Tipo de documento: Working Paper N° 1
ISSN: 0327-9588

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Autoría: Escudé, Carlos

Fecha de publicación: 1993

ISSN 0327-9588

UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA

WORKING PAPER N° 1

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: A PERIPHERAL PERSPECTIVE

By Carlos Escudé

PART I

PERIPHERAL REALISM: A THEORETICAL AND NORMATIVE PROPOSAL

(Chapters 1-5)

CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION

The uncritical importation of U.S. international relations theory into the Third World

In an article first published in 1977, Stanley Hoffmann called international relations a "(North)American social science"[1]. His diagnosis regarding the national origins of the discipline as a field of social-scientific enquiry, and the causes for the predominant role of U.S. academia in its development are, in my modest view, very much on target. What Hoffmann did not perceive, nonetheless, is that however understandable the causes of this phenomenon may be, the uncritical importation into the Third World of theories of international relations coined mainly in the United States has done a lot of damage. This is not an expression of a naïve nationalism, anti-Americanism or anti-imperialism. In the following five theoretical chapters I shall attempt to show that the ethnocentric quality of U.S. international relations theory, misread and ill-applied to the foreign policies of peripheral states, has sometimes seriously misguided Third World governments. I will be focusing on the case of Argentina, but my arguments can be applied to several other Third World examples.

That theories of international relations coined in the United States should be ethnocentric is almost inevitable. Hoffmann himself acknowledged that, when the field developed as a positivist social science, it appeared as if studying U.S. foreign policy were equivalent to studying the international system, and that the study of the international system could not but bring us to the role of the United States. He correctly perceived that the French or the British would be less prone to the development of such a social science, in which the protagonism of their states and nations would be a relatively minor one. Their countries lacked the power to shape world events. Therefore, their political elites became obsessed with what went on within their countries, and it was likely that their intellectuals would have fewer motivations to contribute to the development of this new field[2]. But a side consequence of this phenomenon was that less sophisticated (and/or less honest) political and intellectual elites could be tempted to draw conclusions from the writings of the U.S. theoreticians for their own foreign policies, without a critical examination of the crucial issue of whether the assumptions of these theories were adapted to local circumstances.

Indeed, in the Third World international relations theory has frequently become an ideology used to justify foreign policies that served narrow sectorial interests, rather than an earnest empirical quest to understand the way the international system works and, from there, attempt to come to solid

normative corollaries regarding a foreign policy designed to serve the interests of citizens. Though to some degree this may be the case everywhere, including Washington D.C., the important difference lay in the absence of a theory based on local circumstances (such as, for example, the relative lack of power and its consequences for foreign policy strategy). This absence made it easier for local statesmen and their advisors to resort to the ill-usage of the U.S. theories for purely justificatory purposes. Thus, the uncritical importation of the U.S. theories was juxtaposed with this vacuum, and this combination is what caused harm.

This is true both for theories based on the "realist" assumptions and for theories based on "interdependence" premises. As will be seen in the chapters that follow, realist theories have contributed to justify aggressive Third World foreign policies that have done harm not only to the international community but to the very people of the countries that implemented them as well. And interdependence theories have contributed to an overestimation of the costs, to the industrialized world, of the confrontational policies of some Third World states, and thus to an overestimation of the "margin of manoeuvre" of the said states. It is indeed a paradox that the misperceptions generated by both paradigms have led some Third World countries to more aggressive policies.

As suggested above, this has been facilitated by the fact that an international relations theory that centers on the weakness and vulnerability of peripheral countries, and thus attempts to establish what are the costs of confrontational foreign policies for weak states, has never been developed. Indeed, Hoffmann recalls that Thucydides said that while "the strong do what they can, the weak do what they must", but he reminds us that, notwithstanding, the strong have not always been successful in getting the weak to do what they "must"[3]. A theory that attempted to measure the costs, to the weak, of challenging the international order, would not only improve our understanding of the way the international system works, but would also have the practical consequence of making it more difficult for the statesmen of weak but confrontational states to justify policies that are burdensome to their own populations. In many cases this would not make any difference, but there would be cases in which the absence of a sophisticated ideological justification would make the crucial difference between moderation and brinkmanship, to the benefit of both the local population and the international community.

Yet there seems to exist a prudish attitude towards the possibility of crudely exposing the constraints imposed by vulnerability and weakness upon the foreign policies of states. Few would deny the validity of the substance of

Thucydides' Melian dialogue, but they are light years away from endorsing the Athenians' opinion with the sincere cynicism with which the Greek historian wrote. It is almost as if states were taken to be "persons" whom we should avoid offending (and indeed, as is well known, the notion of "state personality" is a tradition in the field of international law). There is a clear reluctance, on the side not only of diplomats but of theoreticians as well, to acknowledge the inequality of states. For example, Kenneth N. Waltz says: "Formally, each (state) is the equal of all others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey". And Robert O. Keohane endorses Waltz's assertion[4].

Yet this assertion is clearly not wholly true. I will return to it and to Waltz's brilliant yet flawed construction in Chapter 2. For now, suffice to say that the juridical equality of states was a juridical fiction until the signature and ratification of the United Nations Charter. After that event, it is not even a fiction, insofar as the Charter, with the inception of a Security Council with five permanent members endowed with veto power, establishes (for security matters) the principle of the juridical inequality of states. Furthermore, Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter formally awards intervention powers to the oligopolic Security Council. The same principle is extended to such international regimes as the Non Proliferation Treaty, whereby it is juridically established that some states have the right to have nuclear weapons, whereas others do not. The issues ruled by such regimes are very few in number, but exceptionally relevant in substance. States are not formally equal; admittedly, informally they are even less equal, but it is an untruth to say that none is entitled to command and none is required to obey. The provisions of Chapter 7 of the Charter were mostly not applied during the Cold War, but formally they have been there since 1945, and they acquire practical relevance in the post-Cold War era.

There may be good diplomatic reasons for not hammering on this formal inequality that for many in the Third World is an unfortunate and "disgraceful" fact. But if this is the reason for engaging in untruths, or for omitting facts, then let us not even pretend that this be a science, but rather a scholarly extension of diplomacy. The point is not irrelevant, because this omission by U.S. international relations theorists is one of several other omissions and logical flaws that will be studied later, all of which converge in the perception that the Third World states actually have a wider margin of manoeuvre than they actually have. This is not good, if only because it makes it easier for Third World leaders to adopt foreign policies that are sometimes extremely costly to their populations as well as dangerous to the world.

Some logical flaws in mainstream U.S. international relations theories

To some extent, of course, some weak states tend to be oblivious to external costs because they tend to be less liberal-democratic than most strong states. This can work in two ways:

1. In some cases, their governments simply tend to be less responsive to their populations and less vulnerable to public opinion, due to the characteristics of the local political regime and social structure.

2. In other cases, the key to understanding a foreign policy that is relatively oblivious to costs lies not so much in the absence of a vulnerability of the government to public opinion, as in the fact that a locally hegemonic culture (which in such cases will often tend to be nationalistic, unliberal and even militaristic) makes it possible to adopt such a policy and might even make it domestically profitable despite its external costs.

In other words, to understand foreign policies that do not conform to what for most U.S. theorists is the standard of "rationality" (which we will analyze below), one must delve into the nature of what Robert W. Cox has called the "state-society complex"[5], which is the real country-level unit involved in inter-"national" relations. This is true both in the center and in the periphery, but it is perhaps more obvious from the perspective of the periphery, because eccentric foreign policies that do not conform to a "rationality" standard are more frequent there. Failing to take notice of the relevance of Cox's concept and applying a simplified "state-as-actor" model is, in my opinion, one of several major logical flaws in mainstream international relations theory. This is not to say that in the theoretical construction to be developed here we will depart radically from the state-as-actor model. It simply means that, in the following pages and chapters, the state will always be acknowledged to be a problematic concept whose usage requires the definition of the subject whom it actually serves (when describing policy) or should serve (when evaluating "rationality"). Much more will be said on this later.

A second and associated major flaw --already suggested above-- lies in the often unnoticed practical and theoretical consequences of the anthropomorphic language that we all use when referring to states in terms of (for example) "weak" and "strong" actors who "suffer", are "honored", are "humiliated", have "pride" and aspire to "glory". Among other consequences, this obscures the fact that when a weak state challenges the strong at a great cost to itself, we are not witnessing an epic of courage (as might be the case when a weak

individual challenges a strong one), but rather the immoral sacrifice of the interests, the welfare and sometimes even the lives of multitudes of poor people, to the vanity of their elite. And this, in turn, contributes to consolidate a situation whereby a state-as-actor model for which the state is an unproblematic concept is elevated to the status of the country-level unit in international relations theory. As I said before, we speak of states as if they were persons, and as a consequence, unknowingly, we often adopt attitudes toward states and their policies that would be fitting for individuals but are clearly unsuitable for institutions and politicians whose primary responsibility is to care for the rights and interests of the citizens under their care. I enthusiastically acknowledge that there is a (liberal democratic) value judgement in the latter assertion, but as I will argue in Chapter 4:

1. It is impossible to avoid value judgements in the construction of international relations theory, and

2. Notwithstanding, the linguistic mechanism whereby we tend to confuse the attributes and behavior of states with those of individuals, as well as its consequences for foreign policy and international relations, can be described and studied in a value-free way.

In my opinion, one of the findings in the forthcoming theoretical chapters that can be useful not only for an international relations theory that focuses on the weakness and vulnerability of peripheral states, but also for the more general literature on international relations, is related to this "anthropomorphic fallacy" in the discourse of international relations. I think that this is an universal mechanism which has not been explicitly pointed to in the literature, and that to explore its causes and consequences everywhere will enhance our understanding of the way the world works, and will have major theoretical consequences as well. Obviously, the anthropomorphic fallacy is the linguistic dimension of what E.H. Carr has called "the fiction of the group-person"[6]. As we shall see later, this fiction has unintendedly led mainstream international relations theory to a state-centrism that generates an unacknowledged totalitarian bias.

This finding, however, is intrinsically linked to my statement above that it is impossible to avoid value judgements in the construction of international relations theory. This is true not only insofar as the theoretical relevance of the anthropomorphic fallacy depends on liberal democratic (i.e. contractarian) philosophical assumptions. It is also true from a more general point of view. Leaving aside such ramifications as decision-making or bureaucratic-politics theory, general theory of international relations hinges

around concepts such as power, interests and rationality, a fact that even critics of classical realism such as Robert O. Keohane consider positively and necessary[7]. Yet, for instance and as already suggested, "rationality" as a concept inevitably leads to the incorporation of value judgements in the logical structure of international relations theory.

In this sense, I harbor the conviction that the conventional concept of "rationality" of neoclassical economics is insufficient for international relations theory, insofar as it evaluates the rationality of means but not the rationality of ends. Not only this, but the variant of realist thought represented by Morgenthau did not really correspond to that definition and was more on target than post-Morgenthau international relations theory. As we shall see in Chapter 2, Morgenthau has an imprecise and at times contradictory use of the concept, but his most clearly defined statements point to a concept of rationality that includes Weber's rationality of ends. Indeed, Keohane is very much mistaken when he contends that although Morgenthau does not present a formal definition of rationality in Politics Among Nations,

> he seems to accept the conception that is standard in neoclassical economics. To say that governments act rationally in this sense means that they have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light both of those preferences and of their perceptions of the nature of reality.[8]

Such a definition of rationality excludes the evaluation of a government's objectives or ends (i.e., its "preferences") and is limited to the relation between means and ends. Under such a definition, Hitler's objective of eliminating the Jews from the world would not be evaluated as rational or irrational: only the means that he chose for his objective would be subject to that scrutiny. From the point of view of this definition, Hitler's policy would be rational if the means that he chose to implement it were technically adequate. But this was certainly not Morgenthau's conception of rationality. It is only necessary to reach page 8 of Morgenthau's work to find a statement that clearly and definitively contradicts Keohane's interpretation:

> (...) political realism considers a rational foreign policy to be a good foreign policy; for only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success.[9]

Thus, Morgenthau is not only encompassing means in his concept of rationality. He is clearly including ends as well. His is not the "standard conception in neoclassical economics".

There are a number of reasons why the neoclassical conception of rationality is insufficient for international relations theory, the main being that the range of state objectives that are to be found empirically is considerably wider and more divergent than in economic activity. The eccentricity of a state's foreign policy can have greater and more serious consequences for the international system than a firm's eccentricity for most markets or an individual's madness for society. Thus, the eccentricity of foreign policy is usually much more significative than is eccentric behavior at a market or societal level of analysis. Explicating such eccentricity should be a major theoretical pursuit. Preventing or controlling such eccentricity should be a major normative endeavor.

If methodologically we proceed with our theory-building as Morgenthau did, that is, building an ideal type of state behavior which we can call "rational" foreign policy, this rationality must contemplate not only means, but ends as well, because only thus will we be able to identify significatively deviant behavior. What is significative about Hitler's policies is not limited to the means he chose to execute them. The same applies to many other cases, such as Saddam, Khadaffi or Khomeini. But this implies the methodological abandonment of a merely technical concept of rationality, and the adoption of value judgements about human nature, about what the relation between the state and the individual should be, and therefore, about which foreign policy objectives are legitimate and which are not. Above all, a definition is necessary regarding who is the subject that a foreign policy is supposed to serve. And in truth, there is more than one alternative.

That in order to speak of "rationality" it is necessary to define the subject to be served by a foreign policy comes out clearly from the following example. Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait and accept an extremely costly and necessarily losing war can be evaluated both as a "miscalculation" within the realm of what Herbert A. Simon has called "bounded rationality", or as what the same author has referred to as "radical irrationality"[10]. Which of the two we choose will depend on the subject that we select as focus of that foreign policy. If the subject to be served was Saddam or the Iraqi elite, then it can probably be conceived as a miscalculation. But if the subject to be served was the people of Iraq, then not only the invasion but the entire international political power game of the Iraqi state is radical irrationality (the only rational policy available being a developmental one in which foreign policy itself is geared principally toward that goal). The choice of Saddam

or the Iraqi elite as the subject to be served by foreign policy is logically associated with authoritarian, organicist assumptions about the relation between the individual and the state. The choice of the people (or citizenry) is, contrariwise, associated with contractarian, liberal-democratic philosophical assumptions. Similar arguments could be made for the concept of "interests". Thus, philosophical assumptions are explicitly or implicitly built into the very logical structure of international relations theory, whether the theoretician acknowledges it or not.

For mainstream theory (for example, in Robert O. Keohane's important 1984 volume, After Hegemony[11]) ethical considerations are a mere complement of a value-free theory. They are useful for normative ends which are independent of the theory itself. It is my contention instead that, knowingly or unknowingly, ethical considerations are enmeshed into the very theory, intertwined with empirical elements and if-then hypotheses. The theory therefore becomes a construction that is epistemologically different from the theories of the natural sciences. It should even warrant a different name (for example, theoria, which I shall deliberately avoid using in order to simplify jargon). Needless to say, this is true independently of whether we look at the world from the perspective of the powerful or from that of the periphery.

A systemic theory of limits

If our philosophical assumptions are contractarian and liberal democratic, then a theory of international relations for the periphery will begin by focusing on systemic constraints. Indeed, as we shall see in the forthcoming chapters, an international relations theory that focuses on the weakness and vulnerability of peripheral states will necessarily be a modest theory of limits[12]. It will teach us what a peripheral state should not do if it does not want to jeopardize the welfare of its own population. As such, it will be based on the value-judgement that the primary "national interest" of a weak state (especially if it is also poor) lies in its economic development, and in the quest of a rationality defined in terms of such an interest.

On the other hand --and contrariwise to the opinions of Kenneth N. Waltz and Robert O. Keohane-- such an international relations theory will almost inevitably come to the conclusion that the contribution of systemic analysis will be modest, and that a critical mass of specific theories of foreign policy for individual states would teach us much more about the way the world works than a more general systemic theory. But despite its modesty, this systemic theory of limits must be developed because of the reasons stated above: its absence is not only intellectually impoverishing; it is also

politically dangerous. Its absence makes it easier for scoundrels anywhere to construct fallacies on the bases of an international relations theory that has been developed from a set of assumptions related to the greatest concentration of power in the planet, i.e., the (North)American state. The existing theory of international relations is unknowingly ethnocentric and cannot be extrapolated without subtle adaptations to the foreign policy of a peripheral state.

I will attempt to demonstrate this assertion through an analysis of the literature on international relations theory vis-a-vis one peripheral case-study. In so doing, I will in a way be taking up Hoffmann's challenge, for in his 1977 article he states that the heretofore (North)American field of international relations theory needs to take distance from the perspective of a highly conservative superpower towards the weak and revolutionary[13]. My perspective will be the opposite, that of the weak towards the strong, especially towards the United States. But my perspective will not be "revolutionary", and this not because of conservative political values, but because I think that it is clear that our perspective will only be truly democratic and humanitarian if we give economic development the status of the foremost national interest of a weak and poor country. This requires moderation and prudence in foreign policy. And in this I pay my homage to Hans J. Morgenthau, in my view the most ethically-minded and most misunderstood of the international relations theorists who worked in the United States.

The fallacious "state-centric" character of mainstream U.S. international relations theory

In this respect, one important conclusion both for peripheral and central realism is that Waltz represents a regression vis-a-vis Morgenthau. This point will be developed in Chapter 2. From this point of view, I (once again) deeply disagree with Keohane, and arrive at a paradoxical and stimulating agreement with Richard K. Ashley which is worth some attention[14].

Indeed, I find my convergence with Ashley regarding many conceptual points to be intellectually fascinating, because we depart from very different philosophical assumptions and normatively we come to opposite conclusions. My critique of the anthropomorphic fallacy and of certain methodological flaws in mainstream international relations theory is parallel and has some points in common with his critique of what he calls the "state-centric" character of neorealist and interdependentist theory. My critique of the field's "scientificism" (of which the example mentioned above regarding the necessarily value-laden character of concepts such as rationality is

illustrative) is parallel to his more global critique of positivism. My critique of Waltz's concept of the international system has something in common with Ashley's more global critique of the "structuralism" of neorealist theory. We are both deeply concerned about the unproblematic status awarded to the state in mainstream international relations theory. We both think -- contrariwise to Keohane-- that this generates a theory that leads to the legitimization of the interests of dominant elites. We both share an underlying concern for the people who are supposed to be represented and served by a foreign policy. In a paradoxical way we are both "radicals" who distrust the very concept of the nation-state, and question the theoretical validity of the state-as-actor assumption of neorealist and interdependentist thought (though in very different ways).

But Ashley is undertaking his analysis from the United States, and this leads him to an underlying but radical questioning of that country's role in the world, its hegemony, dominance or leadership. I, on the contrary, am basically concerned with the consequences for the people of certain Third World states, of certain confrontational Third World foreign policies. As a consequence, my "radicalism" leads me to question the right of Third World elites to adopt foreign policies that are costly to the people whom they are supposed to represent (under explicit liberal democratic assumptions). This means that while Ashley implicitly questions U.S. domination, I question costly and ineffective Third World challenges of U.S. domination! From a peripheral perspective under contractarian, liberal democratic assumptions, economic development is the very definition of the "national" interest, the principal function of foreign policy is to facilitate development, and the United States is simply the single most important external constraint to foreign policy.

Of course, part of the difference between Ashley's final conclusions and my own are the product of one basic difference in our explicit assumptions. I am a contractarian individualist, and he explicitly rejects this philosophical position. My "radicalism" regarding the nation-state and the "state-centric" character of neorealist and interdependentist theory derives not from Marx or critical theory, but from Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, John Stuart Mill, Renan, and Argentine mid-nineteenth century political philosopher Juan Bautista Alberdi. This difference in our assumptions may account for our probable differences in the evaluation of Third World foreign policies. But this difference does not interfere in our other conclusions, regarding the fallacious unproblematic status given to the state by mainstream international-relations theory, its pernicious political consequences, and the futility of value-free positivism for general theory in this field. In my opinion, this convergence greatly enhances the significance of our conclusions regarding neorealist and interdependentist theory. Contrariwise, classical

realism is a thing apart, and a tradition from which there is a great deal to be learnt.

An additional word on our contactarian assumptions

An explicit definition of the term "contractarian", as I use it, should be given at this point. I acknowledge the "social contract" to be, in part, an ahistorical myth which was and continues to be functional to the social construction of a state-individual relationship whereby the only ethical justification of the state lies in the defense of the rights and interests of the individuals, and whereby the individual is an end-in-itself and the state is only a means to serve the individual. Thus, the myth of the social contract was and is functional for democracy, even though the historical process that led to democratization involved the often violent evolution of power structures and the interplay of competing social forces, and is therefore at the antipodes of a contract among rational individuals maximizing utility functions.

However, insofar as a mind frame is generated whereby the only acceptable relationship between the individual and the state is one in which the state exists solely to protect the individual, an implicit "contract" in fact develops which is more than a myth, and this is what in fact has happened with the world's liberal democracies.

To exemplify, when Alberdi adopted the Roman maxim, ubi bene, ibi patria ("where I am well, that is where my country be") he was being fully contractarian, not in the sense that he naïvely believed his polity to have sprung from a historical social compact, but in the sense that his allegiance to the state was conditional to the state's compliance with the duties that spring from the conception of the relation between the individual and the state described above.[15] If the state fails to do this, it loses moral authority, the exercise of its authority becomes tyrannical, and challenges to that authority become legitimate.

