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STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: IN SEARCH FOR A NEW CONSENSUS

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ABSTRACT: The objective of this study is to identify whether there is a contemporary consensus on the role of SOEs in different countries on selected issues, through the view of experts around the globe. We conducted a survey to formulate prospective forecasts of the evolution of the role of SOE and to summarize the state of knowledge. Here we present a selection of the results obtained, with an emphasis on identifying consensus on SOE governance and conflicting goals. Because of that, the qualitative approach adopted in this paper is a natural complement to the more quantitative ones.

KEYWORDS: State-owned enterprises, Governance, Performance, Expert survey, Companies.

I. Introduction

In 1995, the World Bank published “Bureaucrats in Business”, a report on State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that focused on the ways to reform or privatize state-owned-enterprises that were regarded as an inefficient fiscal burden that “hinders growth, impedes market liberalization and [...] directly and indirectly limits efforts to reduce poverty” (World Bank, 1995, p. ix). Fast forward 25 years and SOEs remain numerous and active, mostly with the same structure and mandate, and in many cases larger revenues (**Taghizadeh-Hesary et. al. 2019**).

The objective of this study is to identify whether there is a contemporary consensus on the role of SOEs in different countries on selected issues, through the view of experts around the globe. We start from the premise that SOEs differ from private companies in that they are not here to make money, but rather to pursue other goals. **Because SOEs use public funding, these types of firms are usually thought to be charged with increasing social welfare rather than focus exclusively on profits (Taghizadeh-Hesary et. al. 2019).** Hence, to evaluate their efficacy, we need to define those roles and measure performance against that metric. This is easier said than done: these mandates are many and not perfectly aligned, if not at odds with each other. Moreover, they depend on the institutional context, the degree of development and even the size of individual countries: contrary to profit maximization for the private firm, no simple metric could be applied to appraise the efficiency of an SOE.

The results and conclusions presented here were obtained through a two-round expert survey. Because of that, the qualitative approach adopted in this paper is a natural complement to the more quantitative ones, based on performance indicators (financial performance, revenues, jobs, capital structure, etc.) often used in the literature.

Specifically, we conducted a Delphi survey to formulate prospective forecasts of the evolution of the role of SOE and to summarize the state of knowledge. The Delphi methodology is based on rounds of surveys to a group of experts that is maintained throughout the study. In each successive consultation, aggregated results and individual responses of previous rounds are presented to the panel with the expectation that the answers converge over

time. In fact, a certain variance in the responses always persist but this is also informative about areas of enduring disagreement –which, in our case, could be used to cluster answers and better define positive prospects and normative views in a context-specific way.¹

This report presents selected results of a larger survey performed through this exercise. The survey focused on the role, performance and future of public firms. The objective of the project was not only to gain insight on the SOEs sector as a whole but also on the particularities of public firms located in the infrastructure and financial markets.

Here we present a selection of the results obtained, with an emphasis on identifying consensus on SOE governance and conflicting goals.

The paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, a second section summarizes some of the conclusions that the literature on SOEs has highlighted in recent years. In the third section we present the results of the survey that speak to the issues we believe are central in this discussion: the question of governance and conflicting goals. A final section presents some preliminary conclusions and suggests the future lines of inquiry.

¹ It is expected that the experts' specialized knowledge, as well as the strategy of sharing partial results with the panel, will facilitate reaching richer and more precise conclusions than those that could be obtained either by a reduced research team or by a public opinion survey based on a random sample of the general population. The Delphi method can be productively used to explore these topics among a large and geographically diverse panel of International Organizations and government experts, as well as managers of SOEs across the globe, from which we plan to extract context-specific opinions.

II. Theoretical discussion on the role of SOEs

In this section we discuss the question of SOEs performance, governance and conflicting goals, which we think are the key issues that need to be understood when analyzing the role of the former. These issues are the ones in which we focus on the Delphi survey we conducted.

As their priority remains social goal, the economic performance of SOEs is largely seen as mediocre, which slows down economic growth (Taghizadeh-Hesary et. al. 2019). At its turn, the question of governance has received significant attention in recent years, motivated by the discussion of state capacities (Fukuyama 2013; Grindle 2004; Kaufmann and Kraay 2009). Fukuyama (2013) discussed that there was a close relationship between bureaucratic autonomy (good state institutions) and government performance. If we include SOE performance within the overall government performance, it can be said that the relationship looks like the letter U. In low-governance countries with small (or nonexistent), highly risk-averse private sector, the state and SOEs can fill the void and be relatively efficient. In these contexts they might become catalyzers of growth. At its turn, SOE management needs a sound bureaucracy, and this is the case in developed countries. In these settings, SOEs perform well.

