



Climate hypocrisy attacks are bipartisan, but their psychological impact is unequal

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Climate hypocrisy attacks are bipartisan, but their psychological impact is unequal

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Climate hypocrisy attacks are bipartisan, but their psychological impact is unequal

Environmental action is one place where accusations of hypocrisy are frequent across the political spectrum. Here we test whether there is indeed a hypocrisy penalty whereby the same environmentally damaging actions are blamed more if the agent speaks out in favor of climate protection, rather than saying nothing. In two pre-registered studies, we also test whether the penalty faced for hypocrisy is the same depending on one's own climate policy support, and whether the target of the attacks modulates it. In two pre-registered studies (N = 962), we confirm a hypocrisy penalty but see it decrease among strong climate policy supporters and when hypocrisy came from one's political ingroup. Our findings highlight the asymmetric political impact of climate hypocrisy accusations, with implications for climate communication and political psychology.

1 Calling someone a hypocrite—accusing them of saying one thing and doing another (e.g.,
2 Barden et al., 2005)—is a frequent move in climate debates. Climate scientists are criticized for
3 flying to conferences, and politicians for supporting oil companies while urging others to reduce
4 fossil fuel use and claiming an undeserved higher moral or social ground (Effron et al., 2015).
5 Such accusations appear in hundreds of news articles (Gunster et al., 2018b, 2018a) and flourish
6 on social media platforms (Falkenberg et al., 2022). As such, climate hypocrisy represents a
7 great place to study how accusations of hypocrisy play out, especially in a political rather than
8 simply moral context.

9 Previous literature in psychology has indeed focused on moral inconsistencies, considering when
10 the label of hypocrisy is applied and whether it is consistent with philosophical definitions
11 (Kreps et al., 2017; Laurent & Clark, 2019; Silver & Berman, 2024; Teeny et al., 2024;
12 Vaughan-Johnston, 2024) , but also how it translates into changes in moral attitudes. Hypocrites
13 are judged as disingenuous, less trusted, are punished more, and condemned as morally weak
14 (Crisp & Cowton, 1994; Effron et al., 2018; Jordan et al., 2017; Laurent et al., 2014; Silver et al.,
15 2021) Some studies have also considered the impact of hypocrisy accusations - for instance
16 condemning adultery in public while having affairs - during political scandals (McDermott et al.,
17 2015).

18 What makes climate hypocrisy accusations special, however, is not just that they are prominent
19 in current political contexts, but that they originate from different sides of the issue. Large-scale
20 studies have shown that critics call out contradictions in climate commitments across the
21 political spectrum (Falkenberg et al., 2022; Gunster et al., 2018b). But do these accusations
22 affect everyone the same way? Whereas sensitivity to moral inconsistency regarding general
23 moral principles, such as not stealing or not lying, could be expected to be general, sensitivity to
24 inconsistency in this more politicized domain raises questions: does sensitivity to hypocrisy
25 depend on one's political support for climate policies? How does one's political support affect
26 the expected ingroup-outgroup bias, where one's judgement is more lenient when the target of
27 the accusation is from one's political tribe (Helgason & Effron, 2022; Wolsky, 2022)?

28 These are the questions we addressed in two pre-registered studies. The first goal was to extend
29 prior research showing that hypocrisy is condemned more harshly than simple wrongdoing

30 (Barden et al., 2005; Effron, Markus, et al., 2018; Stone & Fernandez, 2008). We examined this
31 in the context of climate commitments, looking at a “ climate hypocrisy penalty” defined as a
32 harsher judgment of environmentally harmful actions when paired with hypocrisy.