Twenty years after Alberdi wrote this, the French political philosopher Joseph Ernest Renan wrote his celebrated essay, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?", in which he combined the refutal of the naïve notion of a historical founding compact (which arbitrarily pretended to erase one thousand years of French national history with the assumption that people had rationally and voluntarily associated themselves as a nation), with the republican moral imperative of acknowledging an implicit social compact that operates on an everyday basis, generating and regenerating the basic consensus underlying a legitimate

polity. He summed it up by stating that "the existence of a nation is a daily plebiscite" (Oeuvres Complètes, Vol. I, Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1947; page 904). The present work is based on this type of limited contractarian assumptions, which are not based on an utilitarian theory of action but rather on liberal democratic ethics. It corresponds to a historically-generated frame of mind whereby the myth of the social contract becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy which is ethically binding. This frame of mind avowedly pretends to be of universal validity, even where it is not yet culturally hegemonic[16].

Form this perspective, the arguments developed here cannot be subject to the critiques that theorists the like of Ashley direct against utilitarianism. Nonetheless, they will be unacceptable to anyone who does not agree with the view that certain principles including human rights and liberal democracy are of universal validity. This is so inasmuch as this work is based on the assumptions that foreign policies should be designed to serve the people, and that the primary national interest of a peripheral country lies in its economic growth and development, the promotion of which is the best way of serving the people. It is only from these premises regarding what is desirable that we can even begin to think about the systemic constraints to foreign policy. These, however, are normative assumptions. They do not stem from an utilitarian theory of action, which is irrelevant to our purposes, although other dimensions of utilitarianism (such as utilitarian ethics) are indeed central to our assumptions.

Operational definitions I

Having mentioned my convergence with Ashley regarding the unproblematic character of the state in mainstream international relations theory, it is appropriate now to formulate certain operational definitions (and distinctions) that will make it possible to avoid falling into that theoretical pitfall. Indeed, I shall present two sets of important operational definitions. The first set is of major theoretical relevance, and helps to differentiate the theory to be developed in these pages from the mainstream "state-centric" theory developed in the United States:

> By "nation" I shall understand a human population linked to a territory, and to some extent bound by a common language and culture. In terms of this definition, most countries do not qualify as "nations".[17]
>
> By "country" I shall understand an inter-"nationally" recognized territorial unit that is governed by a set of indigenous institutions. Countries and "nations" are not always equivalents. Terms such as

"international" are essentially fallacious, although one cannot avoid using them because fallacy is built into our language.

By "citizenry" or "people" I shall understand the legally-residing population of a country, whether the country in point be a "nation" or not.

By "state" I shall understand the set of public institutions that regulate a country's life.[18]

By "government" I shall understand a transitory administration of the state.

By the "national interest" I shall understand the long-term interests of the citizenry of a country. In so doing, I am making a concession to usage and habit, because it is somewhat awkward to speak of the "country interest", yet the universally accepted concept of the "national interest" cannot be limited to the "nation" if the same country is inhabited by minorities that are considered alien to the "nation". On the other hand, the concept of "national" or country-interest is empirically problematic yet theoretically of a statistical nature. What is good for 90% of the population is almost unambiguously of the "national interest". What is bad for 90% of the population is unambiguously against the national interest, even if it is clearly in the interests of the remaining 10%. In between there are many ambiguous situations. When a cleavage approximating 50% divides a society on a crucial issue, there is no such thing as the "national interest", and there is a potential for disruption and civil war. Needless to say, the evaluation of what is "good" and what is "bad" for a specific segment of the population (and just how "good" or "bad" it is) is in itself problematic, requires technical appraisal, and implies value judgements.

By the "interests of the state" I shall understand the long-term interests of the set of institutions that conform the state.

By the "interests of a government" I shall understand the shorter-term interests of an administration, which can at times coincide, but can also diverge substantially from the interests of the citizenry, or even from those of the state itself.

By the "interests of the statesman" I shall understand an even narrower range of interests that are not to be confused with the interests of the people or citizenry.

These definitions are of theoretical relevance because for mainstream international relations theory the "state" and the "nation" (and hence the "nation-state") are unproblematic concepts which are usually lumped together with "government", and sometimes even with the interests of an individual tyrant. As will be seen below (especially in Chapter 4) this conceptual confusion is not only theoretically impoverishing but also functional to the legitimization of ruling elites everywhere in the world. Rendering these concepts as unproblematic and undifferentiated leads to confusing a "citizenry-centric" rationality with a "government-centric" or even a "statesman-centric" one, and to the frequent disguise of the latter as the former. Doubtlessly, it is usually empirically very difficult to evaluate which policies are "citizenry-centric" and which are only "government-centric" in terms of the interests that they serve. Nonetheless, to acknowledge this difficulty adds to our understanding, while to forget (on account of this difficulty) about the conceptual difference between a "citizenry-centric" policy and a "government-centric" one, hopelessly confuses the issues under study.

Needless to say, the confusion of government-centric policies with citizenry-centric policies is, on the side of U.S. theoreticians, an unintended one. Keohane, for example, has expressed himself very strongly about the need for policies that benefit the most deprived individuals[19], and thus has shown a sensitivity for what I call a citizenry-centric rationality. But this is not built into his theory, which continues to treat the state as an unproblematic concept. Therefore, although his intentions are ethically-inspired, his theory unintendedly and unknowingly tends to betray those intentions. Fallacy is built into his state-centric prose.

This theoretical flaw (identified also by Ashley) is very substantive. On the other hand, my diagnosis of the logical origin of this flaw of mainstream theory (which is not Ashley's) is that "nation", "country", "state", "government" and "statesman" are all lumped together in a simplified state-as-actor model (while the "citizenry" is seldom if ever mentioned, which as will be seen in Chapter 4 is no coincidence). My solution to this problem (which is not Ashley's either) is to differentiate the diverse subjects that a foreign policy can serve, through a conceptual distinction between "citizenry-centric" and "government-centric" (or "statesman-centric") rationalities.

Methodologically, this is also a shortcut solution to Cox's relevant insight about the fact that the real country-level actor in "international" affairs is the state-society complex. By distinguishing a state's "citizenry-centric" rationality from its "government or statesman-centric" rationalities, we are introducing the state-society complex in a simplified way, at the <u>output</u> level

of state policy, rather than at the operationally more difficult level of the social forces that conform a state. A state that produces citizenry-centric policies will obviously be very different from a state that generates statesman-centric ones. Obviously, social forces lie at the origin of this crucial difference between these types of states. But that can be left to sociological and political theory to explore, while international relations theory can take advantage of this methodological shortcut, and simply depart from an output level of state policy in which the subject to be served by the state is clearly defined. Thus, the fallacy of state-centric theory is avoided, even though we continue to deal with a state-as-actor model.

On the other hand, it should be pointed out that we should not confuse a "state-centric theory" (that engages in the logical flaws analyzed above) with a "state-centric rationality" (that is a policy rationality geared towards the long-term interests of the set of institutions that comprise a state. However, because the state can at times undergo long-term appropriations by elites (as was obviously the case in the Soviet Union and in Mexico, among numerous other possible examples), the interests of the state are not necessarily those of the country and its citizenry, although they can at times coincide. Because of the conceptual ambiguity involved, I will refrain from qualifying rationality as "state-centric", and in my qualifications of rationality will move from the unambiguous extremes of "government or statesman-centric", on the one hand, to "citizenry-centric", on the other (the latter being the normatively desirable type). Thus, state-centric <u>rationality</u> will be eliminated from my lexicon.

On the other hand, in the ultimate instance state-centric <u>theory</u> (which is not to be eliminated from my language) leads to the undesirable anthropomorphisms mentioned before, insofar as it assumes that the state is to the international system what the individual is to the state). This analogy is essentially flawed. Under liberal democratic assumptions, the state is an apparatus that <u>should</u> be at the service of the individual, while the individual is an end-in-itself. Hence, the state's policies are not analogous to the individual's actions: the latter can legitimately be self-serving, while the former <u>should</u> be at the service of the individual. As was said before, my solution to this problem does not lie in altogether eliminating the state-as-actor model, but in defining the subject that the state actually serves or should serve at the output level of policy. The qualification of whom it actually serves is necessary to describe policy. The value judgement of whom it should serve is necessary to formulate a criterion of rationality.

Peripheral realism and the "trading state": two complementary ideal types

As mentioned, peripheral realism assumes that the principal priority of a peripheral state, especially if it is underdeveloped, is its economic growth and development, and that by definition a "rational" foreign policy must, among other qualifications, be citizenry-centric. As such, peripheral realism is an ideal type of foreign policy, which will often not be found in a "pure state" empirically. A policy can at times deviate from peripheral realism for reasons that are unrelated to whether it is citizenry-centric or not. This will be the case if a country has a neighbor the like of Saddam Hussein: it will not be able to afford to subordinate security matters, even if its foreign policy is citizenry-centric.

This brings us to another important conceptual development that I draw from U.S. sources. Peripheral realism is, quintessentially, the foreign policy of what Richard Rosecrance has called the "trading state"[20], which is in itself an ideal type. The emergence of a trading state, with a peripheral realist foreign policy, is conditioned by both external and domestic factors. Not every international context makes it possible for a "trading state" to arise. Not every domestic culture, political regime or social structure is compatible with such a state or such a foreign policy. Nonetheless, today's world is dominated by a mind frame that makes it possible for most peripheral states to adopt the foreign policy of a trading state: small states are no longer automatically absorbed militarily by powerful ones, and large military establishments are usually more the product of the local elite's inclination and other domestic factors, than the imposition of external circumstances.

This change in the contemporary frame of mind is as relevant as the shift from the medieval world to the modern state system explored by John Gerard Ruggie[21]. And, as will be argued in Chapter 2, although systemic factors are to some extent involved in the present shift to a trading world, cultural and domestic factors are at least of similar importance, just as great power rapprochement has sometimes been more a consequence of domestic variables than of systemic ones (a fact that is as valid for the end of the Cold War as for the cases studied by Stephen R. Rock in Why Peace Breaks Out)[22].

As Rosecrance has pointed out, the shift from a military-political world to a trading world did not occur overnight nor as the consequence of spontaneous generation. It is a process that developed slowly. Incipient manifestations of the phenomenon and the corresponding ideology can be found long before it became the trend that it has now become. Countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada have been trading states throughout their history. Even though during the previous half century it had been involved in continuous

internal and external warfare, from approximately 1870 to 1930 Argentina can be fairly described as a trading state as well. Juan Bautista Alberdi, the so called father of the Argentine Constitution, wrote in 1852 that:

> Victory will give us laurels, but the laurel is a sterile plant in the Americas. The spike of peace, which is made of gold, is more valuable, not in the language of the poet but in that of the economist. The time for heros has passed; we have entered the age of common sense.[23]

Not only was this the thought of the most important local political philosopher of the times, who was vastly influential. This was also the national strategy laid out by President Justo José de Urquiza who, in a dialogue with a British envoy, and after listening to the friendly admonition that if he contained "the bellicose spirit of (his) compatriots" he would "do wonders", replied, as if inspired by the yet unborn Rosecrance:

> We will progress, sir, we will not cease to do so. That is my will. This will be a trading country and there will be free navigation.[24]

Such a transformation of a country that had been constantly at war either civil or foreign, since its birth in 1810, could not take place immediately, and ten additional years were required to stabilize the situation. By 1862, however, Argentina was <u>almost</u> a trading state. And by 1870, after the Paraguayan war, Argentina was fully one. As Harry S. Ferns points out in his classic work on Anglo-Argentine relations during the nineteenth century, not only did Argentina become a trading state, but Britain, that was in the apogee of the Victorian trading system, became one in its relations with Argentina. After 1862 there was a rapid shift from a political to a commercial diplomacy, in which the main actors were businessmen and in which the British government very rarely interfered, thus giving the official papers a very welcome dry and boring flavor[25].

Although --as we shall see in Chapter 6-- the ideology of a trading state as formulated by Alberdi and Urquiza did not go by uncontested in Argentina, it was clearly dominant from approximately 1870 to 1908. Indeed, it would be possible to write a history of Argentina that focused on how, from a history of turbulent civil and foreign strife, it evolved into a trading state, and how after approximately 1908, with a greatly increased wealth that came together with an identity crisis produced by the massive waves of immigrants that flowed from approximately 1880 to 1930, it regressed into a political-military state and developed a culture affected by nationalism and delusions of grandeur.

The most important point here, however, is that in certain international contexts, a state policy, political philosophy, and frame of mind based on trading-state principles were possible at least as far back as the nineteenth century, and that this was precisely the case regarding Argentina, our case study. In more recent times, the international conditions needed for the emergence and survival of trading states have proliferated, and the benefits of adopting a peripheral realist foreign policy profile have increased.

Indeed, the post-World War II creation of influential international institutions on a scale never before seen has contributed to the generation of a degree of cooperation that makes the increasing emergence of trading states more feasible. In this sense, all students of international relations are greatly indebted to Robert O. Keohane. Through a gradual learning process, he first rejected realism rather emphatically, then came to acknowledge what is rescueable and unescapable about realism, and finally built a theory of cooperation partly based on the very realist principles that have so often been used to justify conflict. Keohane's work has both enhanced our understanding of cooperation in today's world and stimulated policy-makers to strengthen this pattern of cooperation through the building of international institutions. In the present work, I will strongly criticize specific aspects of Keohane's work many times. This does not mean, however, that I do not understand that the main thrust of his work is one of the most important contribution of the 1980s to international relations theory. On the contrary, the institutionalized cooperation patterns studied by Keohane are essential to the development of the trading state, and peripheral realism is the ideal type of foreign policy that corresponds to the trading state. Hence, all three go hand in hand and are different dimensions of the same phenomenon.

In my opinion, an essential condition for the survival of humanity is that eventually all peripheral states become trading states and/or renounce to the foreign policies of the traditional "military-political" state, thus reducing the range of the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the degree of global instability. Admittedly, the survival of humanity will require additional conditions, but most of these fall outside the reach and influence of a peripheral country and of an author from the periphery. My modest contribution to this sacred and most problematic of human objectives, therefore, can only lie in rationally preaching to the periphery (and especially to the Third World) on the benefits of citizenry-centric policies and on the evils of every other alternative. This is the ultimate normative source of inspiration underlying this effort to build a "systemic theory of limits" for peripheral foreign policies. This is objectively in the interests of both wider humanity and of the individual citizens of the countries of the periphery itself. The citizens of the highly developed yet peripheral trading

states are already conscious of this fact, and the missionary task of conversion is basically concentrated in the Third World, as Rosecrance knows well.

In turn, if it is to be lasting, the eventual conversion of Third World foreign policies is conditional to the liberal-democratization of that set of countries, i.e., their Westernization in the sense applied by Theodore von Laue[26]. Only if the process of liberalization and democratization continues to expand throughout the Third World can there be an ever-increasing prevalence of citizenry-centric foreign policies everywhere, because it is only with liberal democratic assumptions that such policies can be demonstrated logically to be the only possible rational course of action and a categorical imperative as well. On this issue, I definitively side with the view that only a world of "republics", i.e. of liberal democratic polities that acknowledge the individual citizen to be the state's raison d'etre, can survive destruction in the long-term. Only such polities will consistently tend to adopt (albeit boundedly) citizenry-centric foreign policies that will be more predictable and manageable, thus reducing the probabilities of a political accident leading to global war and holocaust. Hence, I side with Immanuel Kant and Michael Doyle in the contention that democracies are less likely to fight one another[27]. The accelerating world trend towards democratization observed by Doyle over the past two centuries is a propitious indicator, as well as a prerequisite for humanity's survival in an age of weapons of mass destruction.

As already suggested, in this sense (that is, from the point of view of the relations between the individual and the state) I am anything but a cultural relativist. I believe liberal democratic principles to be the only natural law of universal validity, and their discovery to be the West's foremost contribution to mankind. On this issue, my position could not be further apart from Ashley's, and this is what makes our convergence on other conceptual issues so fascinating.

The "reflective" approach

The discussion above brings us to Keohane's praiseworthy 1988 attempt to compare and reconcile mainstream theory to what he calls the "reflective" approach to international politics, in which he includes Hayward Alker, Richard Ashley, Friedrich Kratochwill, and John Ruggie[28]. In that piece, Keohane characterized mainstream theory as "avowedly rationalistic". Counterpoised to it he identifies a corpus of work of sociological inspiration "which stresses the role of impersonal social forces as well as the impact of

cultural practices, norms, and values that are not derived from calculations of interests"[29]. These "reflective" scholars "all emphasize the importance of historical and textual interpretation and the limitations of scientific models in studying world politics"[30]. Keohane's effort to effect this comparison and reconciliation merits a statement on the status of the present work vis-a-vis that classification. In this respect, it would be fair to say that:

1. The present work is not "rationalistic" in the sense applied by Keohane. On the contrary, it is obsessed with the problem of "irrationality": eccentric foreign policies that deviate from standards of rationality. Yet "rationality" is a key concept for this work insofar as, given explicit philosophical assumptions that fill it with contents, it is needed to define an ideal type of foreign policy, from which deviations are identified and its causes empirically and social-scientifically explored. From that point of view, I am a "rationalist" in the broader sense by which Morgenthau should also be considered such.

2. The present work, hence, is simultaneously normative and explicatory, but its explicatory dimension is subordinated to value judgements connected with its normative dimension.

3. Positivistic methodologies (in the original sense of Comtian-inspired social science, including testable if-then hypotheses) can be used for middle-range theories with respect to such limited issues as decision-making or attempts to measure the costs and benefits of specific foreign policy strategies. Notwithstanding, the development of a general "science" of international relations is clearly beyond human reach.

4. The normative goals of this work stem from a historically-generated scale of values and frame of mind which can be studied by a strategy like that used by the "reflective" thinkers. This mind frame is cosmopolitan and liberal democratic.

5. Both the normative and the explicatory goals of this work lead me to the identification and deconstruction of the mental and linguistic traps generated by a historically previous mind frame, which was "nationalistic" and state-centric, and which subordinated the values of democracy and individual freedom to that of sovereignty. Phenomena such as the anthropomorphic fallacy in the discourse of international relations, which was mentioned above, should be studied under the perspective of both their causes and consequences. They are of great theoretical relevance, yet their demythification is also part of a

political praxis. Failing to demythfy them, however, would also be part of a (pro status quo) political praxis.

From these points of view, then, the present work is closer to the "interpretive" or "reflective" approaches than to mainstream theory. Notwithstanding, the methodology applied owes a great deal to Morgenthau, and from that point of view it is closer to "classical realism" than to any other school. But because this is a realism for those who are deprived of power, economic affairs are placed at the top of the hierarchy of issues.

Operational Definitions II

My second set of operational definitions merely seeks to clarify what I mean by terms that will be used everywhere in this discussion, including the title of the book:

> By "central states" I shall understand the states of countries whose economies share significatively in the generation of cycles of expansion and contraction of the world economy, and whose political predominance in the international system gives them a major role in the establishment of the written and unwritten rules of the said system. In other words, a composite political and economic standard is applied in the definition of the "center", and hence, of the periphery as well.
>
> By "peripheral states" I shall understand the states of countries whose economies are, contrariwise, deeply affected by the said cycles of expansion and contraction, without sharing significatively in their generation, and whose position in the international system is such that they play a modest role in the establishment of the written rules of the said system, and practically no role at all in the establishment of its unwritten rules. Thus, the concept of "peripheral states" comprises: 1) all underdeveloped states (i.e., the entire "Third World"); 2) many small developed states whose economic vulnerability would be very great if they played their international politics game without paying due attention to systemic constraints. This is not to say that the theory of peripheral realism for which I attempt to lay some modest foundations is applicable to all peripheral states. Indeed, although a few of my conclusions may be applicable to them all, most of these conclusions will be applicable only to underdeveloped states, and some others yet will be applicable only to a special category of underdeveloped states that will be defined later: those which are "relatively irrelevant to the vital interests of the great powers". On the other hand, the reader

must be forewarned that a certain flexibility is needed in the application of the term "peripheral state", insofar as the composite definition of the concept implies different degrees of "peripherality", as well as the existence of cases which are clearly peripheral in some dimensions yet central in others. Notwithstanding, developed countries like Australia and New Zealand are very clearly a part of the periphery almost in every dimension[31].

By the "Third World" I shall understand the set of the underdeveloped countries of the periphery. The use of this very imprecise term is basically a concession to convention, although it is at times handy and practical.

By "systemic constraints" I shall understand those external constraints faced by peripheral states, in whose generation they have had an insignificant role if any at all. For the purposes of a theory of the international relations of peripheral states, it is not necessary to limit the concept of "systemic constraints" and of the "international system" to relational phenomena that are relatively independent of the actions and attributes of the states as such (whether large or small, powerful or weak), as does Kenneth Waltz (who attempts to make an analogy between the international system and the market, which he claims is independent of the microeconomic units that interact in it). This may be important for a theory of the international relations of the central states, but insofar as the periphery is concerned there is no need to disaggregate the external constraints stemming directly from the attributes and actions of the central states, from those that stem from the relational phenomena that define the international system in Waltz's theory.[32] The existence of systemic constraints, on the other hand, does not imply that a peripheral government cannot adopt policies that challenge these constraints, but only that such policies will probably produce a negative balance of costs and benefits for the long-term interests of the people. It is interesting to note that the very concept of "systemic constraints" makes value judgements unavoidable. The systemic constraints affecting policy "A" will often differ according to whether we evaluate the policy in citizenry-centric or government-centric terms.

With these definitions in mind, we can now move on to a description of the structure of this book.

The contents of this study

In Chapter 2 I will begin with an analysis of the insufficiencies of "classical" and "structural" realism vis-a-vis the realities and circumstances faced by peripheral states (thus picking up the terms coined by Keohane to refer to the currents of realist thought of which Morgenthau and Waltz have been the main postwar spokesmen).

