas-Bugueño 2024).

Contextual particularities aside, it is important to understand these conceptual differentiations, so that future models can isolate the effect of the theoretically appropriate phenomenon rather than conflating them. Specifically, we follow Antje Daniel and Dieter Neubert (2019: 176) in recommending that future research use the term ‘civil society organization’ when the theoretical focus is on existing associations in the public sphere arena, and the term ‘social movement’ when the focus is on ‘mobilization and action’.

Finally, the order effects control is negative and statistically significant in almost all the estimations. The vignette order of appearance had an effect on the likelihood of support: those viewed on the right side of the survey were less likely to be preferred than those on the left.¹⁸

A concluding discussion

What, then, seems to be the relationship between collaboratively designed policy and citizen support? Our findings offer initial support for the notion that citizens, in general, prefer policies that the national government crafts in collaboration with other actors. This was the case in Argentina and Chile, and we found support for these preferences across different policy areas, including education, health and gender-based violence. The probability of preferring collaboratively produced policies was, on average, five percentage points higher than compared with policies designed exclusively by government.

When we drill down and disaggregate from this broad, general finding, preferences become more nuanced. Take, for example, the question of with whom the national government collaborates. Citizens in both countries, with different degrees of significance, preferred policies designed in collaboration with municipal governments. The likelihood of preferring collaborations with civil society organizations and also the private sector was much more variable and often negative (that is, citizens tended to *not* prefer collaboration with these actors). At least in Argentina and Chile, then, the collaboration of local governments in national policy design may be a boon for policy support. Research shows that local governments elicit different levels of trust than national government. Additionally, the source of said trust is often different (Fitzgerald and Wolak 2016). Our findings may tap into a similar phenomenon. They also cohere with recent qualitative case-study work on collaborative responses to the COVID-19 pandemic which suggest that collaboration with local governments in Argentina and Chile, when it occurred, produced responsive policies (Cyr et al. [forthcoming](#)).

Partisanship also helps to distinguish preferences over collaboration in both countries. For example, individuals with intentions to vote for a particular party tended

to prefer policies designed by that party. Additionally, right-leaning voters were more likely to prefer policies designed in collaboration with the private sector. Left-leaning voters, by contrast, preferred policies designed in collaboration with municipal governments. These findings reinforce the conclusion that the in-group loyalty that partisanship tends to foster can be fundamentally important for collaborative processes (Liu 2024).

Preferences for collaboratively designed policy were also shaped by prior levels of trust. Citizens were more likely to prefer policies created in collaboration with actors they trusted more, including local government and especially the private sector. One implication may be that governments seeking to shore up support with constituents may benefit from designing policy with more trustworthy non-state and/or non-national actors – especially local government officials and the private sector (see also Bundi and Pattyn 2023).

Our finding that citizens tend to prefer collaboratively produced policies is not trivial. Ours is the first systematic testing of how citizens view collaborative governance in Latin America, a region that confronts several, overlapping challenges, including climate change (Araos et al. 2017), forced migration (Castles 2006) and global pandemics (Al-Ali 2020). Nevertheless, given weak state capacity and national governments that inspire low levels of trust, Latin American countries are likely to struggle to address the policy consequences of the wicked problems they disproportionately face. In short, Latin America could benefit greatly from adopting a more collaborative approach to governance (Cyr et al. *forthcoming*).

Nevertheless, and despite its theorized benefits, collaboration between state and non-state actors is difficult to achieve. Collaborative governance requires investment, time and, yes, trust from all parties involved. It is costly and unwieldy in practice (Lahat and Sher-Hadar 2020). Collaborative arrangements may lose steam over time, as stakeholders bow out or participate less (Heikkila and Gerlak 2016). Especially in countries like Argentina and Chile, which are vulnerable to economic, social and political crisis, collaboration may be difficult to achieve over time.

Given these obstacles, it is difficult to imagine that collaborative policy design could be feasible. Government actors tend to avoid risks and revert to ‘conventional interpretations of policy problems and solutions’ (Doberstein 2016: 823). Other stakeholders may need to be convinced of the value of collaborative governance (Hileman and Bodin 2019). Towards that end, our article offers a potent argument: Collaboratively produced policy is likely to be preferred by citizens.