33 Study 1 further assessed whether this penalty depends on one’s political commitment towards
34 climate policies. Here, two opposite hypotheses can be made. Based on the Black Sheep Effect
35 (Marques & and Paez, 1994), where group members are harshly evaluated when they deviate
36 from group norms, one could expect supporters of climate policies may be more critical of
37 hypocrisy due to concerns about credibility in terms of commitment to the cause and worry that
38 it undermines their own and everyone’s climate efforts. Indeed, it has been shown that
39 accusations of climate hypocrisy erode trust, divert attention from solutions, and hinder progress
40 (Attari et al., 2019; McDermott et al., 2015; von Sikorski & Herbst, 2020). Alternatively,
41 considering the Moral Balancing Theory (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990) or the Moral Licensing
42 Effect (Simbrunner & Schlegelmilch, 2017) as mechanisms that allow people to find grounds
43 that justify their own immoral actions, one could expect that people with lower climate policy
44 support are harsher towards hypocrisy, finding it a way to regain a moral high ground over those
45 who promote such actions (and are found guilty of doing the same as them). Study 1, therefore,
46 can test these two predictions and see whether the hypocrisy penalty is stronger among those
47 with higher or lower climate change (CC) mitigation support. If hypocrisy regarding climate
48 action is considered only under the lens of moral inconsistency, we would expect that the penalty
49 does not depend on one’s commitment to the cause.

50 Study 2 explores another facet of the hypocrisy penalty relevant to the domain of climate.
51 Previous studies have shown that a target is perceived as more hypocritical when the attitude
52 they express (and contradict in practice) is more deeply embedded in their identity, which we
53 expect to be the case for politicians in charge of defending and implementing climate policies.
54 Accusations of hypocrisy are also more prominent when the target is seen as high in competence
55 or power (Dong et al., 2021). Here, however, based on the Social Identity Theory (Hogg, 2016)
56 explaining people’s biases and perceptions of ingroup and outgroup members, coupled with vast
57 literature showing that one’s own political identity shapes reactions (Amira et al., 2021; Falk et
58 al., 2012; Kim, 2018; Munro et al., 2010; Sparkman et al., 2019), we can expect that climate
59 hypocrisy is less punished when it originates from a political ingroup rather than an outgroup.

60 We also examined whether reading about hypocrisy in politicians affects not just judgment but
61 also donation behavior and emotions to shed light on its impact.

62 *Does hypocrisy affect supporters and opponents of climate policies equally?*

63

64 In study 1, we recruited 268 US participants (n=256 after removing attention check failures)
65 using MTurk via Cloud Research - a research platform that builds on and improves access to
66 participant pools and helps researchers recruit participants, control sample quality, and manage
67 studies online. The study had an experimental design with two between-subject conditions.
68 All groups read four scenarios where a character engaged in environmentally harmful behavior.
69 The actions were identical, but the context varied. In the Hypocrisy condition (n=126), the
70 character previously advocated for the opposite behavior. In the Mere Harm condition (Control,
71 n=130), an unrelated detail about the character was provided. All vignettes were validated (see
72 Supplemental Information). Participants judged the actions on a 7-point Likert scale and
73 answered additional scales on climate change attitudes, including a climate change mitigation
74 policy support scale.

75

76 In this context, we found that the climate hypocrisy penalty is significant. Across scenarios'
77 topics ($\alpha = 0.81$), environmentally harmful actions were judged far more harshly when
78 paired with hypocrisy (M= 2.53, SD = 1.15) than when simply performed (M= 4.44, SD= 1.09;
79 Wilcoxon test: $W = 14,679$, $p\text{-value} < .001$, 95% CI [1.75, 2.25], $r = 0.68$).

80

81 A mixed-effects regression with an interaction term for condition and climate change mitigation
82 support ($\alpha = 0.85$), and random effects for vignette topics, confirms our pre-registered
83 hypothesis showing that the climate hypocrisy penalty was stronger among those with low
84 support and decreased as support increased (Est = 0.27, df= 1012.00, $p < .01$, 95% CI [0.17,
85 0.37], $d = 0.32$), as depicted in Figure 1. For more details, see Supplemental Information.

86

87 *Figure 1.* The moral judgment of climate hypocrisy versus climate mere harm (averaged across vignettes,
88 $\alpha = 0.81$) as a function of Climate Change mitigation support. Binned points represent mean
89 judgments across 7 bins of Climate Change mitigation support, while the loess curves illustrate smoothed
90 trends with 95% confidence intervals.

91

92 The vignettes in Study 1 focus on everyday individuals for whom expressing pro-climate
93 attitudes may seem less consequential. Previous research has shown that hypocrisy is more
94 strongly noted when individuals express attitudes that are more deeply embedded in their identity
95 (Vaughan-Johnston, 2024), and given the political dimension of climate action, this should be the
96 case for politicians.