In Chapter 3 I will carry on with the insufficiencies of the "complex interdependence" model for my peripheral perspective. I will pay particular attention to Keohane and Nye's 1979 book, even though one has the impression that many of its theoretical claims have quietly lapsed, and despite the fact that the thought of Robert O. Keohane on the issues posed there has, since that time, undergone considerable evolution, because this is where some of the most relevant claims with respect to the Third World are to be found in the recent debate with respect to realism and neorealism. Furthermore, the 1979 edition of Keohane and Nye's book has had an exceptional impact upon the standard rhetoric of some Third World leaders and their advisors on issues of world politics. It was intended to do good, but it has done harm instead. Therefore, its errors must be clearly and explicitly refuted and demythified.

Chapter 4 will delve deeper into some philosophical and methodological problems faced by mainstream theory that are of significance both from the perspective of the center and that of the periphery. Here I will go on to reflect on the characteristics, origins and consequences (both practical and theoretical) of the anthropomorphic fallacy mentioned above.

In my brief Chapter 5 --which puts an end to Part I of the book-- I will make the point that not only has the Third World imported a theory that was developed from the perspective of the powerful, but that, to make things worse, it is to a great extent a theory of a very low quality in which contradictions and logical flaws abound, even thinking of it in its own terms (i.e., abandoning the perspective of the periphery). To do this I will concentrate on one major author, Robert O. Keohane, because he is the leader of the so called school of the "neoliberal institutionalists", which is a relevant segment of mainstream U.S. theory that I had not delved into in the previous chapters. Among other issues, I will deal there with the marked obsession with "hard" science and with economics that prevails in the field, and with the apparent need to import a methodological and epistemological model from fields whose subject-matter is very different from that of international relations.

Concomitantly with these analyses and criticisms, I will come to some elementary conclusions regarding the external constraints faced by the foreign policies of peripheral states, under the assumption that the primary "national" or country interest of such a state is the economic growth and development of the society that it partially administrates.

With a modest systemic theory of limits thus sketched, in Section II I will move on to my case study, which is basically an incomplete and embryonic theory of Argentine foreign policy. The need to develop such theories arises, as suggested above, from my conclusion that the contributions of systemic theory are necessary but very modest, and that we can learn much more about the way the world works by attempting to understand the origins of the foreign policies of specific countries.

Chapter 6 will be devoted to the empirical identification of the cultural elements that have often led Argentine foreign policy away from the limits that, theoretically, should have been imposed upon her by the international system. In other words, there I will study the cultural background of Argentina's lapses into irrationality. In so doing, I will adopt a couple of theoretical concepts developed by Simon that have led me to conceptualize culture not in terms of direct causality vis-a-vis specific decisions, but in terms of its incidence upon the menu of choices from which decisions are drawn. In other words, culture cannot explain why decision B was taken when the alternatives given were A, B and C. But it can tell us very much about the origin of the alternatives themselves, and why they were not B, C and D, or A, D and E. As an example, consider the fact that no Canadian government would have entertained the notion of invading St. Pierre et Miquelon, while the possibility of invading Falkland/Malvinas has been studied as a possibility by most Argentine governments ever since approximately 1950.

In Chapter 7, I will continue with the development of my case study, through an attempt at measuring the costs, for Argentina, of a confrontational foreign policy during the 1940s. Finally, in my Conclusions I will outline President Menem's foreign policy, describing it as an attempt to focus on development and avoid unnecessary and potentially costly confrontations with the United States and other great powers on issues that are not related to Argentina's material interests. In other words, we are witnessing an attempt to give Argentina the foreign policy that is typical of a "trading state", despite the cultural obstacles described in Chapter 6.

However, my theory of Argentine foreign policy will necessarily be incomplete because I will not engage in traditional decision-making analyses, partly because that requires additional empirical investigation, partly because that

has been done elsewhere[33], and partly because the origins of irrationality (indeed an understudied dimension of international relations and the source of a significative amount of the world's instability) interest me more than phenomena linked to bounded rationality. Indeed, as Herbert A. Simon pointed out, this is one of the great challenges faced by the social sciences and a gaping black hole in our knowledge, insofar as the unexpected and unforeseeable are often much more relevant than the relatively expected and predictable.

NOTES

1. S. Hoffmann, "International Relations: An American Social Science", Daedalus, Summer 1977, later reprinted in S. Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva, Boulder: Westview 1987, chapter 1.

2. S. Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva, Buenos Aires: GEL, 1991; Spanish-language edition, page 25.

3. S. Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva, Spanish-language edition page 34.

4. K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979, page 114; cf. R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview Press 1989; page 1.

5. R.W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", in R.O. Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986; page 216.

6. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, London: Macmillan, 1962; page 149.

7. R.O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", in R.O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986; p. 159.

8. R.O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics", in R.O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986; page 11.

9. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred P. Knopf, 1948, page 8.

10. H.A. Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science", American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, 1985, pages 301-303.

11. R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984; Chapter 11.

12. In this I agree wholly with S. Hoffmann, who --referring not only to he modest realm of peripheral circumstances, but to the entire field-- stated that international relations should be the science of uncertainty, of the limits of action. See Janus and Minerva, Spanish-language edition, page 33.

13. S. Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva, Spanish-language edition, page 35.

14. R.K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism", in R.O. Keohane (ed.) op.cit. 1986.

15. J.B. Alberdi, Las Bases, Buenos Aires: Tor, 1948; page 59. First published in 1852.

16. Needless to say, I strongly reject the doctrine of the morality of states, that holds that the subjects of international morality are the states and not the individuals. I opt instead for the cosmopolitan position that holds that boundaries between states are irrelevant from the point of view of the moral obligations of states to their citizens, and that external intervention on such issues as human rights and the defense of liberal democratic principles is legitimate (see C. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). However, this is not the issue at stake here, insofar as what I am discussing is what the obligation of the state is in itself, vis-a-vis foreign policy. To say that, under contractarian, liberal democratic assumptions, the only legitimate foreign policy is one that serves the citizens of the country involved, rather than the egotistic interests of an elite, is a question apart from the right of intervention by external powers when basic human rights are being violated grossly and systematically.

17. I explicitly reject any organicist undertones to this concept. The "nation" is not a gestalt whose whole is greater and more important than its constituent individuals. This is the reason why in principle I dislike using the term "nation" (which often does carry organicist undertones), and avoid it as much as I can. The term "nation", however, is so built into our language that it is almost impossible to theorize about inter-"national" relations without using it.

18. I explicitly assume that the state's role should be defined in contractarian terms, although empirically this is very often not the case. The state exists to serve the individual. The individual is the only end-in-itself (and thus we see that even definitions can have built-in value judgements). On this score I declare myself a direct follower of my nineteenth century compatriot Alberdi, whose work Las Bases was already mentioned. This book was (together with the U.S. Constitution) the single most influential source in the drafting of the 1852 Argentine Constitution, which is still in force today. Another work by Alberdi that is strongly congenial with the present study is his rather sketchy El Crimen de la Guerra, first published in...

19. R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony, chapter 11.

20. R. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading Sate: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York: Basic Books 1986.

21. J.G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis", in R.O. Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press 1986; chapter 6.

22. S.R. Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

23. J.B. Alberdi, op.cit. page 59

24. H.S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960; page 303.

25. H.S. Ferns, op.cit., page 294.

26. T. von Laue, The World Revolution of Westernization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

27. M. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986).

28. "International Institutions: Two Approaches", first published in International Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 4 (December 1988), and reprinted in R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview Press 1989.

29. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989, page 160.

30. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989, page 161.

31. My definitions of central and peripheral states are inspired in Immanuel Wallerstein, although they are adapted to my purposes. I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System II, Academic Press, Inc., New York 1980.

32. K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979. See Chapter 2 below.

33. Roberto Russell, Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University 1992.

Chapter 2 - WHY AND HOW "PERIPHERAL REALISM" IS DIFFERENT FROM "CLASSICAL" AND "STRUCTURAL" REALISM

Introduction

Realism is an approach to the study of international politics and to the formulation of foreign policy that can be applied to central and peripheral states alike. However, because political realism focuses its attention on power, and because the world looks very different when seen from the perspective of the powerful than when seen from that of the relative absence of power, a "central" realism will differ substantively from a "peripheral" one. Nonetheless, the development of a peripheral realism has heretofore been neglected. In this chapter I shall attempt to take a first step in the development of a peripheral realism, identifying the conceptual differences between a realism of the center and a realism of the periphery.

As was said in Chapter 1, the uncritical importation of international relations theories coined mainly in the United States has done considerable harm to some Third World countries. Theories based on realist assumptions have often led to internal repression, to the breakdown of democracy and to human rights abuses, as a consequence of the realist's obsession with "national" security. In some extreme cases, they have led to aggressive foreign policies and to attempts to produce and sometimes also sell weapons of mass destruction, thus increasing regional (and sometimes even global) instability.

This has led the foreign policies of some Third World countries very much astray. Almost always, it has taken economic development and the welfare of the citizenry away from the focus of domestic and foreign policies, and this has been to the detriment of the happiness of the peoples involved.

Obviously, the theories themselves, however ill-interpreted and ill-applied, cannot be said to be the sole causes of these phenomena. As already suggested, when theories are picked up by governments it is usually because they are useful to justify a policy option that would have been attractive to those governments even if an ideology to justify it were not readily available. Nonetheless, theories not only help to justify (and justification can at times make a very important difference). When they have been marketed successfully, they also contribute to shape the decision-makers' images about the world and how it works. It is a theorist's cliche that ill-conceived theories can have disastrous practical consequences. The same applies to better-conceived yet ill-interpreted theories.

This problem is aggravated if the theory in point has been constructed from a set of circumstances that are wholly different from those prevailing locally. In the case of "realism", the uncritical, incompetent and naïve application of the framework has been partly responsible, for instance, for acts of folly such as Argentina's invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas islands, a policy that has been imprecisely justified by some of its authors in terms which partly derive from classical realist discourse[a].

Realist-inspired arguments were also used in 1978, when Argentina nearly went to war with Chile over three insignificant islands situated in the Beagle Channel, in the extreme south of the continent. Furthermore, balance-of-power arguments have always been used to justify the deviation of development funds for arms purchases, despite the fact that Argentina has not faced credible threats for more than half a century, and that the most important destabilizing force in that part of the world has been Argentina herself, violating arbitration agreements with Chile (1978), invading Falkland/Malvinas, and pioneering nuclear and missile development in Latin America without subscribing safeguard treaties (until the Menem government).

Indeed, the Argentine case presents us with good examples of realist-inspired pathologies. A great deal of the geopolitical paranoia that has prevailed in the relations between the Southern Cone countries of South America until the

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[a]. An additional word should be said about the example just cited, because it will be used frequently in this book. Although there may be commercially exploitable petroleum in Falkland/Malvinas waters, this is a possibility that has gained actuality long after the war, while contemporarily to the war itself the invasion of the islands was never justified by its authors or their apologists in economic terms.

The Falkland/Malvinas islands can generate (as they have after the war) a very high per capita income due to their very small population (approximately 2000), but their natural resources per square kilometer are well below that of the average square kilometer of mainland Argentina. Therefore, given the scarce capital available for investment in Argentina, if the islands were reconquered by that country they would be the last place in which to invest development capital, at least if a criterion of economic rationality were to be followed for such investments. Justifications for invasion and war have not been economic but rather hinged on:

1. A pseudo "idealistic" juridical obsession with historic title (the islands were lost to the British in 1833, and had changed hands several times before that since their first occupation by France in the eighteenth century). This obsession derives from the classroom indoctrination that will be studied in Chapter 6. [See P. Beck, "The Policy Relevance of the Falkland/Malvinas Past", in A. Danchev (ed.), International Perspectives on the Falkland Conflict: A Matter of Life or Death, New York: St. Martin's Press 1992. For the question of title deeds, the best source is J. Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927, 1971 and 1982.]

2. An almost metaphysical concept of "territorial integrity", whereby there is something ontologically "Argentine" about these islands. This is an old dogma of the Argentine foreign ministry.

3. The pseudo-realist yet realist-inspired geopolitical idea that the islands dominate waters with great strategic value, on account of "controlling" the Drake Passage and the Strait of Magellan. [See J. Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors, New York: Praeger Publishers 1985; especially pages 41-49, 77-84, and 112-146.]

4. The illusion that Argentina is a peer of Britain, together with the realist-inspired idea that peer states are always potential adversaries, whereby it "follows" that Britain's presence in the islands is a military threat to Argentina. This argument was also used by Alfonsín's democratic administration, vis-a-vis the fortification of the islands by the British.

mid 1980s has been fed by the security and war obsessions of the central realists, that aggravated the persistent influence of previous intellectual importations from pre-World War II Germany[1]. In Argentina, aggressive policies vis-a-vis Chile and Brazil that have cost the country many billions of dollars have been justified on "realist" grounds which were really quite "unrealistic" (insofar as the only way in which a peripheral country can eventually get to play a bigger power game is through sound investments and rapid growth, as did the devastated Axis powers after the Second World War).

In Argentina, the intellectual seduction of misread realist theorists has not only helped to justify the aggressive policies of military regimes. Even such a prestigious democratic leader as former president (1983-89) Raúl Alfonsín engaged in a policy of missile development, through the signature in 1984 of an agreement with Egypt and Iraq to develop the 600-mile, two stage Cóndor 2 missile. The project was to supply the three countries involved with this weapon of mass destruction, and it would have enabled Argentina to bomb the Falkland/Malvinas islands from the Argentina mainland with the mere touch of a button. The policy was pursued despite its cost, despite intense Western pressure to disactivate it, and despite the high risk of becoming the victim of covert trade and financial discriminations as a consequence[2]. And the policy has been justified in terms of realist theory by many of its advocates, as are all arms projects.

Needless to say, with the previous military regime the pathological seduction of the realist theories was much more acute, and it helps to explain why Argentina engaged in an expensive, unsafeguarded program for the enrichment of uranium and the extraction of plutonium. Due to the fact that the country's nuclear reactors run on natural uranium, these projects did not make sense economically, and indeed made sense only through a military (central realist) rationale. Concomitantly, the country refused to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty and to ratify the Tlatelolco Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America[3].

The main logical flaw of the Argentine strategists and tacticians who engaged in the territorial policies, arms races, and nuclear and missile projects that were inspired by First World realists, was to extrapolate the strategic objective of these realists --world power-- to a peripheral, dependent, underdeveloped and indebted country that faced no credible external threat. Indeed, the quest for regional and eventually world power is an old "national" obsession, and its advocates were only too happy to have available an apparently sophisticated justification for their strategies and tactics, thanks to their unsophisticated interpretation of the works of Morgenthau,

Waltz, and their disciples, which were added to the previous intellectual influences of Clausewitz and pre-World War II German geopolitical thought[4].

The obsession with regional and world power can be documented. In the early 1950s, for example, U.S. State Department officials commented that the main obstacle in U.S.-Argentine relations was Argentina's pretension to be considered a world power and the dominant state in Latin America[5]. The substance of this expectation (competition for regional hegemony) defined foreign and defense policies during decades[6], and the tactics applied have been justified if not inspired, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, by the sum of the foreign intellectual influences mentioned above. Thus, the main logical flaw of Argentine strategists was not to acknowledge that the principal "national" interest of a peripheral country is not the immediate quest for power but its economic development, without which competition for power is a mere illusion.

Indeed, although the premises and conclusions of peripheral realism are common-sensical and self-evident, it is worthwhile to construct a theory of the international relations of peripheral states if only because, due to the perverse impact of the First World realists in the Third World, the images and perceptions of the world and of a peripheral state's role in the world have been gravely distorted in several if not many Third World societies. Even acknowledging that sometimes these distorted images and perceptions predate the importation of the realist theory, the availability of the latter has helped to reinforce these perceptions and justify policies based on them. Obviously, what (at the very least) is to be expected from an international relations theory is quite the opposite: the generation of images and policies that are adapted to reality.

Moreover, the lack of an adequate theory of international relations valid from the perspective of the periphery is not only serious from the point of view of the harm that this intellectual failure has done to the Third World. It is also serious from the point of view of:

1. Our (lack of) understanding of the foreign policies of some peripheral states, and

2. The formulation of the foreign policies of central states vis-a-vis certain peripheral states.

Thus, no matter what our motivations for the study of international relations are, the task ahead is interesting and relevant. Methodologically, I will proceed through an analysis of the shortcomings of the major theoretical

constructions, both from the point of view of the understanding of the behavior of some peripheral states and from that of the evaluation of their foreign policy strategies. This requires the identification of the differences in the set of circumstances affecting the center and the periphery. This, in turn, will lead to the embryonic formulation of what in Chapter 1 was called a "systemic theory of limits" for peripheral states. Simultaneously, this methodology will help to place the new theory within the tradition of international relations theory.

I will begin my analysis with Waltz because it was this author who placed the most emphasis on a systemic (i.e., relational) concept of the international system.

Kenneth N. Waltz's concept of the international system

In my opinion, Waltz's concept of an international system, though intelligently built, is of a dubious usefulness even in the case of a theory of international relations for central states. This is clear when we consider his logically correct analogy between the international system and the market[7]. Both concepts are relational. Through a reference to the obvious relevance of the market as a concept that makes the development of economic theory possible, he attempts to show the relevance of developing such a concept for the sphere of international politics. Yet the international system that Waltz identifies does not have the same impact upon the behavior of individual states that the market has for individual firms, simply because the number of units operating in a typical market is incomparably bigger than the number of units operating in the international context and because the distribution of power between international actors is far more oligopolistic than in most markets. It has been argued that this brings us to oligopoly theory, which would be the truly useful analogy. Yet the difference between an international system and an oligopolic market is still abysmal, because the only units operating in an international system are analogous to the firms operating in a market; there are no units operating in the international system that are analogous to the consumers, and this takes much of the theoretical power of the market as a concept away from its analogy for international politics. Thus, and unfortunately, Waltz is light years away from the Copernican revolution he sought to create in the field of international politics. His strictures regarding the use of a systemic terminology by analysts like Henry Kissinger are intelligent and logically correct, but what he offers in its place is of far less relevance than he presumes[8].

This is of importance to our quest because Waltz hurries on to say that, because in international politics (as in any self-help system) the units of greater capacity set the scene for the rest and for themselves, and because in systemic theory the structure is a generative concept and a system's structure is generated by the interactions of its most important parts, it would be ridiculous to build a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica[9]. Here again, he applies the analogy of the market, saying that the fate of the states, as the fate of the firms in a market, are far more affected by the actions and interactions of the bigger units than by that of the smaller ones. True as this may be, it leaves aside the important fact that the contestarian behavior of some peripheral states is one of the major sources of instability in the contemporary world. These are usually states that do not accept the systemic constraints that "should" guide their behavior: their policies may be "irrational" from a systemic point of view, yet this does not mean that they are not relevant to the international community. And they do not go broke and disappear from the scene, as would a firm that does not abide by the constraints posed by the market.

It is Waltz's contention that a general theory of international politics must be based on the great powers, and that this theory will be applicable to minor states, insofar as their interactions are isolated from the system's great powers, due either to the indifference of the latter or to obstacles of communication and transportation[10]. He argues that whoever analyzed international politics at the beginning of the twentieth century would not have focused his/her attention on the foreign and military policies of Switzerland, Denmark and Norway, but rather on those of England and Germany, Russia and France. His example is marred by the fact that he happened to choose politically peripheral states like Switzerland, Denmark and Norway that were and are adapted to the international system and do not pose contestatarian challenges. But this was clearly not the case, in recent years, of Khomeini's Iran, Khadaffi's Libya, Galtieri's Argentina and Saddam's Iraq. Waltz's theory is not only blind to such relevant cases: he explicitly assumes that such states are not relevant for theory-building. This is false. Moreover, the explanation of the behavior of such states needs a different theory, and as we shall see below, such a theory will be more a theory of each specific state's foreign policy and less a theory of the international system, whose constraints were clearly not abided by these states' policies and were therefore not relevant in these cases.

It is interesting to observe that Waltz is right in pointing out that while the European states were the greatest in the world, their unity could only be a dream, and that politics between them tended to be a zero-sum game. Cooperation between them was not perceived as worthwhile even when it was

clearly profitable for all, because of the danger that a state other than one's own might reap the greatest profit. Waltz is likewise right in observing that with the emergence of the American and Soviet superpowers this situation changed dramatically. The Western European powers became "consumers of security". For the first time, the key determinants of war and peace lay in the hands of other states. The new circumstances made the "ascent of the common good" possible. Suddenly, mutually profitable cooperation was possible, because it was no longer perceived as truly dangerous that it be a state other than one's own that profited most, so long as everyone had something to gain. Waltz rightly perceives that in this example, a change in the international system produced a behavioral change.

What Waltz does not perceive is that this is not always the case. Notwithstanding the fact that objectively, systemic conditions similar to those that started to prevail in Western Europe after World War II have prevailed in South America throughout the twentieth century, the South American states have engaged in arms races throughout the period, jeopardizing their economic development though rarely engaging in actual warfare. Regional inter-state politics have been a zero-sum game to the extent that during decades the Argentine military vetoed the construction of bridges or tunnels over the Paraná River, within Argentina's own territory. These public works were needed to connect the Argentine provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes with the rest of the Argentine territory. The rationale for vetoing their construction was that such bridges or tunnels would be dangerous in the case of a Brazilian invasion, insofar as they would facilitate Brazilian movements from the said provinces onwards to the territory of central Argentina. Thus, the economic development of these potentially rich provinces was severely obstructed until relatively recent years. Similar examples are to be found in other peripheral regions. The change in the international system following World War II made a difference for Western European behavior, yet other countries with different cultures, different social structures and different political systems did not respond in the same way to similar systemic conditions.