The problem resides in country with mediocre governance levels, where SOEs perform badly. In these contexts, management can be burdensome, distracting attention and funds from problems that only governments can and should address. Bureaucrats face conflicting goals and perverse incentives.

SOEs perform erratically, as there is no clear and objective measure of what their performance should be, and bureaucrats are trapped between commercial and political/social objectives. Commercial objectives are precluded by government intervention in operating decisions, monopoly powers, unaccountable managers and skills inappropriate for commercial purposes.

Of course, theory and experience suggest that efficiency is greatest when a company attempts to maximize profits in a competitive market, under managers with the autonomy, motivation, and capability to respond to the challenge of competition (Shirley 1993).

But governments are not willing to allow inefficient SOEs to go bankrupt and be liquidated because of strategic, symbolic and political reasons. Among the non-commercial objectives to create SOEs are the need to correct perceived market failures, the possibility of raising revenues, increase employment, promote regional development, redistribute income, and encourage (or discourage) a particular national group. SOEs are also perceived as a way to achieve independence from foreign companies and to direct the course of development by controlling key sectors (Shirley 1983, p. 13). The fact that “social” profit is different from private profits and that many SOE objectives conflict with profit maximization shows the importance of taking into account a different performance metric for these enterprises.

When thinking about SOE goals, there seems to be a consensus in that non-commercial objectives of SOEs are economically costly. In developing countries, these objectives can have a net effect of increasing inequalities (Shirley 1993, **Taghizadeh-Hesary et. al. 2019**). Prices may be controlled to benefit the poor or assist counter-inflationary policies and therefore shifted

towards the taxpayer from the direct consumer. In some cases the deficit is financed with emission, severing inflation which at its turn impacts disproportionately on the poor. In addition, SOEs beneficiaries can be middle class, not the poor. First, SOEs might produce goods and services that the poorer sectors do not consume, such as utilities. In addition, capital-intensive SOEs do not alleviate unemployment and can even become employment outlets for educated middle classes, especially at the management levels. Also, in order to lessen unemployment SOEs can end in overstaffing, which not only reduces profitability but also worsens fiscal deficit and inflation. Finally, non-commercial oriented SOEs can also provide below standard good and services and hence suffer of low employment morale.

Where SOEs are expected to pursue both commercial and social goals and to answer many different constituencies, their performance will be erratic unless they are given a clear sense of priorities. Profitability might not be the best criterion, as many SOEs are monopolies, “social” profit is different from the commercial profit. There is some consensus that a “clear mission, vision, and strategic plan can provide conceptual clarity for both management and employees” (World Bank 2014). The latter allow to measure results against expectations and discriminate between poor management and social goals. But clarifying and ranking the objectives of their SOEs is one of the most daunting tasks for politicians (Shirley 1993, p. 16).

Governance and performance, hence, are key topics when analyzing SOEs. **In order to explore the expert opinion on these issues, we conducted a survey using the Delphi methodology. We present the main results of the exercise in the next section.**

III. Expert survey results

As anticipated, in this section we will present the main results of an expert survey conducted through a Delphi methodology. We will first discuss a general overview of the role of SOEs and then focus on the issues raised in the previous section.

a. General overview on SOEs

As has already been analyzed (Wong 2018), the participation of SOEs in the global economy at the turn of the 21st century has not declined despite the reform processes initiated in the 80s. Not only SOEs are still responsible for a considerable amount of the GDP of industrialized economies; but also play a crucial role in key sectors such as infrastructure. This presumption was also shared by the panel. Moreover, they pointed out to the provision of utilities and infrastructure as the sectors that were favored by SOEs. The exploitation of natural resources and the provision of financial services were also seen as sectors in which SOEs have strong presence. More generally, the panel also highlighted that governments usually accept or promote SOEs in situations in which they want to protect some sort of national interest or deal with market failures. The following figure presents these insights graphically.

Figure 1 near here.