97

98 Therefore, in Study 2 we embedded hypocrisy or mere environmentally harmful behavior
99 accusations of either left or right-wing politicians as social media posts from fictive news sources
100 (all posts were independently validated; Supplemental Information). We aimed to replicate that
101 hypocrisy penalty varied with different climate mitigation support levels while measuring the
102 effect of the target being a political ingroup or outgroup. Additionally, we tested whether just
103 reading about climate hypocrisy would affect people's environmental donation behavior and
104 emotional responses.

105

106 We surveyed 800 US participants (N= 706 after attention-check fails and political orientation
107 filters mismatch exclusions) using MTurk via CloudResearch, balancing our sample between
108 right and left-wing participants (72 participants who identified as 'moderate' were excluded).
109 Using a 2x2 between-subjects design, each participant read three different posts on three
110 different topics, pointing that a right or left-wing politician committed an environmentally
111 harmful action (e.g., promoting fossil fuels industry) either while advocating the opposite
112 climate-friendly behavior (e.g., encouraging CO2 reduction) or generic, unrelated goals (e.g.,
113 fostering national innovations). After reading each post, participants rated their judgment of the
114 politician's actions (7-point Likert-scale: 'absolutely wrong' to 'absolutely right'), their
115 emotional response to the post, and the plausibility of the post (i.e., how likely to be real they
116 thought the post was; 7-point scale, 'very unlikely' to 'very likely').

117

118 First, we replicated Study 1 results. The climate hypocrisy penalty was significant. Participants
119 found the actions of politicians accused of causing mere harm (n = 357, M = 3.49, SD = 1.42)
120 more acceptable than those accused of hypocrisy (n = 349, M = 2.83, SD = 1.31; Wilcoxon test:
121 $W = 79,777$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.33, 0.99], $r = 0.24$). This pattern held across topics (alpha =
122 0.69). Similarly, we replicated the finding that support for climate mitigation policies (alpha =

123 0.83) significantly moderates the climate hypocrisy penalty. As support for mitigation increases,
124 the penalty weakens (Est = 0.12, df = 2112.00, $p < 0.01$, 95% CI [0.04, 0.21], $d = 0.15$). These
125 results remain unchanged when including the politically ‘moderate’ participants or when
126 controlling for Plausibility (i.e., how likely to be true participants found the social media posts to
127 be; see Supplemental Information).

128

129 As expected, participants judged actions—mere harm and hypocrisy—by the political outgroup
130 as significantly less acceptable than by the political ingroup (Est = -0.57, df = 2113.00, $p < .001$,
131 95% CI [-0.72, -0.42], $d = 0.33$; see Figure 2). This effect remained significant when controlling
132 for Plausibility, although in this case, Plausibility also had a significant negative effect on
133 judgment (see Supplemental Information). Crucially, this bias was significantly influenced by
134 participants’ level of climate mitigation support, which moderated the gap between ingroup and
135 outgroup judgments (Est = 0.11, df = 2111.00, $p < .02$, 95% CI [0.02, 0.19], $d = 0.11$). Again,
136 these effects remained unchanged when controlling for Plausibility (see Supplemental
137 Information).

138

139 *Figure 2.* Comparison of moral judgment (averaged across topics, $\alpha = .69$) across conditions and
140 groups. Violin plots depict the distribution of judgments for each group (Political Ingroup and Outgroup)
141 and condition (Hypocrisy and Control). Black dots represent mean judgment values, and significance
142 levels (calculated using pairwise Wilcoxon rank-sum tests) are indicated above.

143

144 Participants with stronger mitigation policies support donated significantly more to
145 environmental causes (Est = 0.09, df = 704, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.24, 0.38], $d = 0.66$), suggesting
146 that policy support drives meaningful action. However, accusations of hypocrisy versus mere
147 harm had no significant effect on donation behavior (Est = -0.002, $p = 0.94$), and no significant
148 difference was found between accusations against political ingroups versus outgroups (Est = -
149 0.03, $p = 0.31$). Given that regressions for this behavioral measure did not follow normality of
150 residuals, we used Bootstrapping methods and confirmed these results. For more details, see
151 Supplemental Information.