The fact that actual warfare rarely broke out despite inter-state politics in South America having been a zero-sum during most of the twentieth century is another example of how similar systemic factors affect different societies or groups of societies in different ways. This relative absence of war was once a novelty. Until approximately 1880 South America had actually been ridden with more warfare than Europe. Argentina and Brazil, for example, competed during decades for the possession of Uruguay and Paraguay or for direct influence over them. All of the South American countries had repeated territorial wars. As the twentieth century drew near, actual war tended to

fade away from these countries' histories, though not arms races and paranoid perceptions of neighboring states. Meanwhile, in the European scene almost nothing had changed. This continued to be the case until the holocaust of World War II. And with the end of World War II, everything changed in Europe, yet this time around nothing changed in South America.

Systemic factors cannot explain the difference between Western Europe and South America after 1945. One might attempt to use systemic factors as an explanation for why wars were more scarce in Latin America than in Europe from 1880 to 1945: peace was a requisite for trade, and trade was actively encouraged by Britain in South America ever since Castlereagh's tenure in the Foreign Office from 1812 to 1822. Nonetheless, it took several decades to produce results, and it would be an overestimation of British capabilities to say that this result was principally a product of British policy instead of changing local conditions. Whatever the case may be, the problem remains that even if systemic variables do sometimes account for differences in results, sometimes they do not, and it is impossible to forecast when the dependent variable (the occurrence of war, arms races, or zero-sum inter-state politics) will be explained by systemic factors, and when it will be explained by individual country "attributes": this can only be done after the facts, as a historical interpretation. Hence, this phenomenon cannot be modelled successfully, and a "science" cannot be made out of it.

Waltz placed a caveat in his argument when he said that his theory, based on the great powers, will be applicable to minor states when their interactions are isolated from the system's great powers. This might be used for an explanation for inter-state warfare in South America during the nineteenth century, and it might even appear to work as an explanation for the decrease in the frequency of war after approximately 1880, as isolation diminished. Yet it does not seem to work for the difference between South American and Western European reactions vis-a-vis similar systemic circumstances after World War II. The differences between these European and South American reactions to the post World War II changes can hardly be attributed to South America's greater geographical distance from the superpowers (i.e., in Waltz's words, to obstacles to transportation and communication). In the first place, the great powers are all too willing to sell weapons to countries that engage in arms races: central states are less of an obstacle to the power politics of peripheral states than this argument seems to imply. In the second place, when hell breaks loose, as it did between Serbs, Croats, and Moslem Bosnians after the end of the Cold War, the lack of obstacles of communication and transportation does not seem to make a big difference.

On the other hand, the quest for a "Greater Serbia" does not have parallels in contemporary Europe. Czechoslovakia broke down peacefully. These differences do not have a systemic origin, nor are they rooted in obstacles to communication and transportation. And again, when will the independent variable (obstacles to transportation and communication) account for a difference, and when will it not? We have no clue, except after the facts.

The fact that many differences in outcome are not rooted in systemic changes completely turns the tables on Waltz's argument that, due to hypothetical systemic causes, the realm of international politics changes less than the units themselves. Indeed, as proof that there is more to the realm of international politics than the units that interact, and that a relational phenomenon analogous to the market operates in the international context, Waltz argues that variations in the units' attributes are not directly related to their behavior and interactions. He rightly points out that in the twentieth century's two world wars, the same principal countries were aligned with each other against Germany, despite the domestic changes that took place during the period between the wars[11]. He could surely have found other more convincing examples that can also be used to illustrate the operation of such a relational phenomenon. But he could also have found examples, as I have above, that illustrate the opposite phenomenon, i.e., cases in which different states react differently to similar systemic environments, suggesting that sometimes the differences between the attributes of two or more countries might explain more state behavior than the international system. This is particularly the case with contestatarian Third World states today, and these cases are more relevant to international peace and security than the many cases of happy adaptation to systemic constraints.

It is particularly ironical that he should have criticized Henry Kissinger on the score that explanations from the inside out produce the results illustrated by the examples used: as I have argued above, the same is true for explanations of foreign policy that focus on the outside, such as Waltz's. Waltz criticizes Kissinger because he says that international instability and wars are produced due to the existence of "revolutionary states", which is tantamount to saying that wars are produced because some states are bellicose[12]. Well it so happens that <u>some</u> wars are produced simply because some governments are indeed bellicose (and for diverse reasons are able to impose war upon their populations). Just a glance at Saddam Hussein or Galtieri can convince us of that fact.

The critique above is analogous to that of John G. Ruggie, when he tells us that:

> Waltz reacts strongly against what he calls the reductionist tendencies in international relations theory. In the conventional usage (...) he finds that the system is all product and not at all productive. He takes pains to rectify this imbalance. He goes too far, however. In his conception of systemic theory, unit level processes become all product and not at all productive.[13]

Yet this is not the opinion of, for instance, Robert O. Keohane, who in his evaluation of the alleged contributions of Waltz's theory tells us that:

> Theoretical analysis of the characteristics of an international system is as important for understanding foreign policy as understanding European history is for understanding the history of Germany.[14]

Here, in my opinion, is a clear overestimation of the role of the international system (especially as Waltz defines it), unless we accept Keohane's assertion as so absolutely ethnocentric that he need not specify that he is talking only about the foreign policy of the United States and "like countries". This is not even remotely true for critical junctures of Iraqi foreign policy, Libyan foreign policy, Iranian foreign policy, or for Argentina's foreign policy under Galtieri.

Hans J. Morgenthau and the alleged autonomy of the political sphere

For a peripheral realism, Morgenthau's shortcomings sometimes converge with Waltz's and in other cases are of an entirely different nature. Following Morgenthau, political realism believes that the world, though imperfect from the "rational" point of view (i.e., in this case, from the perspective of what would be ethically desirable), is the result of forces inherent in human nature, and that to improve the world one must act with those forces, not against them[15]. Political realism considers a "rational" (i.e., in this case, "objective", "unemotional") foreign policy to be a good foreign policy, for (as mentioned in Chapter 1) "only a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies with both the moral concept of prudence and the political requirement of success"[16]. Political realism believes in the "objectivity of the laws of politics" and in "the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects these objective laws"[17]. For realism, both central and peripheral,

> theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed

> and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. (...) Yet examination of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline (...). The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power(...).[18]

Thus far, although it is clear that Morgenthau has a problem with the definition of the term "rational" (already suggested in Chapter 1 and to which I shall return later), his conception of the "realist" attitude remains valid both from the perspective of the center and that of the periphery. But in the words that immediately follow the quotation above, Morgenthau continues with a conceptual development that is the parting of the roads of central and peripheral realism:

> This concept (...) sets politics as an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth), ethics, aesthetics, or religion[19].

This is clearly not valid from the perspective of the periphery, especially if we are thinking in terms of citizenry-centric interests. From that perspective, the "main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics" is the concept of interest defined in terms of... economic development, without which there is no real power in the long-term, and what is more important, no welfare for the population.

The sharp division between the (international) political sphere and the economic sphere drawn by Morgenthau is based on two implicit assumptions:

> 1. A static perspective of the interstate system, whereby abstraction is made of the generative sources of politico-military power, that are economic and technological, and
>
> 2. A minimum economic prowess that will make international competition for political power possible and meaningful without regard for the economic sources of power in the short and middle term. This minimum economic prowess is not present in the periphery, yet it is not true that on account of this lack, peripheral states do not have a foreign policy, simply because some Third World states do not abide by a citizenry-centric rationality.

These are implicit assumptions not only in Morgenthau's work, but also in Waltz's and in that of all of those who fail to incorporate an economic dimension into the so-called security dilemma.

Morgenthau's failure to make explicit the assumption that the alleged autonomy of the political sphere presupposes a minimum economic prowess points to a lack of awareness of the relevance of the link that indeed exists between economic factors and political power (and which Morgenthau understood but underrated). This leads to a definition of the sphere of international politics that is too narrow even for a central realism (as the Soviet collapse illustrates), but much more so for a peripheral one. This is clear when he states that:

> Not every action that a nation performs with respect to another nation is of a political nature. Many such activities are normally undertaken without any consideration of power, nor do they normally affect the power of the nation undertaking them. Many legal, economic, humanitarian and cultural activities are of this kind. Thus a nation is not normally engaged in international politics when it concludes an extradition treaty with another nation, when it exchanges goods and services with other nations, when it cooperates with other nations in providing relief from natural catastrophes, and when it promotes the distribution of cultural achievements throughout the world. In other words, the involvement of a nation in international politics is one of many types of activities in which a nation can participate in the international scene.[20]

Morgenthau develops this concept further when he says that:

> (...) Whenever economic, financial, territorial, or military policies are under discussion in international affairs, it is necessary to distinguish between, say, economic policies that are undertaken for their own sake and economic policies that are the instruments of a political policy --a policy, that is, whose economic purpose is but the means to the end of controlling the policies of another nation. The export policy of Switzerland with regard to the United States falls into the first category. The economic policies of the Soviet Union with regard to the nations of Eastern Europe falls into the second category. So do many economic policies of the United States in Latin America, Asia and Europe. (...) An economic, financial, territorial, or military policy undertaken for its own sake is subject to evaluation in its own terms. Is it economically or financially advantageous? What effects has territorial acquisition upon the population and economy of the nation

> acquiring it? (...) The decisions with respect to these policies are made exclusively in terms of such intrinsic considerations. When, however the objectives of these policies serve to increase the power of the nation pursuing them with regard to other nations, these policies and their objectives must be judged primarily from the point of view of their contribution to national power.[21]

However, the boundary set by Morgenthau above between economic policies that are a means in the quest for power and economic policies that merely have economic aims, is not clear inasmuch as wealth and development generate a power that is fungible into politico-military resources. The same is often true for territorial acquisition. The United States attacked Iraq in 1990 not so much because its invasion and annexation of Kuwait violated international law, or because it was really interested in defending the sheikdom for its own sake, or because it wanted to dominate Iraqi policy, but because the acquisition of Kuwait's oil assets by Iraq would have meant a formidable increase in its economic power and hence, in its political leverage over states, a power that eventually could have easily been translated into military terms.

Ultimately, the origin of this shortcoming of Morgenthau's conceptual framework seems to spring from a certain ahistoricity: time and the long-term are not included as variables at least in this dimension of his work. This static quality of his framework of analysis enables him to make a narrow definition of international political action. And this finally leads him to tautology. When he tells us that:

> The aspiration for power being the distinguishing element of international politics, as of all politics, international politics is of necessity power politics.[22]

he is not making a discovery or a deduction of any sort, but simply saying that because he defines politics as a struggle for power, international politics is of necessity "power politics". If he would have defined international politics as a bargaining process through which power-related resources are distributed or redistributed instead --only one of several legitimate alternatives for a definition-- cooperation politics as well as "power politics" would have been logically included in the definition (and indeed, power would have become a relational concept present both in conflict and cooperation).

For a central realism, the consequence of this tautology is merely that the scope of Morgenthau's theory is narrowed as to exclude the politics of

cooperation, which in a world that faces grave common dangers has become an essential part of international politics. This is Robert O. Keohane's great insight, and indeed, what we are indebted to him despite the shortcomings of his own theories.

But for a peripheral realism, the limited scope of Morgenthau's definition of politics, the tautological character of his starting point, the ensuing exclusion of cooperation politics, and the lack of an awareness of the link between economic factors and power, is truly dangerous insofar as it leads to misperception. It places Third World leaders before the predicament of either dedicating themselves to power politics (with destabilizing consequences for the world and impoverishing consequences for their citizenries) or renouncing to the game of international politics, which is often taken as a defeatist and humiliating alternative. With such a starting point, it is difficult to advocate for a strategy such as that of post World War II Japan, which is the only way in which a vulnerable country can eventually be in a position to compete for world power. Indeed, with such a starting point it is difficult to accept the systemic constraints that affect a peripheral state if it is bound to a citizenry-centric rationality. The temptation will be to abandon a citizenry-centric rationality altogether. To avoid the intellectual sources of this temptation (though not its other sources, which will remain active) it is necessary to point to Morgenthau's essential error of setting politics as "an autonomous sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics (understood in terms of interest defined as wealth)".

The alleged anarchic structure of world politics

As already suggested, the autonomous character given to the political realm by most international relations theorists derives from a static theory-building methodology that abstracts the generative sources of political power. This leads to a statement of the security dilemma whereby economic factors are excluded. Thus, in the words of Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis:

> Like other foreign-policy goals, the security of one state is contingent upon the behavior of other states. (...) In its efforts to enhance its own security, one state can take measures that decrease the security of other states and cause them to take countermeasures that neutralize the actions of the first state and that may even menace it. (...) The security dilemma means that an action-reaction spiral can occur between two states or among several of them so that each is forced to spend even larger sums on arms and be no more secure than before. (...) At the heart of the security dilemma are these two constraints: the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between offensive and defensive postures

> and the inability of one state to bank on the fact that another state's present intentions will remain so. (...) The need to assess capabilities along with intentions, or, the equivalent, to allow for a change in intentions, makes statesmen profoundly conservative. They prefer to err on the side of safety, to have too much rather than too little[23].

It is obvious that, in such terms, "to have too much" security means to invest more on security and to have less resources to invest on endeavors with a greater wealth-generating effect, and that in the long-term, to literally have "too much" will inevitably lead to having too little. Therefore, because the quality and quantity of armaments is a function of economic and technological resources, from a dynamic perspective security cannot be abstracted from economic factors. Because dynamically-speaking the economy is at the root of security, the inter-state system must be conceived as a self-help system not only in terms of security but also in economic terms. The risks generated by sacrificing security to economic development are unquantifiable and variable, but limited. The risks generated by sacrificing economic development to security in the long-term are infinite: they lead to a certain loss of security itself, to a certainty of economic ruin as well, and the very concept of "risk" is no longer applicable. Thus, the traditional distinction between "high politics" and "low politics" is inverted: when a time axis is introduced and the analysis becomes dynamic, there is a hierarchy of realms in which the economy is above politico-military resources.

The aforesaid is universally true, but the weaker a country is, the shorter the term for which the sacrifice of the economy becomes intolerable. In other words, although survival is a quest common to states of the center and of the periphery, in the periphery economic factors become a more immediate (short-term) determinant of survival and of the relative place that the state occupies within the system. This essential difference leads to a categorization of states that acknowledges functional differences between "great powers" and "weaker states": although the difference is one of degree and empirically there exists a continuum, for analytical purposes this dichotomy can be useful. Great powers and weaker states differ in their capabilities, as Waltz acknowledges, but this difference is so important that great powers can often afford to base their middle-term international political strategy making abstraction of the generative sources of their power, while weaker states cannot do this in the middle and long-term without abandoning a citizenry-centric rationality and eventually producing their own ruin.

Moreover --and this is more important-- in their relations with weaker states, great powers are in a position to link crucial economic issues to desirable

political attitudes on the part of the weaker states. For example, in the case of Argentina, the United States was in a position to link the former country's admission into the Brady Plan (for restructuring the foreign debt, a portion of which was condoned) to the disactivation of the Cóndor 2 missile project. Thus, great powers are in a position to demand political concessions from weaker states that abide by a citizenry-centric rationality.

This difference is sufficiently important as to imply that great powers and weaker states are not "like units". For a number of reasons, but especially because of the above, it is not true that in inter-state political systems "formally, each (unit) is the equal of all the others", as Waltz contends. On this score, Thucydides understood the world better than Waltz. The strong do what they can; the weak do what they must. The difference between great powers and weaker states in terms of the relative relevance of economic constraints for their foreign and security policies, plus the fact that the great powers are in a position to apply economic issue-linkages in order to discourage destabilizing security policies on the part of weaker states, implies that the "structure" of the inter-state system is not as Waltz describes it, and that there is an incipient hierarchy in the said system in which a different operating principle is involved than those of a simple anarchy (as defined by Waltz), or a domestic hierarchy. Anarchy tends to be limited to the great powers and to a small number of weaker states that blatantly cast aside a citizenry-centric rationality. In the rest of the system a hierarchy limited to certain crucial issues is at work.

Thus, states are not "like units", but rather there are three types of states in the inter-state system:

1. great powers and

2. weaker states, which are divided into

    a. those that tend to abide by a citizenry-centric rationality, and

    b. those that clearly abandon citizenry-centric rationality and tend rather to be the property of a tyrant who plays a personal, high risk game in inter-state politics.

In turn, these different types of states are functionally differentiated. Indeed, there are:

1. states that command regarding issues related to international peace and security;

2. states that obey, and

3. rebel states, that despite their relative weakness do not obey, accepting high costs and risks, and renouncing to a citizenry-centric rationality.

Although a structure of anarchy prevails among them, the great powers tend to "rule" over the weaker states on issues related to international peace and security, while the weaker states that do not abide by a citizenry-centric rationality and rebel against this "rule" tend to play a destabilizing role in world affairs and share in the anarchy. The latter states are the equivalent of outlaws or maffias in domestic societies. Thus, Waltz is wrong in assuming that there does not exist a functional differentiation of states. The differences in capabilities --which Waltz acknowledges-- are so great, that they are translated into a functional differentiation: states are not "like units". But to understand this it was necessary to overcome Waltz's and Morgenthau's static analysis.

But the above is not the only functional difference between these types of states. A further difference can be identified if we subject to analysis Waltz's claim that:

> In anarchic realms, like units coact. In hierarchic realms, unlike units interact. In an anarchic realm, the units are functionally similar and tend to remain so. Like units work to maintain a measure of independence and may even strive for autarchy. (...) A state (...) worries lest it become dependent on others through cooperative endeavors and exchanges of goods and services. (...) The world's well-being would be increased if an ever more elaborate division of labor were developed, but states would thereby place themselves in situations of ever closer interdependence. Some states may not resist that. For small and ill-endowed states the costs of doing so are excessively high.[24]

Thus, Waltz tells us that states shy away from interdependence even if it would represent a gain in efficiency, because the issue is not absolute but relative gain, and the important question is not what can be gained from specialization but which state will reap the greatest profit and hence gain an advantage in the relative distribution of capabilities. But here again, weaker states that abide by citizenry-centric rationality are less able to afford losing the economic advantages of specialization and interdependence,

even if these do generate vulnerabilities. And thus we see empirically that prosperous weak states such as Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, South Korea, Taiwan or Hong Kong, to name just a few, attempt to reap as many gains as possible from specialization despite the ensuing vulnerabilities. Weak states that refuse or are unable to specialize are the poorer and the weaker because of it. Normatively, weak states are to be advised to specialize. The structural and systemic constraints faced by weaker states would appear to be quite the contrary than what Waltz claims when he asserts that small and ill-endowed states cannot afford to specialize. Actually, with the southeast Asian "tigers" rising fast in the world economy through export specialization, no advise could be more misguiding than what springs from this statement, and few things could be more harmful than encouraging small countries to seek autarchy.

The main conclusions here, then, are that Waltz is wrong when he asserts that anarchy is one of the terms that define the structure of the international system, and that he is also wrong when he assumes that the units of the system (the states) are functionally equal. The structure of the international system is really quite different from Waltz's description, and herein lies one of the reasons why the alleged anarchy is considerably less chaotic than one would expect. The limited hierarchical structure of the inter-state system is determined by three factors:

1. The dynamic link between the politico-military realm and the economic realm, whereby there is a hierarchy of realms in which the economic sphere ranks first,

2. The greater sensitivity of weaker states than great powers to the hierarchy of realms mentioned in (1), and

3. The ability of the great powers to use economic issue-linkages to encourage some security options and discourage others among weaker states.

Thus, the dilemma by which "rational behavior, given structural constraints, does not lead to the wanted results"[25], is partially overcome. Thanks to the operation of these factors, supranational organizations that partially regulate the security-related policies of most weaker states emerge and consolidate. The elements of authority that emerge internationally through this process are not "barely once removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those elements" in such a way that "authority quickly reduces to a particular expression of capability", as Waltz claims[26]. Reality is more complex than that in a theoretically significative

way, insofar as differences in capabilities are so great as to generate different types of states with different needs and with functionally differentiated roles. The different needs are what tends to make weaker states more attentive to the generative sources of power, i.e., basically the economy, placing a limit upon the political dimension of their role in the inter-state system. This in turn leads to role differentiation. And these functionally differentiated roles are reflected directly in key supranational organizations, in which the fact that states are neither informally nor formally equal is formally acknowledged.

Indeed, despite the euphemisms used both by diplomats and theoreticians, states have not been formally equal ever since the inception of the United Nations Charter and the empowerment of an oligopolic Security Council (whose five permanent members have veto power) to intervene in certain affairs affecting international security through the provisions of its Chapter 7. This juridical inequality of states, mentioned in Chapter 1, is extended by such international regimes as the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which the vast majority of the world's states are signatories. Furthermore, other international regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), help to establish, through mechanisms that are not yet consensual on a world-wide basis, what amounts to a clear formal hierarchy of states on security and proliferation issues.

One example of the efficient operation of this hierarchy can be found in the process through which Argentina's government under Menem felt obliged to abandon former president Alfonsín's missile project, the already mentioned Cóndor 2, because of the very tangible costs that would accrue to the country in terms of potential financial and commercial discriminations if it did not abide by MTCR demands. In an attempt to save the Cóndor 2 (on which a few hundred million dollars had already been spent), the Menem government made an overture to Spain, to explore the possibility of jointly using the two-stage Cóndor 2 to develop a three-stage satellite launching vehicle. The Spanish government was interested until it learnt that the United States (and the MTCR) strongly vetoed that cooperation. Spain had a green light from the MTCR to develop her own satellite launching vehicles, but she was not allowed to do this in partnership with Argentina.[27] Thus, both a formal and an informal but effective hierarchy of states exists, whereby some have rights that others do not have. Spain would be in an "upper middle-class" which is allowed certain developments as long as it is done with the adequate partners. States can rebel to these constraints and adopt policies that challenge regimes such as the MTCR or the NPT, but at such high external costs that such policies are incompatible with citizenry-centric rationality. These facts suggest that Robert O. Keohane's "institutionalist" approach to the study of international

organization could be particularly rewarding if coupled with a realist sensitivity vis-a-vis the relevance of the concentrations of power[28].