In this sense, a crucial feature of SOEs was rapidly highlighted by our panel of experts: The latter are usually established due to political rather than economic concerns. The pursuit of national interests and/or political objectives usually is the initial motive that supports the establishment of a new SOE. This presumption was shared by the panel in our second round of the survey. Indeed, 80% of the respondents agreed that the existence of strategic interests and/or social objectives is usually used as justifications for the presence of SOEs. It then appears relevant to understand what kind of social motives are used to justify the establishment or support of SOEs. In this sense, we asked our panel to deepen on what kind of strategic interests or social objectives were used as justification in their respective countries. In this case, we noted an important dispersion on the answers given by the respondents. However, a majority of the panel pointed out to the development of affordable infrastructure or utilities. The existence of market failure situations, the development of sectors considered strategic or the establishment of public policies that try to reduce economic inequalities also received an important amount of mentions by the respondents.

Figure 2 about here.

b. The problem of SOEs conflicting goals.

As noted in Shirley (1983), SOEs are considered to be trapped in a situation in which they have to be able to fulfill two different (and usually

conflicting) goals: the maximization of economic benefits and the accomplishment of the particular social objectives that the State aimed to achieve when it created it. This lack of clear mandates generates a series of inefficiencies given the ambiguous role of managers on deciding which objective should take precedence and the difficulties in evaluating performance. Some authors (Wong 2018) have recommended explicitly singling out the social mandates that a given SOE should fulfill and construct a number of indicators around them in order to evaluate performance. This strategy, first, allows a clear evaluation of the costs involved in fulfilling the particular social objectives that the State decided to pursue through its SOE. In addition, it also provides a clearer notion on the capacity of each public firm to be economically profitable.

Regarding how to evaluate SOEs, however, the panel did not offer a clear insight on the kind of indicators that should be favored. As it can be seen in Figure 3, there was a clear division between those experts that consider that a combination of indicators of commercial and social performance should be adopted and those that favor solely economic efficiency metrics. However, we also registered an important dispersion of opinions on whether this kind of metrics should be combined with customer satisfaction or corporate governance indicators. It must also be noted that a significant portion of the panel stated that it is imperative to tailor metrics to the sector of the economy in which the public firm is located.

Figure 3 near here.

Given that during the first round the panel was not able to provide a clear indication on which kind of metrics should be used to evaluate SOEs performance, we decided in round 2 to reduce the variance by asking experts to select between solely economic efficiency indicators or a combination of economic efficiency and the accomplishment of social objectives metrics. In this case, the results gave a clearer result. As Figure 4 shows, an 82% of the panel considers that one should evaluate SOEs performance with a combination of metrics that capture both economic efficiency and the accomplishment of social mandates.

Figure 4 near here.

c. The question of governance

After the reform processes initiated in the 80's, a new trend gained track when thinking on how to achieve an efficient SOE sector. The key variable when attempting to equalize the performance of SOEs with private firms was thought to be the particular governance structure of the former (World Bank 2014). This brought up a renewed interest in particular aspects of SOEs that had not received attention such as the board of directors, the creation of external oversight agencies or the establishment of accountability and transparency mechanisms. When asked during the first round about what were the main governance problems SOEs faced, the panel highlighted two issues that were also considered crucial during the reform processes initiated in the 80s, as can be seen in Figure 5. Firstly, how can autonomy from politics

increase for SOEs managers. Secondly, how to achieve increased levels of transparency in the administration of SOEs resources. Other topics that were named (less emphatically) were the lack of commercially oriented objectives, the inexperience of management, undefined mandates, agency issues and the continued protection by the State. We also gave the panel a list of elements highlighted as key by the literature so as to achieve a successful SOE (autonomy, composition and qualification of the board, evaluation metrics, presence of an external auditor, clear and simple mandate and transparency) and we asked them to choose which of them they considered necessary for achieving a good governance. As shown in figure 6, clarity and simplicity of the mandate, the composition and qualification of the board and transparency were the top 3 components signaled by the panel. Moreover we also gave the respondents the opportunity to add elements that they considered to be crucial when achieving a successful SOE that were not included in our list. The most mentioned items were necessity of an accountability mechanism, a competent management and an approach that has similar criteria as those enforced in the private sector were the most cited ones (also shown in Figure 6).

Figure 5 near here.

Figure 6 near here.