152

153 Finally, participants were asked to rate their emotions—three negative (frustrated, angry,
154 worried; $\alpha = 0.91$) and three positive (proud, enthusiastic, hopeful; $\alpha = 0.95$)—after

155 reading each post. Our exploratory analysis reveals that participants exposed to hypocrisy
156 reported significantly higher negative emotions compared to those who read about mere harm
157 (Est = 10.29, df = 2113.00, 95% CI [7.34 – 13.24], $p < .001$, $d = 0.29$). Similarly, participants
158 reading about their political outgroup expressed higher negative emotions than those reading
159 about their ingroup (Est = 9.55, df = 2113.00, 95% CI [6.60 – 12.51], $p < .001$, $d = 0.28$).
160 Positive emotions followed the reverse trend, with lower ratings for hypocrisy (Est = -4.67, df =
161 2113.00, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-6.92 – -2.43], $d = 0.18$) and outgroup accusations (Est = -5.92, df =
162 2113.00, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-8.16 – -3.68], $d = 0.22$). That said, positive emotions were rated
163 uniformly low across all groups, so the latter findings should be interpreted cautiously.

164

165

166 **Discussion**

167

168 Study 1 shows that accusations of climate hypocrisy carry a moral penalty, but this penalty is not
169 applied equally and depends on the level of support for climate policies. The findings align with
170 the Moral Balancing Theory (Nisan & Horenczyk, 1990), suggesting that individuals with lower
171 support for climate policies blame perceived hypocrisy more than mere environmentally harmful
172 behavior, contrary to the Black Sheep effect (Marques & Paez, 1994), whereby supporters of
173 climate policies would be the most concerned and critical of perceived hypocrisy.

174

175 Study 2 replicates this finding, also showing that the effect is moderated by individuals' political
176 identities. In both everyday and political contexts, people judged environmentally harmful
177 actions more harshly when they involved hypocrisy, but individual political attitudes and
178 affiliations significantly influence the condemnation. Despite their emotional effects, accusations
179 of hypocrisy did not affect pro-environmental donations. Together, these findings reveal the
180 asymmetric nature of hypocrisy judgments in environmental debates.

181

182 On a methodological and conceptual level, the study shows the importance of accounting for
183 fine-grained levels of support for a cause (here, climate policies) when studying hypocrisy. In the
184 current case, levels of support were measured along with political ideology. Left-right or liberal-
185 conservative labels are useful proxies for climate attitudes, but not perfect. In the U.S., Liberals

186 and Democrats tend to support climate action more than Conservatives and Republicans, but this
187 divide is less rigid in other regions (Spektor et al., 2023). Even within the U.S., the pattern is
188 more nuanced: the gap is smaller among people of color (Ballew et al., 2021) and shaped by
189 levels of populist sentiment (Huber et al., 2020).

190

191 In terms of the target of hypocrisy accusations, political identity is predictably crucial as ingroup-
192 outgroup effects are known to affect one's moral judgment (Amira et al., 2021; Falk et al., 2012;
193 Kim, 2018; Munro et al., 2010; Sparkman et al., 2019). In both cases, people judged the
194 hypocrisy less harshly when it came from their own political group. The interpretation of the
195 other effect - the fact that higher support for climate policies makes people less harsh towards
196 hypocrisy - remains open to several interpretations. Those less supportive of climate policies
197 may see hypocrisy as a strategy to discredit advocates, or a way to assert their own consistency,
198 assuming they don't preach for climate actions and perform environmentally harmful actions.
199 The surprise is perhaps more on the side of the strong climate supporters, who, on the other hand,
200 seem to be more outcome-focused and proportion their condemnation to actions rather than
201 words. Climate policy support is shaped by several factors (Drews & van den Bergh, 2016),
202 including higher perceptions of the consequences of climate change, which may play a role in the
203 present effect. Alternatively, we cannot rule out that other cognitive or religious attitudes also
204 correlate with the differences in climate policy support and underlie the effect.

205

206 Before drawing practical implications about the effects of climate hypocrisy accusations, some
207 limitations must be considered. Our two studies focused on the United States, where climate
208 policies are a polarizing issue (Smith et al., 2024). This focus reflects both the concentration of
209 existing research and the opportunity to test ingroup-outgroup effects (Kennedy, 2023).