The limited usefulness of the concept of "structure"

It should nevertheless be acknowledged that the "structure" of the international system described above, though closer to reality than Waltz's, is notwithstanding a concept of very limited usefulness for international relations theory. As mentioned above, it does help to explain why the world is less chaotic than would be expected otherwise: real "anarchy" has far less virtues than Waltz believes[29], and posits many more dangers. But the concept of "structure" as presented by Waltz, even if corrected as above, is still just a clever artifice whose explanatory use cannot go much beyond what has just been said. Its very correction leads it even further away from the analogy with the market, which he mistakenly believes to be so powerful. This correction of the concept of structure implies bringing in what Waltz wants to take away from systemic analysis, the "attributes" of states, albeit in a simplified way, into the very definition of the structure. As we have seen, such a modified concept of structure generates hope for a further organization of the world in security affairs. This is quite the opposite of Waltz's gloomy projections, and helps us to engage in "thoughtful wishing".

Yet the differences described by Waltz between domestic and international structure are not convincing. According to him, supranational organizations that do not become in themselves states derive exclusively from the capabilities of the major states involved. This is true, but it is not true that the same does not hold for domestic society, which is also the product of its individual actors. For example, experience shows that no matter what the laws of the land may be, when a country lacks an income tax culture and the citizenry (including both the powerful and the weak) massively cheats when filing tax returns, little can be done about it at least in the short term. Domestic society is the product of individuals no less than the inter-state system is the product of states and other complex units, themselves the product of individuals.

The "structure" as a relational concept (e.g., in the sense that what defines it are not the absolute capabilities of the units but their capabilities with respect to each other) is not in any way objectionable or "wrong": the problem lies in just how useful it is for explanation. The world's most important problems --e.g., the international consequences of the instability of post-Cold War Russia, or the policies of destabilizing regimes like Saddam's-- cannot be understood through the concept of structure, even when modified, nor

by systemic analysis of any sort that I can conceive. The understanding of these problems requires the in-depth study of specific country foreign policies and their determinants, i.e., quite the opposite of systemic analysis.

The only significative sense in which the concept of structure, once modified, becomes a major instrument in understanding world politics, is in the insight it provides with respect to who are the likely "winners" in inter-state competition. Although he is wrong about what the structure looks like, Waltz rightly says that "the game one has to win is defined by the structure that determines the kind of player who is likely to prosper"[30]. Fortunately, that structure is not pure anarchy, nor is it as deeply entangled in the security dilemma as Waltz thinks, due to the ameliorating effects of the hierarchical dynamic link that exists between the economic and the politico-military realms, and due to the potential use of economic issue-linkages by the great powers. Thanks to this configuration --which is very different from the anarchic one that Waltz envisages-- the type of weaker state likely to prosper, in the present structure, is a state that minds its own business, concentrates its attention on its trade and development, and abides by the rules of the game set by the great powers on international political matters that are beyond its scope. This is the sort of strategy adopted by Germany and Japan after their defeat in World War II, and it has brought them such a degree of success that they are now once again great powers, despite the fact that theirs was quite the opposite of a strategy advised by the paranoid arguments of the security dilemma. These countries would in all likelihood not have been allowed to prosper if the political dimension of their postwar foreign policies would have been such as to be perceived as destabilizing or hostile by the United States and its other allies. And their present day prosperity is fungible into military resources, if they should choose to become military powers, illustrating clearly the hierarchical link between the economic and military realms in the latter 20th. Century. In this (and only in this) sense, the modified concept of structure is very important, to the point that we can say that it lays the bases for a peripheral realism.

Some systemic constraints faced by peripheral states from a citizenry-centric perspective

After having corrected Waltz's conception of the structure of the inter-state system, the solution to the problem of attempting to infer some basic systemic constraints that can serve as a point of departure for an embryonic "theory of limits" becomes self-evident. I will proceed by formulating three sets of

questions and answers linked to the relations between a state's power base, its "national" interest and its foreign policy rationale.

1. Can an underdeveloped state compete for international political power? Only in a very limited way. Or, for that matter, can a developed yet economically small (and hence, ultimately vulnerable) state compete for international power? The answer is, likewise, that only in a very limited way. This is the reason why both Waltz and Morgenthau assumed that international relations theory can make sense only for central states (leaving aside the crucial fact that the actual behavior of some peripheral states contradicts the common sense answer to these questions). Even limited competition for international political power by a peripheral state can be undertaken only under high risk conditions and with huge costs for its population.

2. Can we conceive of a "national" or country interest in terms of competition for international political power in the case of an underdeveloped state? Only in terms of limited and immediate security goals, usually vis-a-vis neighboring states, whose behavior should in principle be restrained as well by the same systemic constraints. And in the case of a developed yet economically small state? Likewise. The "national" interest of a peripheral state lies primarily in the field of economic growth, which is the source of most if not all power. Only through economic development can a relatively important peripheral state eventually participate in a bigger power game, without undue costs to its population. In other words, a peripheral state can participate in a bigger international power game when it ceases to be peripheral. As already stated, such is the case of Germany and Japan in the post-Cold War era, after long decades of reconstruction, accumulation and a low profile foreign policy which was quintessentially one of citizenry-centric peripheral realism. Unfortunately, however, it is not always the case that a given country's neighbors will abide by these constraints set by a citizenry-centric rationality. Furthermore, as was said in Chapter 1, a state (and a citizenry) cannot afford to subordinate security policies if they have a neighbor like Saddam's Iraq. Notwithstanding, the arguments here presented are perfectly valid for Saddam's Iraq as well. Every dollar spent by that state in military prowess that was not essentially necessary for its self-defense was money taken away from its development, from the welfare of its citizenry and from its long-term politico-military power as well. Fortunately, the hegemonic frame of mind in today's world makes it possible (in varying degrees) for most states to adopt the foreign policy profile of a trading state. As Rosecrance pointed out, we are no longer living in a

world in which small states are automatically absorbed by more powerful ones. The United States does not absorb Mexico, Mexico does not absorb Guatemala, Argentina and Brazil no longer make wars over the possession of Uruguay. There is a large margin of autonomous decision in the degree to which a peripheral states engages in the policies of the traditional military-political state: this profile tends to be dictated more by domestic factors than by external ones. Insofar as the decision to adopt the foreign policy of a military-political state is voluntary and is not dictated by dire need vis-a-vis an aggressive neighbor, it does not respond to a citizenry-centric rationality.

3. Can the rejection of these systemic limitations to its "rational" foreign policy objectives be compatible with the "national" interests of a peripheral state, if the said state is not under a clear and direct threat from its neighbors? In other words, to pose the question with illustrative examples, assuming that a country is not flanked by a more aggressive neighbor, can a policy of direct international aggression or of developing weapons of mass destruction be described as compatible with the "national interests" of a peripheral and economically vulnerable state, even if it is not underdeveloped? It seems clear that not accepting nuclear safeguards and developing weapons of mass destruction, or otherwise engaging in regional destabilization, aggression and/or proliferation, can subject a peripheral state to all sorts of discriminations by the great powers. Such discriminations are potentially counterproductive for its development and ultimately for its very power base (which is obviously linked to its development). As Richard Rosecrance has convincingly argued, at least in the case of peripheral countries many advantages accompany the foreign policy profile of the "trading state", and many disadvantages accompany its bellicose counterpart.[31]

In synthesis, it would not be unfair to say that peripheral realism sides fully with the Athenian logic in Thucydides' Melian dialogue, and repudiates the Melian position as suicidal as well as unfair and irrational from a citizenry-centric perspective. A power-oriented policy that in the medium and long-term conspires against a country's power base and welfare cannot be said to be in the "national" interest, although it may be consistent with the interests of a given government or of specific sectors of society (such as the military or the private suppliers of the state). Most (but not all) peripheral states abide by the systemic constraints that make it unprofitable to adopt power politics without power, and do not engage in policies such as the development of weapons of mass destruction or direct international aggression,

because they are aware that their primary international interest lies in the commercial and financial spheres, i.e., in the economic realm.

Notwithstanding, the significative fact is that there are exceptions to this rule, and this is what makes it necessary to engage in the present intellectual exercise. It is simply not true that, as Stanley Hoffmann states, Morgenthau's most important message, that is, that "there is no foreign policy without power", has been accepted by every policy-maker and by every member of the "informed public": that may be the case in the industrialized world, but it is not the case universally, and this is one of the many ethnocentric perceptions of the international relations theorists of the United States[32]. There indeed are foreign policies without power. They happen to be self-destructive, but they are sometimes implemented because their costs are paid largely by the populace of weak and poor countries, and because they serve the vanity, the wishful-thinking and the power yearns of the elites, as well as domestic interests and, sometimes, obsessions that are deeply ingrained in the local culture. And insofar as these foreign policies without power can generate threat perceptions in neighboring states that in turn generate arms races and further cripple development on a region-wide basis, they become like a virus infection that spreads throughout entire regions of the planet, and they affect some countries that might otherwise be prone to a "trading-state" mentality and a peripheral realist foreign policy.

Some methodological corollaries of the analysis above

The ultimate cause of these pathological phenomena under the present systemic conditions, would appear to lie in a combination of factors that include, in varying measures:

1. An attitude toward foreign policy that is not citizenry-centric (which in turn can have its causes in domestic social, political and cultural factors).

2. The existence of aggressive neighbors, probably affected by the syndrome characterized in (1) above.

3. An obsolete, security-obsessed frame of mind, that in general terms has been overcome in the developed periphery, but that for reasons related to (1) and (2) above subsists in ample regions of the Third World.

These are some of the reasons why what seems self-evident to many U.S. theoreticians is not self-evident universally, and why it is not a worthless intellectual exercise to attempt to draw conclusions from the questions and answers posed above. I derive five important methodological conclusions from them:

1. As already suggested, for peripheral states international politics is not a sphere of action autonomous from the economic sphere[33], even if we adopt a static methodological perspective for our theory-building strategy, whereby we abstract the generative sources of politico-military power. Or better put: in the case of peripheral states, such an abstraction does not lead to sound theory. Of course, this could be refuted by the Morgenthaunian conception that peripheral or underdeveloped countries do not have a "real" foreign policy. Yet this is false, because there are altogether too many exceptions to the rule. As was repeatedly stated before, not all peripheral countries abide by supposedly self-evident systemic constraints. Except when directly threatened by an aggressive and more powerful neighbor, in pursuing power politics they usually cause their people harm, not good, and hence they do not serve the "national" interest (are not "rational", in Morgenthau's terminology, nor abide by a citizenry-centric rationality, using my own). If Libya (or Iraq, or Iran, or Galtieri's 1982 Argentina) had an atomic weapon, its security would probably not be enhanced, but crippled. Yet Khadaffy would be delighted to have one. Why?

2. This rhetorical question leads to our second conclusion. Following Morgenthau, Khadaffi would be delighted to have an atomic devise because of his quest for power. But if, because of systemic reasons, Libya's security would be crippled and not enhanced by the possession of this devise, it cannot be said that Libya would gain in power by its possession, insofar as real power leads to security. Furthermore, the sound investment of Libya's resources into wealth-generating projects would eventually lead to much more power than the meager measure of extra power that accrues from the acquisition or even the development of atomic weapons today. In the case that Khadaffi were successful acquiring an atomic devise, what would increase is not Libya's long-term power but Khadaffi's own, short-term power, in a high risk personal game that the Libyan people let him play. The problem again is why they let him play it. The answer lies in the study of what Waltz would call Libya's "attributes": its culture, its social structure, its institutions, its political system, etc. In other words, the answer lies in a theory of Libyan foreign policy. But this leads us to the already suggested conclusion that, at least in the case of peripheral countries,

what is more relevant is not a theory of the international system (that would explain why certain peripheral states abide by systemic constraints) but theories of foreign policies (that attempt to explain why specific peripheral states do not abide by systemic constraints). At least in the case of the international relations of peripheral countries, Waltz's systemic approach[34] leads us to the study of what is obvious, intellectually less interesting and politically less relevant. The problems faced by today's world require in-depth studies of the sources of the foreign policies of potentially destabilizing countries. Destabilizers almost always catch political scientists, international relations analysts and Western policy-makers by surprise.

3. This is not to suggest that the international system and the constraints that it should impose upon the behavior of peripheral states (were this behavior always "rational") need not be studied at all. Indeed, although the exceptions to "rational" behavior are of great relevance from the point of view of the problems posed to world peace and security (and therefore, to the survival of humanity), most peripheral countries do abide by systemic constraints most of the time, and therefore systemic constraints account for more behavior than do the specific attributes that generate contestatarian, "irrational" international behavior. A country like Mexico, for example, that is not only peripheral but also part of the so called Third World, has over the past half century adopted foreign policies that abide by major systemic constraints, and departed from such constraints only with respect to relatively minor issues. This is even more the case of developed peripheral states, such as Australia, New Zealand and minor Western European states. These are states that have not attempted to annex territories by force (as have Argentina and Iraq) and that have always abided by the written and unwritten rules of the international system regarding, for example, the development of weapons of mass destruction. The systemic constraints for the international relations of peripheral states does merit some thought and theoretical development, and this is what my first five chapters are for. However, it is nonetheless true that, as suggested above, major systemic constraints for peripheral states are self-evident, could be reduced to less than "ten commandments", and require relatively little theorizing. On the contrary, what requires a major theorizing effort is why peripheral states all too often do not abide by these major systemic constraints, with such costs to their own long-term "national" interests, to their citizenries, and to the international community as well.

4. Following the argument of the point above, in the case of the foreign policy of most (but not all) peripheral states it is no longer true that, as Morgenthau claims, "statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption out."[35] Fortunately, as Richard Rosecrance has ably demonstrated, in today's world most peripheral statesmen think and act about their foreign policy in terms that are basically compatible with the welfare of their people. Due to systemic constraints, this leads them away from power politics abroad. The development of a democratic culture, of democratic polities and of more egalitarian social structures have helped to make this evolution possible. In many peripheral societies, such foreign policy behavior is functional for the maintenance of domestic power, insofar as the system of domestic checks and balances would make a costly international power politics game domestically unprofitable. This is the reason why a definition of the "national" interest of peripheral states in terms of their economic growth, i.e., in terms that are divorced from international power politics, has become consensual in most democratic cultures. On the other hand, Hoffmann's perception that Morgenthau's claim that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power is valid only at a gross and useless level of generality proves to be, once again, tremendously ethnocentric, to the point that he even casts aside from his perception the case of many "well behaved" peripheral states that simply do not pursue "national" power goals in international politics[36]. Indeed, the problem is not that Morgenthau's claim is valid only at a gross level of generality. The problem is that, as Rosecrance has pointed out, this is a case in which Morgenthau's judgement is simply not valid in most of today's world. Unfortunately, however, as has been stated repeatedly, some Third World states do play an international power game that is very costly to themselves. This fact has led U.S. theorists to misconceptions of the "national" interest (defining it in terms of power) which paradoxically are typical of undemocratic cultures, in which the focus is taken away from the welfare of the people. The unproblematic status of the state in mainstream international relations theory reinforces these confusions and misconceptions.

5. Nonetheless, it should be pointed out here that a democratic culture does not necessarily come along with a democratic political system. Some Third World states have democratic political systems, yet have a culture such that a bellicose foreign policy has a potential for popularity. This is one of the reasons why, during Alfonsín's democratic government in Argentina, there was a flat refusal to declare a cease of hostilities

vis-a-vis the United Kingdom in relation to the Falkland/Malvinas conflict. Thus, it appears that the contestatarian international behavior of some Third World states will sometimes have its origin not only in their authoritarian political systems, but also in political cultures that give such behavior a potential for popularity and therefore, a certain domestic legitimacy. This is a major point in relation to the research strategies to be followed in any attempt to build a theory of the inter-state relations of contestatarian peripheral states. The specific theories of foreign policy demanded in point (2) above will probably have to dedicate a major effort to the influence of cultural factors in the determination of the menu of foreign policy alternatives available to the statesmen of contestatarian Third World states.

It should therefore be clear that systemic factors can help us to understand, for example, why the Falkland/Malvinas war was not waged in 1970, 1975, or 1980 (despite being considered as a plausible and domestically profitable alternative by successive Argentine governments ever since approximately 1950), but they cannot help us regarding why it was actually waged in 1982. To understand this we need a theory of Argentine foreign policy. To be sure, if states always adopted policies compatible with systemic constraints their behavior would be predictable. The problem lies in the fact that largely because of the attributes of the states themselves, their behavior is often not predictable, despite the many regularities that do likewise exist and that are the product of systemic constraints. Cases like those of Galtieri, Khomeini, Khadaffy, Saddam, (or even that of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its implications for international relations, which are certainly not peripheral) all show that what is relevant politically is often the "exception" and not the "rule", i.e., that which falls outside the realm of systemically-predictable policy. The range of phenomena that are of interest here, therefore, leads to a methodological strategy that is quite the opposite of Robert O. Keohane's, as expressed in his article on "the theory of hegemonic stability", where he explicitly says that he is not interested in "improbable events", but on "a pattern of behavior and overall trends"[37].

Nonetheless, it must be understood that the systemic approach is the only possible basis for the development of a normative analysis of foreign policy that prescribes how best to serve a certain conception of a country's "national" interest. But for an explanatory theory, especially in the case of the periphery, the predominance of the systemic approach will lead to explaining relatively irrelevant regularities while leaving aside the most significative exceptions. This will not only render the theory itself irrelevant, but will also have undesirable consequences with respect to the

design of Western policies that foresee systemic predictability yet sometimes encounter nothing of the sort (as in the case of Reagan's policy toward the Argentine military Junta immediately before the invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas islands).

This brings us to the important point that, in any attempt to build a theory of international relations, normative analyses and explanatory theories are of necessity interwoven conceptually. A useful causal theory will explain to us why some relevant behaviors are different from expectable, "rational" behaviors, but these expectable, "rational" behaviors are in themselves a statement on desirable foreign policy strategies, even when the objective of the analyst is not to prescribe but to explain. Furthermore, (as pointed out by Morgenthau) such expectable and rational behaviors are defined in terms of a conception of "human nature" and of the "national interest". This is one of the reasons why even an explanatory theory of international relations that seeks to understand causes and does not pretend to prescribe behavior will inevitably be based on some philosophical premises. It is best that these premises be made explicit, and I will try to do this throughout my attempt to develop a "peripheral realism".

On the other hand, it should in all justice be remembered that Morgenthau is aware of the fact that "not all foreign policies have always followed so rational, objective and unemotional a course". Moreover, he goes as far as to acknowledge that:

> It is a question worth looking into whether modern psychology and psychiatry have provided us with the conceptual tools which would enable us to construct, as it were, a counter-theory of irrational politics, a kind of pathology of international politics.[38]

But Morgenthau himself does not take off in this direction and, on the contrary, tells us that:

> A theory of foreign policy which aims at rationality must for the time being abstract from these irrational elements and seek to paint a picture of foreign policy which presents the rational essence to be found in experience, without the deviations from rationality which are also to be found in experience.[39]

And Waltz, who correctly perceives that Morgenthau continuously confuses the concept of a "theory of international relations" with that of a "theory of foreign policy", takes off in the direction of building a systemic theory that underestimates the role of theories of foreign policy and therefore altogether

leaves aside Morgenthau's undeveloped insight about the relevance of irrational politics. This deficit is burdensome enough in the case of a realist theory that focuses on the international relations of central states. In the case of a peripheral perspective, it is downright crippling.

Further reflections on the level of analysis problem in the definition of "rationality"

Let us now get back to Morgenthau's problem with rationality. It has already been said that what is "rational" for Khadaffi is not necessarily "rational" for Libya. The problem is important because a similar point could be made for Third World policies like Khomeini's in Iran, Galtieri's in Argentina or Saddam's in Iraq. In other words, there are many peripheral governments that have adopted policies that are not "rational" for the interests of their citizenries nor for the long-term interests of their countries, and the point is therefore crucial to any theory of peripheral foreign policy and international relations, it being also relevant, from a practical point of view, for Western policy-making vis-a-vis such countries. This takes us to the important conceptual point, partially treated in Chapter 1, that the level of the subject (e.g., citizenry, state, government, or individual statesman) for which rationality is attributed has to be explicitly defined. To better understand the point, let us get back to a paragraph already quoted from Morgenthau and analyze it from a different perspective than before:

> Yet examinations of the facts is not enough. To give meaning to the factual raw material of foreign policy, we must approach political reality with a kind of rational outline (...). In other words, we put ourselves in the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstances, and we ask ourselves what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner), and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances, is likely to choose.[40]

"What the rational alternatives are". Rational with respect to what ends? For example, taking up again the case of the invasion of Falkland/Malvinas, what is the objective vis-a-vis which the "rationality" of the policy has to be evaluated? If the policy's objective was to gain new power or economic resources for the Argentine state and people, the policy was not rational, not only because the war could not be won (this can be reduced to miscalculation and hence, the policy could be said to have been "boundedly rational") but

because what was lost in terms of significative international isolation (vis-a-vis countries that were and are economically relevant to Argentina) was more important than what there was to be gained by the conquest (or reconquest) of Falkland/Malvinas even if the war would have been winnable. But if the objective was to gain domestic support for the government instead, and the fact is considered that invading the islands was likely to be (as it indeed was) a popular measure due to some of the characteristics of Argentina's political culture, then there was an imperfect ("bounded") rationality involved in the invasion. It was "bounded" because relevant misperceptions were involved, such as that the British would not react, and/or that the United States would side with Argentina or be neutral in the worst of cases, and/or that the war could be won. Nonetheless, from the point of view of the interests of the individual statesmen involved, or from that of the transitory government in charge, should the above not have been misperceptions there was something important to be gained, domestically, from invading the islands, and hence we can speak of bounded rationality. But because the decision was not geared toward the acquisition of new power or economic resources relevant to the long-term interests of the country and/or to the welfare of the Argentine citizenry, the decision was not rational from that more legitimate and permanent perspective.