The results from the first round clearly indicate that guaranteeing autonomy from decision makers and management's transparency are the top two issues

that should be taken into account when thinking about efficient corporate governance structure for a SOE. In this respect, we decided to ask our panel what mechanisms or strategies one should adopt in order to increase autonomy and transparency. Regarding autonomy, the top three suggestions given by the panel were establishing a corporate governance code in line with that proposed by OECD (2015), a higher number of independent members of the board and listing SOEs as public corporations. The results are presented in Figure 7. Furthermore, and regarding the steps one should take to achieve increased levels of transparency, as can be seen in Figure 8, the experts highlighted establishing an information mechanism that guarantees regular accessibility to SOEs records, a regular oversight from parliament or an independent agency and enforcing the same legal requirements over public firms than those to which private companies are held. Finally, we presented the panel a list of six issues that were raised in the previous questionnaire as key when explaining SOEs governance problems and asked them to select three and rank them in order of importance. We present these results in Figure 9. As expected, management's lack of transparency and possible agency issues between management, board and decision makers are the two elements that experts highlighted as more important. Beyond these top two options, the panel more or less equally weighted the management's low skill level, a lack of commercially oriented objectives and the persistence of state protection mechanisms as their preferred second and third choices, as shown in Figures 10 and 11.

Figure 7 near here.

Figure 8 near here.

Figure 9 near here.

Figure 10 near here.

Figure 11 near here.

Finally, we asked the panel if they believed that there was a particular governance structure better equipped to shield SOEs from political capture or mismanagement. The experts surveyed in the first round did not give a clear answer on this issue; almost 55% of them believed that some governance structure shield SOEs and 45% did not. When asked about the three most important features of a governance structure that were most cited as being capable of guaranteeing SOEs autonomy and transparency, experts mentioned SOEs as public corporations, a clear mandate and the establishment of autonomous agencies with oversight and regulator capabilities, as shown in Figure 12. The experts that do not believe there are governance structures able to shield SOEs prefer to analyze the specific practices of politicians and managers, the objectives decision makers decide to pursue through SOEs and the context in which public firms operate rather than suggest cookie-cutter solutions (these experts also tend to suggest outright privatization of SOEs, as Figure 13 suggests). These experts, following Shirley (1983), tend to be concerned about the political dynamics of SOEs. In order to deepen our understanding on this issue we decided to ask in the second round a question

that explores the relationship between a given country's general institutional strength and its SOEs performance. As it can be seen in Figure 14, a clear majority of the panel (almost 80%) agrees that stronger institutional settings do have a positive impact in SOEs performance.

Figure 12 near here.

Figure 13 near here.

Figure 14 near here.

IV. Conclusions

In this section we summarily present a summary conclusion of the issues discussed in this paper and suggest future lines of inquiry that follow up the results presented here.

Guaranteeing autonomy from state authorities and transparency in SOEs management are the most important challenges that public firms currently face. The preferred approach to solve these two issues is through various regulation mechanisms that involve not only SOEs but also the participation of the private sector and governmental agencies. In this respect, experts signaled that the most effective way to avoid the danger of political capture is through the establishment of specific normative frameworks that guarantees autonomy. This involves a corporate governance code and an important amount of independent members on the board. In addition, autonomy could also be effectively

guaranteed through the involvement of privates in the management of SOEs through a public listing strategy. A similar approach was mostly favored by the experts when thinking on achieving management's transparency. In this sense, on one hand, SOEs should adopt and be held accountable to a regulatory framework that is similar to the one used for private firms and that is capable of guaranteeing regular and open access to relevant information on how public firms are managed. On the other hand, oversight schemes should be implemented through parliament or a special independent agency.

Future lines of inquiry based on the findings of the present study should include.

- a. Extend this approach to measure politician's opinion on SOEs. Experts highlighted the relevance of politics when thinking about SOEs. Thus, it would be relevant to understand what decision makers believe about public firms and whether their opinions around the subject are similar by region or area of expertise.
- b. Investigate what is the role SOEs should play in contestable markets. The study did not find conclusive opinions on how to deal with public firms located in contestable markets. A future line of research is to examine in more detail the role that SOEs play in these scenarios.
- c. Expand our understanding on SOEs to other sectors and to economies with different economic development levels. It would be useful to expand this research project with a focus in other sectors of the economy beyond

financial and infrastructure markets. The latter can include sectors such as technological development, provision of health services and manufacturing. Secondly, it is crucial to understand how the differing degrees of economic and political development might have on the functioning of SOEs. Not only the specific social objectives SOEs have might vary but also the institutional strength can have differing effects over the performance of this type of companies.

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