210 However, since sensitivity to hypocrisy has been shown to vary across cultural contexts (Effron,
211 Markus, et al., 2018; Seo et al., 2024) and political attitudes toward climate action are more or
212 less polarized depending on context (Smith & Hempel, 2022) and knowledge (Pröpper et al.,
213 2022), these results call for broader testing across countries and samples. Still, given the U.S.'s
214 significant contribution to climate change (Deng et al., 2025; Evans, 2021; Köne & Büke, 2015),
215 our findings remain relevant.

216

217 The second limitation comes from the fact that no immediate effects on donation were observed.
218 As the donation option featured charities unrelated to the accused figures, donations may not
219 have appeared like an opportunity for punishment against hypocrisy. Measuring donations
220 towards political parties could be addressed by future studies.

221
222 The final qualification comes from differences between topics and scenarios. Despite following
223 an analogous template, not all scenarios were rated as hypocritical. As pointed out earlier,
224 people's understanding of what counts as hypocritical or not does not perfectly align with
225 philosophical definitions (Alicke et al., 2013). Therefore, we observed some variance in the
226 validation of the vignettes. To avoid anchoring, we could not ask the same participants to judge
227 whether the case was hypocritical and whether it should be blamed; therefore, we cannot directly
228 establish an individual link between perception and evaluation of hypocrisy. We should note that,
229 in study 2, only 58% of participants found the behavior hypocritical for one of the posts within
230 the hypocrisy condition (topic Meat). Given that over 50% of raters considered it hypocritical,
231 we decided to keep it in our analysis. In addition, used random effects for the stimuli topic in our
232 models to account for any variability arising from the different topics of the social media posts.
233 Nevertheless, future studies could investigate whether certain topics are more likely to be
234 perceived as hypocritical but judged less harshly, and explore the reasons why.

235
236 With these limitations in mind, these findings still highlight key challenges in climate
237 communication and policy framing. Climate hypocrisy accusations are frequent and holding
238 leaders accountable for discrepancies between their words and actions remains important
239 (Eckersley, 2013; Platt & Retallack, 2009), yet our findings warn that hypocrisy accusations will
240 resonate with prior attitudes and add to existing polarization - resonating stronger among those
241 already doubtful of climate initiatives, while potentially failing to move those committed to
242 action. Even so, given that our findings suggest opponents react more, climate hypocrisy claims
243 may reinforce resistance. If supporters don't, one can argue these accusations still risk increasing
244 political cynicism and disengagement in the long term (Gunster et al., 2018b, 2018a).

245 Hypocrisy accusations can also serve different purposes, and while some intend to criticize
246 politicians or companies who promote pro-climate action but do not follow by actions ("green
247 washing"), some may aim to motivate reflection about the contradiction between pro-

248 environmental values and commitment attitudes (Gunster et al., 2018b, 2018a). Additionally, the
249 importance granted to consistency between words and actions may be also a rich-country luxury,
250 as pointed by critical scholars, when individuals or leaders from developing countries need to
251 more immediately respond to changing contexts and compromises (Millar, 2024).

252 **Conclusion**

253 Whether in everyday conversations or on social media, accusations of hypocrisy are common in
254 climate debates. People are quicker to condemn those who advocate climate action, like reducing
255 air travel or phasing out fossil fuels, when they fail to follow their own advice, compared to
256 those who stay silent on those issues. Perfect consistency is of course a high bar, but not
257 everyone judges inconsistency in the same way.

258

259 Supporters of climate policies are more likely to overlook inconsistencies between words and
260 actions, focusing instead on what gets done. But the impact of hypocrisy accusations still
261 depends heavily on who they're aimed at. While moral judgments may look backward, what
262 matters most is their long-term effect on credibility—whether pointing out inconsistency builds
263 momentum for change or simply deepens public mistrust.

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Methods
Study 1

Pre-registration

The pre-registration can be found here: aspredicted.org/zjy-9nxy.pdf (anonymized link).
Observations: To deal with non-parametric aspects of the data and match the analysis properly to the pre-registered hypotheses, some adjustments to the originally pre-registered analyses were needed to be made.