My conclusion here, therefore, is that the description of the "ends" sought by a foreign policy (e.g., the policy of invading the Falkland/Malvinas islands) can be disaggregated into two dimensions:

1. its "objective", for example,

    a. gaining domestic political support (which was the actual aim inspiring the invasion), or alternatively

    b. acquiring additional resources for the state and people of Argentina (with due consideration for the external costs and benefits of the policy), and

2. its "subject", i.e., who the policy in question is designed to serve (in the case of the objective of gaining domestic political support, it would be the governing clique, and not the citizenry).

Likewise, the description of an alternative as "rational" (or not) requires a conceptual definition of the "level" of the actor involved in the analyst's evaluation, which is more complex and subtle than simply and unproblematically referring to the "statesman" as an individual, as Morgenthau does. A policy can be "rational" for the egotistic interests of a governing clique, yet not

for the more permanent interests of the citizenry. As was mentioned in Chapter 1, I call "citizenry-centric rationality" that which is defined in terms of the long-term interests of a people. If we understand that the rationality that we seek as normatively "good" and theoretically relevant in the acts of decision-makers is that of the long-term interests of a citizenry, then Khadaffi's, Khomeini's, Galtieri's and Saddam's policies were irrational. But then the intellectually more interesting and politically more relevant research and theory-building strategy, especially for peripheral countries, becomes the study of irrationality, not of rationality. And for the study of irrationality we must focus, as was said before, more on the foreign policy and less on the systemic level, and therefore we must pay attention to what Waltz calls a country's "attributes".

An alternative yet defective solution to the problem of rationality

I acknowledge, of course, that we could reason that a better solution to the conceptual problem of rationality than the one above is to leave it at the government or statesman level (i.e., to think in terms of a "statesman" or "government-centric rationality", which can at times be the very opposite of a "citizenry-centric" one). This is what Morgenthau appears to do at times, through imprecision, and this is what led Robert O. Keohane to the idea that Morgenthau's conception of rationality is basically technical and similar to that of neoclassical economics. Nonetheless, I hold that if we draw the right logical conclusions from this legitimate conceptual operation we will arrive to the same point as we just arrived to above from a definition of rationality that differentiates between the citizenry, government and statesman levels, and takes theoretically relevant rationality to be citizenry-centric rationality.

The alternative reasoning would hold that because of "human nature", a statesman will always be tempted to act for himself in the field of foreign policy (as well as in other fields), and therefore would say (in the name of realism) that even Galtieri's (or Khomeini's, or Khadaffi's, or Saddam's) egotistic bounded rationality was "rational" at the only useful level of analysis, which would be that of the individual decision-maker. Of course in this case it could not be said, as does Morgenthau, that the "rational" foreign policy is always the best foreign policy (and --as mentioned in Chapter 1-- it follows from here and from other assertions of his that Morgenthau didn't really mean to define foreign policy rationality at the level of the individual decision-maker nor even at the level of a temporary administration). Notwithstanding, if we were to operationally limit the definition of rationality to the level of the individual decision-maker, then

(exemplifying once again) one key question for a theory of Argentine foreign policy (and probably also for a theory of that country's international relations) would be why the policy option of invading Falkland/Malvinas was domestically profitable (and hence, "rational") for Galtieri, when it was clearly not profitable for the long-term interests of the Argentine citizenry.

The question is relevant because this type of policy is not domestically profitable in many a cultural and political context. For example, as said in Chapter 1, invading the islands of St. Pierre et Miquelon (which have no better reasons for being French than the Falkland/Malvinas islands have for being British) would not be an appropriate means for recovering lost popularity for a Canadian government. The key question would then be, why was it profitable for Galtieri?

In more abstract terms, this question would again drive us to the study of the origin of the menu of plausible choices from which a decision-maker draws his/her policy. This means once again that the more relevant analysis would have to focus not on the systemic level, but on the foreign policy level, and that we would have to engage in the study of the country's "attributes" in order to sort out the origins of foreign policy menus and objectives. So no matter how we define "rationality" (definitions are, after all, arbitrary operations), if our logical steps thereafter are correct we will arrive to the same conclusions regarding the greater relevance of country theories of foreign policy vis-a-vis systemic analysis.

Nonetheless, it should be understood that, from other angles, this alternative approach to the problem of rationality would be entirely unsatisfactory. It implies an absurdity: replacing the state-as-actor model for a "statesman-as-actor model". On the one hand, it leads to the impossibility of constructing the sort of ideal type of foreign policy that Morgenthau sought, which is ultimately a methodology for constructing systematic normative standards compatible with the moral flaws of human nature. On the other hand, because of the wide variety of the sources of human motivation and behavior, neither would such an approach (based on the self-centered rationality of the individual statesman) be useful for the development of an explicatory theory.

Most statesmen do not abide by a solely self-centered rationality. Their belief-systems are too complex for this, and actually have an impact upon their behavior. Thus, behavior cannot be accounted for solely by a personal cost-benefit analysis. In turn, such a cost-benefit analysis would in itself be hopelessly complex because it would have to take the statesman's domestic constraints into consideration. Yet some statesmen <u>do</u> abide mainly by personal

cost-benefit considerations, and this makes the variety of possible behaviors even wider.

The field of international relations would thus become a particularly sterile branch of psychology, which is something that no theoretician has yet sought to make of the field. And most importantly, the concept of rationality, limited to the self-centered rationality of the statesman, would have to be cast out as useless except when studying a specific stateman's hypothetical madness. Indeed, the only useful concepts of rationality are those capable of generating ideal types of foreign policy specifically defined as citizenry or state-centric. Furthermore, the most interesting explicatory theory is that which attempts to explain why foreign policy is sometimes different from what would be expectable, given such standards of rationality, and given sets of systemic constraints defined in terms of ends imposed by one of the said rationalities.

The possible sources of mainstream theory's blindness to the level of analysis problem in the definition of rationality, and the superior insights of Cox and Ashley on this point

The level of analysis problem in the definition of rationality is present for both central and peripheral international relations theory-building. Nonetheless, it is absent from Morgenthau's and Waltz's analyses clearly because they were engaged in the development of a theory of international relations for superpowers (i.e., politically and militarily the most "central" of states), and in the case of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, major departures from both "rationality" and "bounded rationality" into the field of "radical irrationality"[41] were very rare if they existed empirically at all. This peculiarity, though clearly linked to these countries' attributes, was inadvertently taken as a characteristic of international life.

Oddly, Morgenthau considered that there were more chances that the United States would stray away from "pure" rationality (because of the domestic need to make concessions to the electorate and public opinion in a democratic system) than the Soviet Union. This may have been the case from a very narrow foreign policy perspective[42], but if it was so it was only because, due to certain characteristics intrinsic to the Soviet Union, the governing party and the state were one and the same, and the interests of the governing party were considered to be of a very long-term nature. Normally, however, (if only because a system of checks and balances is usually in operation in a democratic state) in less stable totalitarian states there appears to exist

a greater probability than there is in the case of stable democracies, that the interests of individual statesmen, elites or transitory governments will differ significatively from the long term interests of the people, thus leading to major departures from citizenry-centric and even state-centric rationality.

To be fair, it must be said that not only is the level of analysis problem in the definition of rationality absent from the analyses of Morgenthau and Waltz, but that the very distinction between "country", "nation", "state", "government" and "statesman" is unbelievably blurred throughout the international relations literature developed in the United States. Most of the more distinguished authors use these terms interchangeably, probably because of an implicit behaviorist bias that leads them to think in terms of "actors", no matter what these actors are or whose interests their policies actually represent[43]. This leads to frequent anthropomorphisms that, as we shall see in Chapter 4, are imprecise, deceptive and even dangerous.

Moreover, there is an intrinsic fallacy in the identification of a state and/or a government with the citizenry that it is supposed to administrate and represent. This fallacy is, of course, functional to the interests of the governments, but detrimental to the interests of the citizenry: if the actions of a state are automatically taken to be those of the people that it administrates and should represent, the state and the government gain additional legitimacy and hence, power, while the citizenry has less defenses against abuses in the use of that power. It is not surprising that a "scientific" field whose development has been often closely dependent on political power should have fallen naïvely into the trap of not only confusing "nation" and "country" with "state" and "government", but should also have adopted the name "international relations", when in truth it has for the most part dealt with inter-state and inter-government relations. Even trade flows are not truly "international", but "inter-country". It is because of this serious but perversely convenient flaw in inter-"national" relations language and theory that I made it a point to make operational definitions of some of these concepts in Chapter 1.

There are few cases in which an important author is so naïvely justificatory of the facts of life of domination at the state level as that of Kenneth Waltz's influential 1979 book, in which the point of departure of the theoretical analysis is a definition of the realm of the state as the realm of legitimacy, vis-a-vis the realm of the inter-state system, which in his terms would be the realm of anarchy and raw force. Indeed, there he acknowledges that the state does not have a monopoly of force, but he tells us that the state holds a monopoly over "legitimate" force[44]. Thus he simply

falls into the age-old trap of unintendedly legitimizing the realities of domestic power while attempting to uncover the realities of inter-state relations. As Helen V. Milner has observed in reference to this faux-pas, "have the majority of the people in the Soviet Union, Poland, Ethiopia, South Africa, Iran or the Philippines --to name just a few-- felt that the state's use of force serves justice (all the time? some of the time?)?"[45] The effect of Waltz's discourse is unintendedly authoritarian. Not only does the state tend to be associated with legitimacy, but (in a very totalitarian way) everything that takes place within a country tends to be associated with the state. Thus, Waltz asserts:

> Each state has its agencies for making, executing, and interpreting laws and regulations, for raising revenues, and for defending itself. Each state supplies out of its own resources and by its own means most of the food, clothing, housing, transportation, and amenities consumed and used by its citizens.[46]

Thus, without noticing the linguistic transition, Waltz has confused here the "country" with the "state", and by so doing he unintendedly leaves open (conceptually) the possibility that states (sets of public institutions) move into such private realms as he cites above and, indeed, invade private life itself. Waltz surely would not approve that politically, but because his concepts mesh together the "country" and the "state", in his theory there can be no room for a concept such as "citizenry-centric rationality". Waltz's state is by definition legitimate. Therefore, what the state does is also legitimate, independently of who is the subject that it is serving: the citizenry, the elite, or the individual statesman. In such a conceptual context, the very meaning of "survival" (on which Waltz's framework hinges) becomes obscured, because survival will mean something different for a state that tends, however imperfectly, to serve its citizens, than for a state whose function is to serve Saddam Hussein. "I assume that states seek to ensure their survival", Waltz tells us, just like "economic man" is a profit maximizer[47]. But survival is a meaningless concept if we do not define first the relation between the state and its people, both normatively and empirically: survival means different things to different states. Thus, this sophisticated theory, developed by a brilliant intellectual, falls inexorably into that intellectual inferno which is the realm of the nonsensical.

Ultimately, the problem lies in the old analogy between the individual in domestic society and the state in the "international" system. This analogy will always lead to fallacy, and Waltz is no exception despite the brilliancy of his arguments. His tendency to fall into anthropomorphisms becomes sadly

obvious when he ironically acknowledges that "sovereign states have seldom led free and easy lives"[48].

It should be noted that the critique above is analogous to Robert W. Cox's assertion that "neorealism, which usually dismisses social forces as irrelevant, is not much concerned with differentiating forms of state (except insofar as `strong societies' in liberal democratic polities may hamper the use of force by the state or advance particular interests over the national interests)"[49]. On the other hand, my critique also comes to a similar diagnosis as does Richard K. Ashley:

> Knowing that the `objectives and foreign policies of states are determined primarily by the interests of their dominant members or ruling coalitions', (neorealist) analysis nonetheless simply joins the victors in proclaiming the state a singular actor with a unified set of objectives in the name of the collective good. This proclamation is the starting point of theoretical discourse, one of the unexamined assumptions from which theoretical discourse proceeds[50].

Both Cox's and Ashley's analyses are very different from the one presented here, which is much more traditional than their interpretive perspectives. Yet despite the different points of departure (and with due consideration of the fact that their usage of the term "state" is closer to my operational definition of "government" than to my usage of "state"), their conclusion regarding the fallacies incurred upon by Waltz and other structural realists, as well as the interdependence theorists, are identical to mine. As was said in Chapter 1, that identical diagnoses should come from such different points of departure is, in my opinion, neither a coincidence nor lacking in significance. What is rather surprising, instead, is that Robert G. Gilpin should limit his response to Ashley, in his essay "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism", to frivolously poking fun at that scholar's profound insights.[51]

Some additional conclusions for our embryonic systemic theory of limits

That Morgenthau's concept of rationality is really citizenry-centric, and that his inadvertence of the different levels of rationality is basically the product of a certain conceptual imprecision and not of having chosen the individual (statesman) level, nor of having fallen prey to the same fallacy as Waltz and Keohane[52] (among others) is suggested (among several possible quotations) by the following statement:

> The individual may say for himself: "Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the world perishes)," but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty. Yet while the individual has a moral right to sacrifice himself in defense of such a moral principle, the state has no right to let moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival. There can be no political morality without prudence; that is without consideration of the political consequences of seemingly moral action. Realism, then, considers prudence --the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions-- to be the supreme virtue in politics. Ethics in the abstract judges action by its conformity with the moral law; political ethics judges action by its political consequences.[53]

If this assertion is valid for central realism, it is even more valid for a peripheral realism, i.e., for the foreign policies of states that are vulnerable and are often underdeveloped. The moral obligation of a peripheral government, especially if it is the government of an underdeveloped country, to abide by this principle of prudence, is greater than in the case of a central government, both because of the government's obligations to its citizenry (which is often poor and should not be made to bear the risks of imprudent foreign policies), and because a peripheral state has far less power than a central one, and hence has less possibilities of excercizing real influence to correct injustice abroad, whence such efforts are bound to be sterile anyway.

A peripheral government is under a stronger obligation to abide by citizenry-centric rationality than a central one. It is under a stronger obligation to make sure that its foreign policies will be functional to economic development. And it has far less room for risk-taking with "idealistic" foreign policies that are not connected with the country's material interests and which either carry material costs or imply engaging in the risk of such costs. There is also less room for idealistic confrontations with the often immoral foreign policies of big powers, whenever such policies do not directly affect the economic and the immediate political interests of the peripheral country involved. As pointed out at the beginning of the chapter, Morgenthau correctly judged that only a foreign policy that minimizes risks and maximizes benefits is compatible with both the moral concept of prudence and the political requirement of success[54]. This is even more applicable to peripheral states than to the great powers that were Morgenthau's focus of

attention. Hence, running the risk of incurring in reiterations rather than not being clear and explicit, a peripheral government should:

1. Abstain from international power politics and devote itself to promoting its economic development.

2. Abstain also from costly "idealistic" international policies. It should only engage in promoting democracy, freedom, ecological conservation, or other good causes abroad, when it can do this without engaging in material costs or risks for itself and its people.

3. Abstain from risky confrontations with great powers when they engage in policies that are detrimental to universal good causes but which do not affect their material interests. This is not to say that a peripheral government should engage in complicities with such powers when they commit such transgressions: such behavior will often lead to a counterproductive excess of pragmatism. For example, Argentina's military government (1976-83) engaged in complicity with the United States' dirty war in Central America. This was not only contrary to elemental ethics (an "idealistic" reason for not engaging in such behavior) but also alienated a great part of the informed public of the United States itself, and an even greater part of the informed public of Western Europe, thus generating negative perceptions about Argentina that are contrary to her "national" or country interest in the long-term (a "pragmatic" reason for not engaging in such behavior). But in the other extreme, and counterproductive as well, was the Alfonsín government's policy of supporting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua through the award of credits in 1984[55]. This not only gratuitously irritated the United States (on whom Argentine is financially dependent) but was also an irresponsible waste of money that probably will never be paid back and thus implies a gross violation of the Argentine government's responsibilities vis-a-vis those who are in its care and who are increasingly impoverished.

4. Generally attempt to abstain from engaging in unproductive political confrontations with great powers, even when these confrontations do not generate immediate costs due to a reluctance to make use of outrageous issue-linkages on the side of the great power. Even when there are no immediate costs, such confrontations generate negative perceptions within the great power that is being antagonized, and these perceptions can result costly in the long-term.

The role of the "historical memory"

From the latter point of view, the study of Argentina's diplomatic history is of great practical use. Argentina dedicated herself to diplomatic confrontations with the United States for approximately the half century previous to World War II, without immediate costs to herself. The absence of costs was basically the product of not being dependent on the United States: Argentina's main dependence, until World War II, was with the United Kingdom. But, as Morgenthau said well before the recent and surprising changes in the international system, the international system is endowed with an enormous capacity for sudden and unforseen change, and in 1942, when the United States became a belligerent, Argentina suddenly and unexpectedly found herself in a situation in which she became acutely and increasingly dependent on that power, due to wartime controls over international trade and Britain's own dire dependence on the American giant. With the end of the war, Argentine dependence on the United States was accentuated. And --as we shall see in Chapter 7-- the U.S. reaction to the changed structure of U.S.-Argentine relations was to make Argentina pay for what was perceived to be her "essentially anti-American attitude" during the previous half century. In the process of U.S. decision-making towards Argentina during the economic and political boycott that was implemented from 1942 to 1949, there was a constant referral to this historical memory, as an element that justified the adoption of severe sanctions against Argentina.

This historical memory is not a metaphysical attribute nor just another anthropomorphism. It is physically embodied in the National Archives of the United States, and it is made up of historical documents that U.S. officials actually consult when drafting policy towards a country like Argentina. Its operation shows just how important it is, from a self-interested point of view, that a peripheral state be cooperative (or at least not be unnecessarily confrontational) with great powers on issues that do not affect the material interests of the former, especially if policy rationality is evaluated in citizenry-centric terms.

Indeed, the importance of cooperation is greater the weaker a country is. Confidence is an asset that is built in the long-term but can be destroyed instantly. Confidence or its counterparts, distrust and apprehension, stem directly from the historical memory. In After Hegemony, Robert O. Keohane correctly pointed to the importance of cooperation for the developed countries and their citizens, explicitly referring to the role and value of confidence in making cooperation feasible[56]. This is much more the case for vulnerable countries, to the point that unreciprocated, one-sided cooperation on issues

that are not related to the weak state's economic interests is immensely preferable to confrontation. As Keohane said, this is a challenge to the traditional ideal of Realpolitik, i.e., the policy of an autonomous and hierarchical state that keeps its options open and its decision-making process closed. But then, peripheral realism is quite the opposite of Realpolitik, precisely because it is a realism for those who are deprived of power.

The "irrelevance of rationality" factor

As mentioned above, the study of Argentine diplomatic history lends credence to the basic wisdom of refraining from political confrontations with great powers even when such confrontations do not bear immediate costs to the peripheral state, if the said confrontations are unrelated to the peripheral state's economic interests or to its immediate political interests in neighboring countries. The absence of immediate costs is not tantamount to the absence of risks. The international system has indeed a great capacity for sudden change, and the set of conditions that makes it unadvisable for a great power to sanction a peripheral state at a given time may be altered unexpectedly, as happened in 1942 in the case of Argentina.

Nonetheless, it need be stressed that this risk will usually be a minor factor for all those cases in which the peripheral state is of a certain relevance for the central state with which it confronts. A significative risk of being sanctioned for even minor confrontations that are accumulated in a negative "historical memory" arises when the peripheral state is relatively irrelevant to the vital interests of the central state with which it confronts.

This was (and still is) the case of Argentina vis-a-vis the United States, but is certainly not the case of every peripheral state. This makes it necessary for us to refine our category of peripheral states, and to differentiate not only between developed and underdeveloped peripheral states, but also between peripheral states that are relatively relevant to the vital interests of the great powers, and peripheral states that are relatively irrelevant to these interests. This variable is obviously different from a country's development, insofar as it is possible and indeed it is sometimes the case that a more developed peripheral state is less relevant to the vital interests of a great power than a less developed one.

A peripheral state can be relevant to the vital interests of a great power in either a positive or a negative way. It is relevant in a positive way when:

1. it has something important to offer: e.g., natural resources that the great power needs, or

2. it possesses a strategically significative geographic location.

It is relevant in a negative way when it can in a significative way become a threat to the great power, because:

1. it is so close to the great power that local instability would be dangerous to the security of the great power (as is the case of Mexico vis-a-vis the United States),

2. it is in a very unstable and strategic region of the world and is thus endowed with the capacity to activate a major conflict (as is the case of all Middle East countries),

3. it is a producer of goods that are deemed dangerous by the great power (as is the case of the important drug-producing countries in the Western hemisphere),

4. it holds a critical mass of investments of the great power, such that if the peripheral country is thrown into a deep economic crisis, many important interests in the great power will be seriously hurt (as might be the case of Mexico or Brazil), or

5. it possesses a significative arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (as is probably the case of Israel and South Africa).