This argument is strengthened by the fact that past research (Cyr et al. 2021) provides evidence that collaboratively designed policies are associated with better outcomes in Latin America. When national governments in the region devised COVID-19 policy responses in collaboration with other actors, the rates of contagion and mortality were, on average, lower than in those countries where governments did not collaborate. This was especially the case where national governments collaborated with local government and civil society organizations, two of the actors included in our study.

Popular support for collaborative policymaking may well be crucial for Latin American democracies. Regimes are transitioning away from democracies across the globe (Bermeo 2016; Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). If citizen perceptions about governance improve, the increasingly strained relationships between citizens and political

institutions may begin to reverse (Knutsen et al. 2024). Engaging other actors in policy design may help to rebuild that trust.

Certainly, we cannot know for sure that our initial findings in Argentina and Chile travel beyond these countries. Despite the numerous similarities observed across Latin American countries regarding low levels of institutional trust, we must exercise caution when attempting to generalize our results. We consider it important to test hypotheses in cases with variation in levels of trust and in real-life party in government. Future research, therefore, should continue to measure citizen preferences on collaborative governance in Latin America.

Supplementary material. The supplementary material for this article can be found at <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2025.10014>.

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Ethics statement. The research using human subjects has been approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of Maryland, no. 2054425-1.

Notes

1 We adopt a recent definition of collaborative governance, because we see it as a more realistic reflection of how collaborative governance works in practice, especially in newer democracies where formalized ties between state and non-state actors are difficult to achieve. Earlier definitions, including that of Ansell and Gash (2008), adopt a more formalized understanding of collaborative governance that serves as an ideal type for how collaborative governance *should* be in practice. Other definitions exist, including in works that focus on interactive governance (Torfing 2012) and collaborative governance regimes (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015), as well as collaboration ‘subtypes’ including compensatory collaborative governance (Bizzo and Michener 2025).

2 Collaborative governance could be perceived as *less* democratic, given that some of the actors who influence public policy are not elected directly by citizens. We return to this point further below.

3 Published on 23 September 2024: www.undp.org/es/latin-america/publicaciones/gobernanza-para-el-desarrollo-en-america-latina-y-el-caribe.

4 Published on 13 October 2023: www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2023/10/13/statement-of-the-heads-of-multilateral-development-banks-group-strengthening-our-collaboration-for-greater-impact.

5 Literature on collaborative governance in the Global South is not absent. In Latin America, there is research on Brazil (see, e.g. Mancilla García and Bodin 2019; Martins and Bernardo 2014), and Chile (Arias-Yurisch et al. 2024). Most recently, research finds that collaborative governance is used by countries in the region (Cyr et al. 2021). Nevertheless, this is a nascent literature, and none of it addresses how citizens evaluate policies designed via collaborative processes.

6 It could be argued that the distinct institutions and policies of unitary and federal countries lead to divergent levels of trust. Federal systems often exhibit a pronounced divergence in trust between local and national political actors. Denters (2002) and Fitzgerald and Wolak (2016) report that citizens tend to place significantly greater trust in local officeholders than in national politicians. However, Tang and Huhe (2016) argue that fiscal and administrative decentralization, also present in many unitary countries, plays a key role in fostering higher levels of trust at the local level. Kincaid and Cole (2016) further suggest that perceptions of regional equity are more strongly associated with trust in federal contexts. However, none of these studies focus on Latin America. Nevertheless, if we were to extrapolate their conclusions to the region, we might expect cross-country differences but no within-country variation that would affect our estimates.

7 Our Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP, located here: <https://osf.io/ESGPH/>) included a fourth hypothesis that sought to measure how declared voter support interacted with one's tendency to prefer policies produced in collaboration with one kind of actor versus another. Our logic was that citizens who identify more closely with a right-wing party or coalition will tend to prefer collaboration with the private sector over collaboration with other actors. On the other hand, citizens who identify more closely with a centre-left party or coalition will likely prefer collaboration with civil society. The results on these tests were mixed. In Argentina, people who said they would vote for the centre-right *Juntos por el Cambio* tended to prefer policies that were produced in collaboration with the private sector. Interestingly, this was true regardless of the party in government – that is, regardless of whether *Juntos por el Cambio* or the *Unión por la Patria* was the party designing the policy. We did not find a similar relationship in Chile – there was no statistically significant difference between policy preferences for citizens who say they will vote for the radical right-wing party (in Chile, the *Partido Republicano*). Our tests on the relationship between left voters and policies created in collaboration with civil society were not significant in either country. This finding likely reflects our conflation of civil society with social movements in the research design – a point we return to when examining the results from Hypotheses 3a–3c. Overall, the relationship between declared vote intentions and policy preferences is difficult to determine, which is why we exclude it from our analysis. Nevertheless, we include a brief description of our findings in Figure C in the Supplementary Material.