Design

We conducted an online survey experiment with 2 between-subject conditions, defined by the content of the vignettes participants would see as stimuli, explained below:

Hypocrisy	Mere harm (Control)
<i>Character preaches to a group about the importance of certain environmental behavior.</i> + <i>Character acts non environmentally in terms of that specific behavior (does the opposite to what they preached).</i>	<i>Random/neutral fact about the character, not related to any environmental behavior.</i> + <i>Character acts non environmentally in terms of a specific behavior</i>

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Sample

Following our pre-registered sample goal, we surveyed 260 US participants (n=256 after discarding those who did not pass attention checks). Data collection was conducted using MTurk via CloudResearch. Average age was of 41.04 (SD = 11.04), 53.52% Women, 45.70% Men, 0.78% Other. Further demographics are summarized Supplemental Information.

293

294 **Survey**

295

296 The study was conducted using an online survey built in Qualtrics with the following structure:

- 297 • Vignettes (4)
 - 298 ○ Moral judgment
- 299 • Attention Check
- 300 • CC Mitigation Policy support measure
- 301 • Other measures for future analyses (Environmental values, Moral foundations, Climate
- 302 change knowledge, Urgent issues rating)
- 303 • Demographics (reported in supplemental information)

304

305 *Vignettes + Judgment*

306

307 For all conditions, participants were presented with four vignettes. Each focused on a different
308 Climate change action topic (Reducing use of flights, Recycling, Reducing beef consumption,
309 Reducing commute by car). For example, “Last month, Sofia talked to her coworkers about how
310 important it is that they stop using their cars and switch to biking in order to help the
311 environment. Sofia drove her car everyday that same month.” for Hypocrisy condition, and
312 “Sofia lives in an apartment in a city. Sofia drove her car everyday in the past month” for Mere
313 Harm condition. For a complete list of the vignettes refer to Supplemental Information.

314

- 315 • Moral judgment:
 - 316 After being presented with a vignette, participants were asked to answer how right or wrong
 - 317 they found the character's behavior in the story, using a Likert scale from 1 to 7, from
 - 318 ‘absolutely wrong’ to ‘absolutely right’.

319

320 *Attention Check*

321 For both conditions, participants were presented with a 5th vignette that worked as an attention
322 check by introducing a trivially right random action for the character in the story. Then,
323 participants who rated it with anything below 4 were excluded. The vignette was as follows:

324

325 “Ben lives in a house in a town. Last month, Ben helped a blind person cross the street. “

326

327 *CC Mitigation Policy Support*

328

329 Participants are presented with a series of hypothetical policies that are meant to mitigate Climate
330 Change at the cost of some individual benefit (see list below). For each one of them participants
331 reported how much they supported each policy using a 7-point liker scale from ‘Strongly oppose ’
332 to ‘Strongly support ’(4 being ‘Neither support nor oppose’)

333

334 Policies:

- 335 • Increase taxes on gasoline, making it more expensive to commute by car
- 336 • Require electric utilities to produce at least 20% of their electricity from wind, solar, or
337 other renewable energy sources, even if it costs the average household an extra \$100 a year
- 338 • Changing school menu to all plant-based meals, eliminating all meat and other animal-
339 based options
- 340 • Increase taxes on flights, making it more expensive to travel by plane

341

342 *Other Measures*

343

344 The survey contained other measures for exploratory analysis purposes which are not covered in
345 the present paper. These measures were: Environmental Values (Ziegler, 2017), a brief version
346 the moral Foundations questionnaire (Crone et al., 2021), and Climate Change Knowledge
347 (Taddicken et al., 2018).

348

349

350 *Study 2*

351

352 **Pre-registration**

353 The pre-registration can be found here: aspredicted.org/f9fx-ss2c.pdf (anonymized link).

354 Observations: To deal with non-parametric aspects of the data and match the analysis properly to
355 the pre-registered hypotheses, minor adjustments to the originally pre-registered analyses were
356 made. Moreover, ‘Climate Change Care’ from the pre-registration was operationalized with what
357 we call the ‘Climate Change Mitigation Policies Support’ measure presented here.