Clearly, Argentina does not fit into any of the above categories. Its economy is not complementary to that of the United States, but (as a major producer of temperate climate foodstuffs) tends to be competitive instead, and its products are no longer essential for the feeding of Europeans, as they were until approximately 1950. It does not have the major oil resources of the OPEC countries. It does not have Panama's-canal, Chile's copper, Brazil's rubber nor Bolivia's tin. It is geographically remote. It does not have a truly critical mass of United States investments, and no longer has, as in the past, a critical mass of British investments. Its nuclear and missile development is not sufficiently advanced as to make it an actual threat, while if it advances further, Argentina's economic vulnerability is such that it is possible for the United States to prevent these programs from becoming real threats, through economic issue-linkages. Argentina is not even an important cocaine or heroine producer, and it does not even pose the threat of being capable of destroying a significative percentage of the Earth's rainforest,

as does Brazil. If it were wiped out of the map without ecological damage, if it were thrown into a violent civil war, or if it were to fall into total economic ruin, the daily lives of the vast majority of Americans and Europeans would go on undisturbed.

Contrariwise, Iraq, Iran and Libya are major oil producing countries in a highly unstable region of the world, and in the case of the first two this comes together with considerable military power. Mexico produces oil and drugs, is an immediate neighbor of the United States and has a critical mass of United States investments. Both Mexico and Brazil have a much greater degree of economic complementarity with the United States than does a country like Argentina. Such qualities give these countries a much greater bargaining power than that of a country that is "relatively irrelevant to the vital interests of the great powers", because (as the historical record indeed shows) the costs of erring in the case of a great power's policy towards a state that is relatively irrelevant to its vital interests is close to nil.

Indeed, as will be seen in greater depth in Chapter 7, the diplomatic history of Argentina shows that when that country escalated its confrontations with the United States, during the 1940s, it simply became the "plaything of a giant"[57]. It became the arena for wild bureaucratic conflict within the U.S. government, and in this competition the personal ambitions and passions of individual U.S. officials became much more prominent than is usually the case in the decision-making process of the U.S. government, simply because in the ultimate instance the adequacy of the policy rationale mattered very little. Argentina thus became the victim of an "irrelevance-of- rationality syndrome" in the United States decision-making process, i.e. of a certain decision-making pathology. When second-level U.S. officials had to justify their anti-Argentine policies before their superiors, they did so in terms of the historical memory of the State Department, that catalogued that country as "essentially anti-American" because of its long history of relatively innocuous diplomatic conflict with the United States. The fact that these policies produced results that were contrary to their proclaimed objectives, bringing Argentina closer to the Axis, was of little consequence, insofar as failure in policy towards that country carried no real costs for the United States, and even gave that country additional opportunities for a prestige-oriented hard line vis-a-vis Argentine political recalcitrance.

Thus, the fourth "abstention" advisable to peripheral states in their relations with great powers, as listed in the previous section, is heightened when the country involved is relatively irrelevant to the vital interests of the great powers. It is much more important for Argentina to avoid antagonizing with the United States even when this antagonism focuses on

relatively secondary issues and does not carry immediate costs, than it is for Mexico. For Iraq, Iran or Libya it would be sufficient that they not attempt to play a suicidal power politics game which is dangerous for everyone else as well. They could, without costs, continue to engage in petty diplomatic antagonisms with the West as long as the Middle East remains unstable and as long as their oil lasts: no one would pay much attention to it if they moderated their policies in the security front. But for a country like Argentina, the risk factor is heightened: this is a common sense hypothesis that can be verified through history.

The country risk factor

Nonetheless, although not every peripheral country is liable to fall into an "irrelevance-of-rationality syndrome" in the decision-making process of a great power on which it is (or it becomes) dependent, there is another much more important reason for abiding by our "fourth abstention", and with the three previous ones as well, and this applies to every peripheral state. So long as they are not the product of the active defense of their material interests, negative historical memories should be avoided by peripheral states vis-a-vis central powers even if there is no risk that, in the long-term, they might feed the need to justify discriminatory policies vis-a-vis countries that are relatively irrelevant to their interests. This is so simply because negative historical memories also feed the perceptions of potential investors, money lenders and the consultants who build country risk indexes.

If we acknowledge that economic growth is the primary "national" interest of a peripheral country, then any factor that results in an obstacle to growth or development is to be avoided, and any policy that facilitates growth or development, directly or indirectly, is to be deemed advisable, even if the economic consequences of such policies are not immediate and dramatic. Because they are important to the decisions of potential investors, of money lenders and of the consultants who build country risk indexes, positive perceptions should be cultivated with the long-term in mind. Perceptions are positively and negatively affected by a diversity of factors, and these factors are not exclusively of an economic nature (although the economic ones are obviously the most important). Political stability is almost as important as economic factors. The risk of war will impinge heavily upon a country risk index. Juridical security will also be a major factor. But even in the presence of good economic prospects, political stability, juridical security and a reasonable guarantee of peace, it is not indifferent to most investors and bankers (who are mostly Western businessmen) whether a country is an ally of his/her own or is perceived as an antagonist instead, even if not a dangerous

one. Political antagonism is usually associated with the risk of confiscation, inconvertibility, or other potential local policies that are very costly to the investor, and this is obviously not good for a country in need of investments.

Investors usually have much more than a single investment option: on the contrary, there are usually more potential investments deals offered than money to invest. This makes room for a variety of factors to impinge upon an investment or lending decision, which can be quite arbitrary. Furthermore, the rate of return expected by an investor or lender will vary according to the set of factors mentioned above. All of these factors make it imperative for a peripheral state, especially if it is underdeveloped, to make an extra effort not only to acquire the economic and political stability that is the sine que non condition for all reasonable investments and credits, but also to adapt to the political structure of the world as it is, rather than hopelessly confront with the great powers in a fiat justitia, pereat mundus attitude: confrontation with powers big or small should be reserved only for those issues in which what is at stake is precisely the peripheral country's development.

Like all other human beings, investors and bankers are not completely "rational" people. They are usually intelligent people who have focused their intelligence on their business, and thus they usually have less political sophistication than a Ph.D. in Political Science (though much more sophistication in other more tangible affairs). Like all human beings, they harbor stereotypes that affect their behavior. This phenomenon is relevant from the point of view of both positive and negative perceptions. An interesting case that illustrates this process is that of president Menem's decision that Argentina participate in the 1990 Gulf war symbolically, with two vessels that obviously had no impact whatever in the military power of the coalition. Intellectuals the world over ridiculed this policy, including many liberal academicians in the United States, and the liberal press tended to portray this policy with scorn. Yet as a consequence:

1. the Latin American specialists of The Wall Street Journal started writing in much more positive terms about Argentina,

2. the same writers started criticizing the International Monetary Fund's hard policies vis-a-vis Argentina,

3. the consultants lowered the political risk coefficients (the economic risk coefficients having also been lowered as a consequence of success in stabilization),

4. the cost of money to Argentina went down, and

5. the probability of investments increased by an unquantifiable factor that nonetheless should not be underestimated if long-term strategic thinking and planning are involved.[58]

Obviously, the impact of the symbolic decision to send two vessels to the Persian Gulf was very small indeed. But if such policies continued over a course of, say, twenty years, and if this went together with economic growth and political stability, the time would come when investors would perceive Argentina with the same positive prejudices with which they perceive countries like Australia or New Zealand. This would not be a novelty for Argentine history, as this was indeed the case before 1930, a time when that country was more favored by British investors than the said dominions[59]. The intellectuals' criticism of the Menem government's gestures of alignment with the West is oblivious to the fact that in the United States (as anywhere else) there are many highly ideologized people with a great deal of financial power. The degree of "rationality" in corporate decisions is not so great. What is important is to "sell" an idea, and the better the image a peripheral country has with the financial press, the better its prospects will be, no matter how much some intellectuals may scorn a certain policy.

A perception of policy irreversibility is generated by an operation like Argentina's participation in the Gulf war, because of its high public profile, that makes it very unlikely that the same Argentine government might be able to revert to a policy of confrontation with the West. Combined with a change in the right direction in the more important but lower profile fields of the country's nuclear, missile and Falkland/Malvinas policy, the Persian Gulf policy and/or the Menem decision to abandon the Non Aligned Movement are taken note of by the financial operators, who sense that the country is safer as a consequence, and this reduces the political component of the country risk coefficient, while concomitantly increasing the probability of attracting new investments.

It should be pointed out here that there is a considerable frivolity in the criticisms of such policies by liberal intellectuals (especially U.S. academicians). Because of their own relative contestatarianism in the United States, they often enjoy the confrontations generated by Third World states and indirectly promote these policies, without bearing in mind what the costs may be to the countries themselves and their populations. They fall into the same syndrome that affects many Third World leaders, i.e., they forget that what is at stake is often the welfare of millions of poor and hungry people,

and think of countries in anthropomorphic terms, and of foreign policy as if it were the sport of states. I will delve more on this subject in Chapter 4.

Summarizing, it seems clear that, ideally, peripheral states should limit their confrontations to issues in which their economic interests are involved, or to very immediate political interests that affect their security directly. Objectively, I think that it is safe to say that (leaving aside the great powers) the significance of the foreign political interests of a peripheral country are inversely proportional to the distance between its borders and the foreign country involved. This does not mean that at times it may not be worthwhile to pursue symbolic policies far away from a peripheral state's borders; it only means that it is not worthwhile to confront with great powers over such policies.

The validity of this assertion, in turn, is proportional to the underdevelopment of the country whose policy is being evaluated. The more underdeveloped it is, the more poor people its government will be responsible for, and the more serious the economic risks of its policies will be. Unfortunately, however, underdeveloped countries tend to be less democratic than developed ones, and tend to have less egalitarian cultures and social structures, and this leads to the generation of a greater margin of freedom on the part of their leaders vis-a-vis the economic consequences of their foreign policies, and to the perception that it is legitimate to confront, fiat justitia, pereat mundus. Thus, paradoxically, underdeveloped countries have a greater tendency to engage in risky and potentially costly foreign political confrontations than developed peripheral countries.

Nonetheless, to cite Morgenthau once again, "it is no argument against the theory here presented that actual foreign policy does not or cannot live up to it."[60] That argument misunderstands the intention of this chapter, which is to identify the systemic constraints faced by the foreign policy of peripheral states, if we agree that their primary "national" interest lies in their economic development. These constraints tell us what these countries should not do if they abided by a citizenry-centric rationality. But they often do not abide by such a rationality, and this is why their behavior is not predictable, and this is also the reason why the conclusion expressed early in this chapter will be reinforced time and time again: that the really relevant theory-building strategy lies in focusing on theories of foreign policy.

The relative irrelevance of the recent changes in the international system from the perspective of the major conclusions of this analysis

Oftentimes, international relations analysts are dazzled by contemporary events, and feel a compulsion to sort out what consequences the most recent changes in the international system will have for the foreign policies of individual states. This is accentuated when such changes are as momentous as the end of the Cold War, the liberation of Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Yet compared to the awesome structural asymmetries between central and peripheral states that determine the major systemic constraints that impose limits upon the citizenry-centric foreign policies of the latter, even such major changes in the international system as we have lived through recently are relatively irrelevant.

In the present stage of transition of the international system, in which the Cold War has ended but the new order is not yet fully defined, analysts will inevitably devote themselves to endless and sterile pondering about what these changes imply for peripheral countries, especially Third World ones. Their perceptions regarding what the "freedom of manoeuvre" and the "interstices" available to the peripheral states have not yet crystallized, and a great deal of ink will be invested in this endeavor. It is probable that prevailing thought will eventually describe a world in which, at least vis-a-vis Latin America, the United States will have, concomitantly, less motivations than before to intervene (because of the lapse of the Cold War security logic) and a greater freedom of action to do so (insofar as the negative image produced by an excess of interventions will no longer be capitalized by the other superpower in a competition for world power). In other words, it is probable that the analysts will come to the conclusion that, in toto, the United States will have less reasons to intervene, while the international political costs of intervention will paradoxically go down.

While in the abstract it would be difficult to predict whether the balance of such circumstances will be in favor of a greater or lesser intervention abroad, the foreign policies of the United States after the end of the Cold War (the Gulf War, the invasion of Panama, the Supreme Court's decision that abductions abroad by agencies of the U.S. government are legal, the humanitarian intervention in Somalia and the renewed attacks on Iraq[61]) generated the expectation of an increased interventionism. Simultaneously, the accession of William Clinton to power could well change this trend, renewing the uncertainties of the present international situation. Interestingly, these uncertainties will be resolved largely by Clinton's decisions, and only marginally by the operation of the international system.

Whatever the case may be, however, the fact is that none of the major constraints imposed by the international system on the foreign policy of peripheral states that I have dealt with in this chapter, are likely to be modified by any of the plausible post-Cold War scenarios. Our arguments about the priority of development policies, about the irrationality and self-defeating consequences of Third World challenges to the international order based on power politics, and about the relevance of scrupulously pondering not only immediate costs but long-term risks as well in the formulation of policy, will not lose one iota of their power. There may indeed be some very important changes in the impact of the international system upon Third World states, but these changes will in all probability be limited to trade and finance, and they will affect the different underdeveloped countries unequally. As we shall see in Chapter 3, the analysis of political "margins of manoeuvre" is largely futile and is often misleading, unless we limit it to the issues that are directly related to economic growth and development, which as has been said is the primary "national" interest of all peripheral countries under contractarian (i.e. liberal democratic and citizenry-centric) assumptions.

NOTES

1. J. Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985.

2. Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger 1990; pages 229-231. The Cóndor 2 missile program was disactivated by the Menem government. Contrariwise to Alfonsín's administration, Menem's was sensible to the costs and risks of going ahead with a project that confronted directly with the West's anti-proliferation policies.

3. Under Alfonsín, though deprived of a great part of its former budget, the nuclear program survived and the Argentine state refused to accept the treaties mentioned in the text. Under Menem, however, Argentina signed a treaty with Brazil and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), accepting IAEA inspections and safeguards, and declared that it would finally ratify the Tlatelolco treaty. See L.S. Spector, pages 223-224, and the chapters on Argentina in his previous works, The New Nuclear Nations, New York: Vintage 1985; and Going Nuclear, Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger 1987.

4. These influences can be identified in theses presented by naval officers to the University of Belgrano's graduate programs in international relations. The author of this book was a professor there from 1982 to 1992.

5. See Chapter 6.

6. See Jack Child, op.cit.

7. Waltz, op.cit. Spanish-language edition page 108-109.

8. K. Waltz, op.cit. Spanish-language edition page 96. Without referring explicitly to Waltz nor to the imperfection of the analogy between the international system and the market, S. Hoffmann makes a similar critique of the international relations theorists' fascination with economics. He points to the illusory character of pretending that "power" play the same role for international relations as "money" does for economics. See. S. Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva, Spanish-language edition page 28.

9. K. Waltz, op.cit., Spanish-langauge edition, page 109.

10. K. Waltz, op.cit. Spanish-language edition, page 109.

11. K. Waltz, op.cit. Spanish-language edition, pages 98-101.

12. K. Waltz, op.cit. Spanish-language edition page 96.

13. J.G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis", in R. Keohane op.cit. 1986, p. 151.

14. R. Keohane, "Theory of world politics: structural realism and beyond", in R. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism..., p. 193.

15. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 3.

16. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 8.

17. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 4, my emphasis.

18. Morgenthau, op.cit. pages 4-5.

19. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 5.

20. Morgenthau, op.cit. pages 27-28. My emphasis.

21. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 32. My emphasis.

22. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 33.

23. R.J. Art and R. Jervis (eds.), International Politics, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992; page 2.

24. K. Waltz, op.cit. p. 155-157, Spanish-language edition.

25. K. Waltz, op.cit. Spanish-language edition, page 161.

26. K. Waltz, op.cit. Spanish-language edition, page 132.

27. The author of this work was advisor to the Foreign Minister of Argentina while these negotiations were taking place. Simultaneously, the Brady Plan negotiations for the condonement of a portion of Argentina's foreign debt were held. The issues were never explicitly linked by U.S. officials, but anyone acquainted with the diplomatic material in the U.S. National Archives knows that this sort of linkage takes place continuously when a considerable degree of financial vulnerability affects the peripheral country that poses a security risk. See Chapter 6 of this study for historical precedents. As to the denouement of the Cóndor 2 episode, when the United States vetoed Argentine-Spanish cooperation in the development of a satellite-launching vehicle, the agreement was redressed so as to enable the face-saving operation of sending the fourteen existing Cóndor 2 motors and guidance systems for their destruction in Spain, under the pretense that, if possible, they would be recycled for peaceful uses. This was agreed in mid-1992 but was only implemented in January 1993, when the Argentine government finally and reluctantly came to the conclusion that, given the constraints, there really was no other rational course of action. Spain and Argentina persevered in the intention of cooperating in the development of satellites, which was a part of the original agreement which was not vetoed by MTCR nor the United States.

28. R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview, 1989; Chapter 1.

29. K. Waltz, op.cit. Spanish-language edition pages (164-168).

30. K. Waltz, op.cit., Spanish-language edition page 138.

31. An interesting example of the advantages that accompany a trading state profile and the disadvantages coupled with a political military state profile for small and middle powers is the Swedish experience with the development of nuclear weapons. Sweden developed a secret nuclear weapons program during almost three decades, from 1945 until 1972, attempting to specialize in the development of miniature devises. In so doing, it set up smoke screens such as legislation that prohibitted the development of nuclear weapons, and from 1970 until 1972 actually violated the Non Proliferation Treaty that it had signed and ratified. In the latter year, when it was already in the very threshold of producing weapons, Sweden finally scrapped the program, not because of its dovish inclinations, but because its leaders arrived to the consesus that the nuclear program was actually damaging Swedish security because: 1. the great power's arsenals were far beyond the reach of Swedish competition, while by attaining a nuclear-weapons capacity Sweden would become the potential target of a nuclear attack, and 2. the investments in the nuclear program were hurting Sweden's capacities in the field of conventional defense. See L. Spector, op.cit. 1985, pages 65-77.

32. S. Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva, Spanish-language edition page 85.

33. Contrary to Morgenthau's case, K. Waltz is aware of the lack of autonomy of the political sphere vis-a-vis the political sphere, not only for peripheral countries but more generally. This is particularly clear in his criticism of the theory of imperialism of Hobson-Lenin. See op.cit. page 46, Spanish-language edition.

34. K. Waltz, op.cit., especially chapter 3 and 4. The methodological problem for international relations theory-building does not lie, therefore, in the alternative posed by Waltz, i.e., that between "systemic" and "reductionist" theories (the latter being, in his terminology, those that limit causality to the action of the states or other actors instead of considering the intervention of systemic causes that are beyond the states themselves and are rather related to the relations between the states). It so happens that many times, the more relevant (or simply the more dangerous) phenomena are engendered by causes that are simply not systemic, even if most behavior is explainable through systemic factors (or through the constraints posed by the external world, even if these constraints are not strictly systemic in Waltz's terminology). See Spanish-language edition page 91 (Chapter 4).

35. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 5.

36. S. Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva, Spanish-language edition page 80.

37. R.O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977", first published in 1980 and reprinted in R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989; pages 76-77.

38. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 7.

39. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 7.

40. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 5.

41. As mentioned in the Introduction, this concept was coined by Herbert A. Simon, op.cit.

42. It was not the case from a wider perspective, insofar as the obsession of the Soviet Union with its competition for world power with the United States led it to economic bankruptcy and, eventually, to political and ideological collapse. As said before, the case proves that even in the case of central countries, the political sphere is not entirely autonomous from the economic sphere.

43. For example, S. Hoffmann criticizes Morgenthau saying that the latter's dogmatic insistence on the "objective laws" of politics made him look for the determinants of the national interest in the world outside more than in the domestic environment (Janus and Minerva, Spanish-language edition, page 80). I agree that significative domestic interests do and indeed should help to define conceptions and perceptions about a country's interests in the world: this element is missing in Morgenthau, and Hoffmann is right in criticizing this omission. But I also think that it is clear that (for example) for a specific government or political party to win a domestic election is not a "national" interest but a party or government interest, and any foreign policy geared towards gaining popularity and winning such an election was not coined with the "national" interest in mind. This distinction is blurred in Hoffmann, and actually it comes out much more clearly, though implicitly, in Morgenthau, as we shall see below. Also, as we shall see in future chapters, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are among the analysts for whom "nation", "country", "state", "government" and "statesman" are used as synonyms. In certain contexts, this

might be acceptable. But when we are talking about "interests"; "policies" that serve some sort of interest; and "rationalities" that describe certain policies, not to define the level of analysis of the actor involved leads us to reasonings that are close to nonsensical.

44. K. Waltz, op.cit., Spanish-language edition, page 153.

45. H.V. Milner, "The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory", in The Review of International Studies, 1991. Reprinted in R.J. Art and R. Jervis (eds.), op.cit. page 32.

46. K. Waltz, op.cit., Spanish-language edition page 144. My emphasis.

47. K. Waltz, op.cit., Spanish-language edition, page 136.

48. K. Waltz, op.cit., Spanish-language edition, page 143.

49. R.W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", in R.O. Keohane (ed.) op.cit., p. 222.

50. R.K. Ashley, op.cit., p. 269-270. The quotation inside the citation is from R. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 19.

51. See R.G. Gilpin, Chapter 10 of R.O. Keohane (ed.), op.cit. 1986. Although in his essay "A Theory of world Politics" (R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1986, p. 168-169) Keohane also dismisses all too lightly Ashley's critique, he makes up for it in "International Institutions: Two Approaches", which is Chapter 7 of R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview Press 1989.