8 Specifically, a conjoint experiment undertaken in the United States revealed that citizens did not prefer policies designed in collaboration with organized groups (Cain et al. 2021), a finding attributed to the country's liberal foundations and its (unique?) predisposition to have more 'faith' in individuals (Cain et al. 2021: 909).

9 We use 'left' and 'right' broadly when comparing the two countries. Following the literature, when analysing results for Chile alone, we characterize the *Partido Republicano* as a radical right-wing party (Diaz et al. 2023) and *Frente Amplio* as a left-wing party (Titelman 2019). In the case of Argentina, we classify *Unión por la Patria* as centre-left (Borges et al. 2024) and *Juntos por el Cambio* as centre-right (Gené and Vommaro 2023).

10 In Chile, we chose to maintain the options from the 2021 presidential runoff, where the traditional centre-left and centre-right coalitions failed to advance. Moreover, polarization was more pronounced in Argentina (Cicchini et al. 2022). Had we included the centre-left and centre-right coalitions, the ideological distinctions between them would have been less evident to survey respondents.

11 This project's identifier number on Institutional Review Board (IRB) from University of Maryland is 2054425-1.

12 Collaboratively produced policy often includes many actors in addition to national government (Berardo 2009). Nevertheless, to simplify the vignettes presented and to isolate the impact of the collaboration of one actor versus another, our vignettes varied in terms of government collaboration with one other actor. Future research can examine the impact of combinations of actors on collaboratively designed policy.

13 A Spanish version of each vignette is available in Figure F in the Supplementary Material.

14 Survey respondents were recruited by Netquest from their panel of Argentine and Chilean participants. All participants were at least 18 years old. Informed consent was requested at the beginning of the survey, and a disclaimer told how to contact the researchers or the IRB if needed. The survey samples consisted of 2,597 respondents in Argentina, and 2,545 in Chile. The entire sample was profiled, with demographic filters applied for gender and geographic distribution. We requested that Netquest first focus on recruiting respondents with lower educational levels (incomplete and complete primary education). Once those responses were gathered, it moved on to the next two segments (incomplete and complete secondary education), and finally invited participants with higher educational levels. Each survey took approximately 15 minutes to complete. The questionnaire was pre-tested in both countries. Based on the feedback received, we adjusted the wording of some questions and response categories. No comprehension issues or misunderstandings regarding the vignettes were reported. We included timers as a proxy for comprehension checks (not visible to respondents). In both countries, respondents spent more time on the first conjoint, which pertained to public hospital equipment, with a median of 48 and 56 seconds in Argentina and Chile, respectively. Subsequently, the time decreased as respondents became familiar with the structure of the vignettes. In the second conjoint, concerning tutors for public schools, respondents took a median of 17 (Argentina) and 21 seconds (Chile). In the final conjoint, related to safe houses for women, the median time was 15 (Argentina) and 17 seconds (Chile). We incorporated a simple maths question to assess whether respondents were paying attention.

15 Descriptive statistics are available in Table A in the Supplementary Material.

16 In Chile, the collaboratively designed policies were also more likely to be rated more highly in terms of *level of support* as shown in Figure A in the Supplementary Material. In the Supplementary Material we also include ordinary least squares (OLS) statistical models with the *level of support* as dependent variable. Tables B and C are for Argentina and Tables D and E for Chile.

17 This finding is significant at 0.1 in the case of Chile. Policies produced by UxP were also rated less highly in the Argentine case as is shown in Figure A in the Supplementary Material.

18 Other controls are reported for the estimations with the level of support dependent variable in the Supplementary Material.

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