358

359 **Design**

360

361 We conducted an online survey experiment with a 2x2 between-subject design, defined by the
362 content of the social media posts participants would see as stimuli, explained below:

363

	Hypocrisy	Transgression
Right	Preaches green principles but harmful behavior by Right-wing/Conservative/Republican politician	No special principles mentioned but harmful behavior by Right-wing/Conservative/Republican politician
Left	Preaches green principles but harmful behavior by Left-wing/Liberal/Democrat politician	No special principles mentioned but harmful behavior by Left-wing/Liberal/Democrat politician

364

365 **Sample**

366

367 Following our pre-registered sample goal, we surveyed 800 US participants (n=706 after
368 discarding those who did not pass attention checks or did not match the applied cloud research
369 pre-screeners). Average Age was 44.64 (SD= 13), 48.44% Women, 50.42% Men, 1,14% Other.

370 Data collection was conducted using MTurk via CloudResearch, where, to ensure a balanced

371 number of Conservative/Republican and Liberal/Democratic participants, pre-screeners for both

372 political party and political orientation were applied. Participants that in our demographic
373 questions responded with political orientations dissonant with political party affiliations were
374 also excluded since it did not align with the cloud research pre-screener and it could create
375 confusion on the interpretation of results. Further demographics are summarized in Supplemental
376 Information.

377

378 **Survey**

379

380 The study was conducted using an online survey built in Qualtrics. It had the following structure:

- 381 • Infographics comprehension
- 382 • Stimuli (3)
 - 383 ○ Moral judgment
 - 384 ○ Judgment explanation
 - 385 ○ Plausibility
 - 386 ○ Affective reaction
- 387 • Donation Activity
- 388 • Attention Check 1
- 389 • Behavioral Change Intention measure
- 390 • CC Mitigation Policy support measure (same as in Study 1)
- 391 • Attention check 2
- 392 • Demographics (reported in supplemental information)

393

394 *Infographics Comprehension*

395

396 To ensure there was an understanding that at least in the view of environmental experts, certain
397 behaviors go against protecting the environment/mitigating climate change, we added a
398 comprehension measure in the survey where participants were presented with three infographics
399 that they were told contained information from professionals on three different topics. After
400 looking at each infographic, participants were asked to answer two questions about the content of
401 the infographics. As a motivator for them to read the infographics carefully, they were told that if
402 they responded at least 50% of the questions correctly, they would be included in a draw of over

403 fifteen \$10 USD gift cards. The topics were: Mental health, Kitchen and food safety, and Climate
404 Change causes. The figure below portrays the climate change infographic and its comprehension
405 questions.
406
407

Infographic



Questions

According to the infographic, which of these activities are NOT a big driver of climate change? (select all that apply)

- Deforestation
- Recycling
- Waste Accumulation
- None of the above

According to the infographic, which of these activities are big drivers of climate change? (select all that apply)

- Meat Industry
- Fossil Fuels Use (planes, cars, etc)
- Electric Bikes Industry
- Vegetable Supply

408
409
410 *Stimuli + Measures*

411
412 For all conditions, participants were presented with three stimuli (snapshots of a social media
413 post) each focused on a different Climate change action topic (Fossil fuel industry, Private Jet
414 use, Meat industry), and were told to imagine they entered their preferred social media platform
415 and saw the following post from a news source. The Figure below shows an example of how the
416 stimulus looked like. For a complete list of the stimulus texts please refer to Supplemental
417 Information.



Left-wing president [REDACTED] commits to important Carbon reduction goals at COP28, the last UN Climate Change Conference. A few weeks after, he passes national bills to make huge investments in the fossil fuel industry.

418

419

420

421 • Moral judgment: After being presented with a Social media post, participants will be
422 asked to answer how right or wrong they found the actions of the politician in each story,
423 using a Likert scale from 1 to 7 from Absolutely wrong to Absolutely right with labels for
424 each point in the scale.

425 • Judgment explanation: For exploratory purposes, after answering how right or wrong
426 they found the politician's actions, they were asked to explain why they think that in two
427 lines.

428 • Plausibility: Participants were asked, 'How likely do you find the social media post you
429 just read to be true?' and were given a 7-point Likert scale from 'Very unlikely' to 'Very
430 likely'.

431 • Affective reaction: Participants were asked how the post they just read made them feel.
432 For this, they were presented with a list of 6 emotions (enthusiastic, worried, proud,
433 angry, hopeful, frustrated) and they had to rate each one of them in terms of how much
434 each emotion represented the way they felt. They rated these emotions using a slide bar
435 from 0 to 100 that went from 'Not at All' to 'Extremely'. This was a modified version of
436 the measures tested in Marcus et al. (2017).

437

438 *Donation Activity*

439 Participants were told to imagine they had 100usd personal budget to donate to charity, and were
440 presented with three different charities (an environmental one, an climate change denial one, and

441 a neutral/non environment related one) among which they could distribute those 100 dollars. The
442 three charities were: Clean Air Task Force (environmental), CO2 Coalition (climate change
443 denying), Goodwill (neutral). Participants were presented with a small description of each
444 charity and a sliding scale for each that allowed them to distribute the imaginary budget among
445 the three of them. Additionally, to ensure participants cared about their decisions in this task,
446 they were told that we would pick one participant at random and perform a donation based on
447 their selection, meaning that their decisions in this task could have real-world consequences.

448

449 *Attention Checks*

450

451 Additionally, the survey had two attention checks that worked as stand-alone questions. For
452 example: "Select the option that is NOT a fruit: a. Apple, b. Banana, c. Cookie, d. Peach."

453

454 *Data Analysis*

455

456 To analyze the data obtained in both studies, R code was used. The 'lme4' package was used to
457 run all mixed effects models (Bates et al., 2015). Effect sizes were calculated using the
458 'effectsize' package (Ben-Shachar et al., 2020), used to obtain Eta Squared, and the following

459 formula to calculate the effect sizes: $\sqrt{\frac{4*Eta^2}{1-Eta^2}}$ for the mixed-effects regressions; for the

460 Wilcoxon tests, effect sizes were calculated with $r = \frac{Z}{\sqrt{(n_1+n_2)}}$. Linear regressions and other

461 standard statistical analyses were done using the 'stats' package in R (R Core Team, 2022).

462 Bootstrapped linear mixed effects models were calculated using the 'lmeresampler' package
463 (Loy et al., 2023), bootstrapped correlation coefficients were calculated using the 'boot' package
464 (Canty & Ripley, 2022).

465

466 *Ethics*

467 All participants approved an online informed consent statement before taking part in the studies.
468 Protocols for both studies received approval from the Ethics Committee of Faculty 10, Ludwig-
469 Maximilians-Universität München.

470

471

Data and Code Availability

472 All data sets and code for analysis can be accessed with the following (anonymized) link to an

473 OSF folder: https://osf.io/nzvx7/?view_only=e9a6260d4b674401bd02c2fe28dccd9e

474

475

Ethics and Inclusion (Authorship)

476

477 The research was conducted primarily through online survey platforms (MTurk via

478 CloudResearch) with U.S.-based participants. While the study does not include local researchers

479 from the U.S., one of the authors was based in the U.S. while Study 1 was conducted. Moreover,

480 we consider the external perspective of non-U.S. researchers to be an asset in ensuring

481 objectivity and broadening the scope of climate discourse.

482

483 The study examines climate hypocrisy accusations in the U.S., focusing on how reactions to

484 hypocrisy vary based on climate policy support and political identity. While the research was not

485 conducted in collaboration with local partners, its findings are directly relevant to U.S. climate

486 debates. Additionally, conducting this research as non-U.S. researchers provides a valuable

487 external viewpoint on the topic.

488

489 Roles and responsibilities were discussed and agreed upon among collaborators at all stages of

490 the research process. No formal capacity-building plans for local researchers were included, as

491 the study primarily involved survey-based data collection.

492

493 The research received ethical approval in Germany, covering all aspects of the study. The study

494 examines moral judgments and climate policy attitudes, topics that could be politically sensitive.

495 However, no personally identifying information was collected, and participants were recruited

496 through MTurk, ensuring anonymity and minimizing risks. As an online study, the research does

497 not pose significant health, safety, or security risks to the researchers.

498

499 The paper integrates research on climate communication, moral psychology, and public attitudes,

500 with a strong focus on studies relevant to the U.S. context. One key reason for incorporating

501 climate policy support as a central variable is its potential ability to better capture the diversity of
502 people's attitudes compared to traditional political classifications.

503

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505

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685

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