52. See Chapter 4 above.

53. Morgenthau, op.cit. pages 10-11.

54. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 8.

55. See M. Wilhelmy, "Argentina: la política exterior del gobierno democrático", in H. Muñoz (ed.), Las Políticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas frente a la Crisis (Anuario PROSPEL 1984), Buenos Aires: GEL, 1985, pages 330-331.

56. R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony, chapter 11.

57. C. Escudé, The Argentine Eclipse: The International Factor in Argentina's Post World War II Decline, Yale Ph.D. dissertation, 1981, especially Chapter 5. Alternatively, see the published Spanish-language version, Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la Declinación Argentina 1942-1949, Buenos Aires: Ed. de Belgrano 1983, Chapter 4.

58. I am indebted to Cristóbal Williams for valuable exchanges on this subject, which I consider central to my theoretical approach.

59. See, for example, the works of D.C.M Platt.

60. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 8.

61. Personally, considerably before the end of The Cold War and before the U.S. invasion of Panama I have claimed that such issue-linkages would be applied whenever the need arose and prudence made it possible and desirable. I have always used the extreme and counterfactual example of a militaristic Argentine government that developed nuclear weapons, which in my view would necessarily

have been subject to strong economic discriminations by the United States. See my "De la irrelevancia de Reagan y Alfonsín: hacia el desarrollo de un realismo periférico", en R. Bouzas y R. Russell (eds.), Estados Unidos y la Transición Argentina, Legasa, Buenos Aires 1989. This paper, though published late, was presented to a FLACSO seminar in Buenos Aires in October 1987. The point is important because, in my opinion, the interdependence theoreticians were exceedingly optimistic in their judgement about the freedom of manoeuvre of peripheral countries (if such a freedom is to be considered a reasonable ground for "optimism"). That such an "optimism" was to be refuted by history was, in my view, predictable.

Chapter 3 - WHY AND HOW PERIPHERAL REALISM IS DIFFERENT FROM "COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE"

Introduction

In some respects peripheral realism is closer to the complex interdependence model than to central realism. As it should already be clear, peripheral realism, with its focus on development, is quite at odds with the security rationale and obsession with war of central realism. Peripheral realism is not hawkish but clearly liberal instead. In terms of the foreign policies of peripheral states, the hawks are Saddam Hussein, Khomeini, Khadaffy and Galtieri, among others. Contrariwise, the foreign policies of Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, and Argentina under Menem are dovish. Peripheral realism, with its focus on development, disactivates policies such as Argentina's Cóndor 2 missile or her refusal to accept nuclear safeguards. This is surely closer to the spirit of U.S. liberalism than its opposite.

In my view, the complex interdependence model, developed by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in 1979, correctly rejects the classical realist's obsession with the "ever-present possibility of war among sovereign states"[1]. Morgenthau's realist assumptions

> about world politics can be seen as defining an extreme set of conditions or ideal type. One can also imagine very different conditions. (...) We shall construct another ideal type, the opposite of realism. We call it complex interdependence. (...) We shall argue that complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism.[2]

According to Keohane and Nye, the three assumptions central to Morgenthau's realist vision are that:

> 1. States as coherent units are the dominant actors in world politics.
>
> 2. Force is a usable and effective instrument of policy, and
>
> 3. There is a hierarchy of issues in world politics, headed by questions of military security: the high politics of military security dominates the low politics of economic and social affairs.

Our authors claim, correctly in my view, that each of these assumptions can be challenged and that "we can imagine a world in which actors other than

states participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of issues does not exist, and in which force is an ineffective instrument of policy". Such would be the world of "complex interdependence". Furthermore, they do not argue that complex interdependence faithfully reflects world reality, but that both it and the realist model are ideal types[3].

However, classical realism, structural realism and interdependentism have several traits in common which clearly set them apart from peripheral realism. The most important is that the peripheral realist model here presented avoids considering concepts like "rationality" and the "state" as unproblematic. From this point of view it is different from both the neorealist and interdependentist models. Not only are states not coherent units: we must also come to agreement regarding what it is that we are referring to when we speak of the rationality of policy, which cannot be done without first defining the subject that policy is purporting to serve. This implies delving into the nature of the state for explicatory purposes, and defining citizenry-centric rationality as the ideal type of policy both for normative purposes and for the definition of a major subject of theoretical study, i.e., the deviations from citizenry-centric policy rationality. This is done by the interdependentists no more than by the central realists. The interdependentists, like their central realist cousins, deal with a state-as-actor model in which the state is analogous to what stars and subatomic particles are for physicists.

On the other hand, the peripheral realist model is in agreement with the interdependentist model regarding the assumption that military force is usually not a usable and effective instrument of policy, especially if we are thinking in terms of citizenry-centric rationality. As should already be clear, for the peripheral realist model military security comes last or second to last. Military expenditures are viewed as an evil distraction from the productive investments needed to raise the living standards of impoverished populations, justifiable only by the presence of a truly aggressive neighbor. But as said above, peripheral realism diverges from the latter model and converges with the realists insofar as it assumes a clear hierarchy of issues in which economic power replaces military force as the ultimate desideratum of the international politics of a peripheral state. The hierarchy of issues is led by issues related to trade and finance, to economic growth and development.

Thus, peripheral realism focuses on the systemic constraints faced by the foreign policies of the peripheral states, assuming that their primary interest is economic growth and development. From this point of view, peripheral realism differs from almost all of the international relations

theory developed in the United States, including classical realism, structural realism and interdependentism, which are focused on the perspectives of the central powers (especially the United States).

As will be seen below, in their attempts to identify changes in the world order and their consequences for U.S. foreign policy rationality (especially the increased costs, for the United States, of imposing its policies abroad), theorists like Keohane and Nye completely leave out the issue of the costs and risks engaged by peripheral states when they adopt a foreign policy of confrontation with the United States. As a consequence, the superficial reading of this model has often led Third World leaders or their advisors to the fallacy that, because the costs to the United States of using its power resources have increased, their own possibilities of engaging in risky confrontations have increased proportionately.

It is a paradox that in this indirect way, interdependentist theorists who have sought to reduce the level of the confrontations of the great powers have unwittingly contributed to the aggravation of some Third World challenges to international peace and security, and thereby, to the overall level of confrontations in the world.

Indeed, although the tendency of some Third World foreign policies to engage in costly or risky confrontations was first unknowingly nurtured by the realist theorists, in a second stage of theory development and world evolution the distortions generated by the misreading and ill-usage of the realists were to some extent replaced by and to some extent mixed with new distortions coming from those in the Third World who were seduced by the complex interdependence approach to international relations.

Probably the most notable example is that of the first edition of Keohane and Nye's already cited work, that has had an enormous influence throughout the Third World. As in the case of the realists analyzed in Chapter 2, this is not to say that the misreading of this book has been an independent cause of the said phenomenon, but only that it has helped to justify tendencies that were already present as a consequence of variables such as the political system, the political culture and the social structure.

Keohane and Nye are themselves conscious of the potential influence of theoreticians on policy. They point directly to it, although concerned basically with the influence of the realist school upon policy:

> Academic pens (...) leave marks in the minds of statesmen with profound results for policy. Not only are "practical men who believe themselves

> to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences" unconscious captives of conceptions created by "some academic scribbler of a few years back," but increasingly the scribblers have been playing a direct role in forming foreign policy. Inappropriate images and ill-conceived perceptions of world politics can lead directly to inappropriate or even disastrous national policies.[4]

It is ironical that this is true not only of the influence of the realist theorists, but as we shall see below, of that of Keohane and Nye themselves.

The "complex interdependence" model and the fallacy of the alleged absence of a hierarchy of issues

Works like the one named above attempt to describe the consequences of once recent changes in the international order, upon the foreign policy rationale of great powers, especially the United States. As is well known, the advent of the nuclear age did indeed bring about changes in the structure of international politics. Military force, for instance, became more dangerous and therefore less useful. No nuclear power can fully use its might without, at the very least, setting a precedent that in the long-term is dangerous for its own security to a greater extent than the loss of a regional war[5]. The paradigmatic case is Vietnam, a war that the United States preferred to lose, keeping it in the conventional field, rather than rapidly wipe out the centers of enemy power in North Vietnam through the use of a few low powered atomic weapons. Such things did not happen in the pre-Cold War past. That a great power should choose defeat rather than victory at a low immediate material cost, saving the lives of many of its own men, is something new. And the 1990 Gulf war against Saddam Hussein came to ratify that these changes are still the rule after the end of the Cold War. Contrariwise to Vietnam, it was the superpower that won in the Persian Gulf, but the prudence exercised by it would have been unimaginable in former times: there was prudence in the abstention from the use of weapons of mass destruction; there was prudence in the extreme care used by the superpower to cover diplomatic appearances, forming a coalition legitimized by the United Nations; there was prudence in the successful efforts to prevent Israel from replying to the direct military attacks from Iraq. In other words, even while appealing to military power, prudence prevailed, because the excessive danger represented by the weapons of mass destruction limited the usefulness of that military power. The most powerful weapons cannot be appealed to, even when not appealing to them implies higher immediate costs both in money and in the lives of the superpower's own soldiers. Not only this, but the range of issues related to

foreign policy where force is not applicable has also grown. The international agenda has become more diverse and complex. Furthermore, what happens within states has increasing consequences for international relations in a wide variety of issues ranging from pollution to monetary stability. This has also reduced the relative significance of military force in the realm of international relations[6].

This decrease in the capacity to make use of force and in the overall significance of force as the primary actual or latent factor in inter-governmental relations had an important impact upon international relations theory. Previously it was understood that all spheres of international politics were subordinated to the central sphere, that of military power. But towards the end of the 1970s a new trend appeared, according to which power is sometimes (and increasingly) independent in its different spheres: it was perceived that military power is independent from industrial or financial power; that at times an energy power can arise (such as OPEC), that is independent of other spheres of power, etc. Previously it was understood that power was measured in terms of military and economic resources (because it was presumed that drastic measures could always be recurred to, through issue linkages, in order to impose the desired results). Later a trend emerged that considered that power must be measured in terms of the capacity to impose results (because the conclusion was arrived to that often, issue linkages cannot be recurred to, insofar as the resources of power in one sphere will be independent of the other spheres, or insofar as the costs of recurring to such linkages are greater than its benefits and/or ineffectual in terms of outcomes)[7]. An important consequence of this conceptual evolution in the mood of many analysts was the perception that the international system offers (or offered) a greater margin of freedom of manoeuvre for weak peripheral states.

Keohane and Nye themselves have helped to generate this perception, insofar as their carefully crafted book focuses on a United States perspective, and their approach to the Third World's problems, although sympathetic, is somewhat unsophisticated (as is almost inevitably the case with First World analysts). Where this is most notable is in Keohane and Nye's treatment of "linkage strategies"[8]. There they say that realist analyses focus on the international system and lead to anticipate similar processes on a variety of issues. When realist assumptions hold,

> militarily and economically strong states will dominate a variety of organizations and a variety of issues, by linking their own policies on some issues with other states' policies on other issues.

But when military force is devalued, as is the case with complex interdependence,

> militarily strong states will find it more difficult to use their overall dominance to control outcomes on issues in which they are weak. And since the distribution of power resources in trade, shipping, or oil, for example, may be quite different, patterns of outcomes and distinctive political processes are likely to vary from one set of issues to another. If force were readily applicable, and military security were the highest foreign policy goal, these variations in the issue structure of power would not matter very much. (...) But when military force is largely immobilized, strong states will find that linkage is less effective. They may still attempt such links, but in the absence of a hierarchy of issues, their success will be problematic.[9]

This conclusion can help to shed light on what is the most rational foreign policy tactic on certain issues for the United States. The authors are probably right regarding the fact that issue-linkage has become more problematic for the United States on some issues vis-a-vis some countries. But this relevant fact does not under any circumstance imply that heretofore it will be less costly for Third World states to risk such issue-linkages on the part of the United States, and unfortunately this is a frequent interpretation of Keohane and Nye's thought on this score, at least in some Third World countries.

Furthermore, from the point of view of the citizenry-centric rationality of a peripheral state, the devaluation of military force does not imply that an absence in the hierarchy of issues is produced: this is one of many ethnocentric fallacies that can be identified in Keohane and Nye. From the point of view of the developmental goals that define the citizenry-centric rationality of poor, weak states, an economic big stick is more to be feared than a military one. Even before the recent changes in the international system, a peripheral country like Argentina has suffered severely from the United States' economic big stick (for example, during the 1940s) but it has always been too far away to even fear the application of a military one. The results of economic linkages can be as devastating as those of military linkages, with the difference that they have always been more credible. Moreover, where a crippling external debt or a staggering chronic inflation are the rule, it is not necessary to impose outrageous sanctions to destabilize a government: just a word of skepticism from a high U.S. government official or top financier can mobilize domestic forces that do the job. In such circumstances, to speak of the "absence of a hierarchy of issues"

is misleading and harmful. For the poor and weak states, there is a clear hierarchy of issues, even when military force has been devalued.

The paragraph that immediately follows the one cited above, however, is even more prone to misinterpretation and ill-usage:

> Dominant states may try to secure much the same result by using economic power to affect results on other issues. If only economic objectives were involved, they may succeed: money, after all, is fungible. But economic objectives have political implications, and economic linkage by the strong is limited by domestic, transnational and transgovernmental actors who resist having their interests traded off. (...) Thus it is difficult, for example, to imagine a militarily or economically strong state linking concessions on monetary policy to reciprocal concessions in oceans policy. On the other hand, poor, weak states are not similarly inhibited from linking unrelated issues, partly because their domestic interests are less complex. Linkage of unrelated issues is often a means of extracting concessions or side payments from rich and powerful states. And unlike powerful states whose instrument for linkage (military force) is often too costly to use, the linkage instrument used by poor, weak states --international organization-- is available and inexpensive.[10]

This paragraph is deserving of careful analysis, and I shall return to it again and again. The example given in the citation (the unlikeliness of linking concessions on monetary policy to reciprocal concessions in oceans policy) is dangerously deceiving. Unlikely linkages can be thought of just as easily as likely ones. For example, covert trade and financial discrimination against a Third World state is likely to be produced when that state devotes itself to the unsafeguarded enrichment of uranium, a fact that is concealed when only examples of unlikely linkages are presented. In actual practice, discourse such as the one above has served as a green light to justify policies like the Cóndor 2 in Argentina, or even Khadaffy's support of terrorist movements abroad, insofar as it suggests that the power mechanisms for imposing sanctions upon these transgressions to the written and unwritten rules of the international order are failing. The same impression is given by the table in which Keohane and Nye compare political processes under conditions of realism and complex interdependence. There it is said that under conditions of realism "linkages will reduce differences in outcomes among issue areas and reinforce international hierarchy", whereas under conditions of complex interdependence, linkages by strong states will be more difficult to make, and linkages by weak states will erode rather than reinforce hierarchy[11].

In other words, the mechanisms of power no longer work. Of course we know that Keohane and Nye will answer that this is only a model valid so long as its assumptions are not in contradiction with reality. But the object of their book, that unfortunately is full of well-intended wishful thinking, is to show that conditions of complex interdependence prevail increasingly, and although this finely crafted work abounds with caveats that cover any possible evolution of the world system in a different direction, the fact is that the ideological effect of this book has been to feed the interdependence rhetoric that supposes that the mechanisms of power are indeed failing, and that the freedom of action of Third World states has increased.

This is aggravated by the fact that, in the paragraph cited above, our authors suggest that while issue-linkages have become problematic for the United States, the possibility that Third World states use this instrument of power successfully has increased. Generally speaking (as is the case with any instrument of power) the probability that the weak and poor party in a bargaining process will be more hurt than its strong adversary by attempting to use issue linkages, is considerably greater than its contrary. An issue-linkage, after all, is a type of escalation, and escalation has seldom benefitted anyone but the stronger party. Only in very exceptional circumstances is the opposite likely to be true. To overlook this and to point to the rare opposite phenomenon has not done any good to the Third World countries that have uncritically imported these arguments.

The fallacy that the costs of linkage politics, to the powerful, are equivalent to the freedom of action of the weak

Furthermore, the complete lack of reference to the problem of what are the risks to Third World states of relying on a First World rationality that will refrain from costly issue linkages (supposing Keohane and Nye's diagnosis about the implications for the central powers of systemic changes in the world to be correct), is another problem that has led to misinterpretation and misguided policy in the Third World. The costs of certain policies to the powerful inadvertently become equivalent to the freedom of action of the weak.

The problems with Keohane and Nye's work in this respect are related to the more general problem that First World theories of international relations will focus, as they have until the present in a somewhat contradictory way, in the costs and benefits of intervention or issue-linkage for the United States (or other great powers), on the one hand, and on the "interstices" or "margins of manoeuvre" available to the Third World (or more specifically, to Latin America), on the other. This is to be expected and is logically correct when

the object is exclusively to figure out what would be the best policy for the United States (or other great powers). But when these theories are extrapolated to mean something for the foreign policy strategies of peripheral states, a serious error is committed.

In the case of Latin American specialists in international relations and U.S. Latinamericanists, this error has been committed for decades. Systematically they have applied concepts or instruments such as the "balance of costs and benefits" to the United States (when that country can afford to engage in greater costs and irrationalities than any other in the world), while with respect to the foreign policies of the Latin American (or other Third World) states they have tended to think not in terms of costs and benefits but in terms of "margins of manoeuvre". In my opinion, as we shall see below, at least in the case of the Latin American internationalists this error is due partly to the fact that their theoretical and conceptual frameworks come from the uncritical importation of the intellectual production of the First World.

Indeed, most of the thinking about the changes in the international system come (and this may be natural or inevitable) from the developed world, and these changes tend therefore to be perceived from a perspective which is that of the developed world even when the author may harbor a clear sympathy for the Third World. It has been said repeatedly that the United States no longer have the power that they had in the past to impose the international results they desire: the passage from a "rigid bipolarism" to a "flexible bipolarism" was, in the terms of this discourse, interpreted as an event that gave a greater margin of manoeuvre to weaker states. It has also been said tirelessly, as already mentioned, that the linkage of one issue area with another is frequently no longer successful (i.e., costly and not beneficial to the United States), and this has also given rise to speculations about Third World margins of manoeuvre[12]. The same is bound to happen with thinking about the new post-Cold War international order. In other words, the analysis is made from the point of view of the costs and benefits to the United States of carrying out certain interventions or issue-linkages, and from the point of view of the alleged margins of manoeuvre that these U.S. costs and benefits generate for the Third World or for Latin America, instead of the much more relevant perspective (from the point of view of the citizenry-centric interests of peripheral countries) of what are the costs and benefits for the Third World or for Latin America of making use of these alleged margins of manoeuvre.

This is a fallacy that prevails throughout most of the mainstream thought about the international relations of the Third World, and which has a perverse effect upon the foreign policies of some Third World states, at least insofar

as it feeds back into preexisting tendencies to make an irresponsible use of the "room for manoeuvre" that these states allegedly have: it is a factor that encourages abandoning citizenry-centric rationality (i.e. citizenry-centric cost-benefit analyses), and encourages instead statesman-centric rationality in the best of cases and adventurerism in the worst.

It may be that central states (and the states of developed peripheral countries) are perceived to be on the average more democratic and stable (and therefore more subject to limitations by their public opinions and more mindful of costs), as well as less likely to present important contradictions between their citizenry-centric and their statesman or government-centric rationalities, than Third World states. Keohane and Nye suggest this several times in their book, stating that weak, poor states often have a "stronger commitment" or more "intense preferences", and "may be more willing to suffer" or "may have greater political unity", than powerful ones[13]. I shall delve into this problem in greater depth in Chapter 4. But translating this difference between central states (and developed peripheral states) on the one hand, and Third World states, on the other, into the aforementioned double standard, implies a very faulty logic.

In the first place, if we were to engage in the rather absurd logical operation of applying a citizenry-centric rationality standard for central (and developed peripheral) countries on the one hand, and a government-centric rationality for Third World states on the other, we would have to make this double standard explicit. This could make some sense if empirically all central (and developed peripheral) states applied a citizenry-centric rationality, and all Third World states applied a government-centric one.

But the latter is clearly not the case. Although most Third World statesmen appear to enjoy antagonizing innocuously with the developed world in fora such as the United Nations General Assembly or the Non Aligned Movement, they do not go further than that, and by and large abide by systemic limitations and a bounded citizenry-centric rationality on important issues. Only a minority of Third World governments are devoted to challenging systemic limitations, and adopt a fiat justitia, pereat mundus attitude towards foreign policy. Most of the Third World does not engage in the sort of foreign policy behavior that would warrant not applying a model of citizenry-centric rationality to its analysis.

Thus, this is clearly a problem related to the thought processes of the analysts, who for reasons unknown tend to adopt a logically flawed double standard, and inadvertently tend to apply one criterion to a set of countries that includes the central powers and the developed periphery, and a different

one to the underdeveloped periphery (the so called Third World). Even should Keohane and Nye be right on target about the costs for the United States or other central states of intervening in the Third World or of engaging in issue-linkages to impose results; even if (independently of the changing circumstances of the world order) they should be right about what is and what is not convenient for the foreign policy of the United States from a cost-benefit perspective, the relevant issue for a peripheral state in general and for a Third World state in particular is what are the costs and risks to themselves of making use of the alleged freedom of manoeuvre granted by the rising costs of the central states. Not taking this into account implies incurring in the fallacy that the costs of the strong are equivalent to the freedom of action of the weak. Although this is clearly nonsensical, this sort of logic is often applied inadvertently by analysts. Less often, but in tragically relevant cases, it has also been applied by Third World statesmen.

The fallacy of increased global interdependence

The trend noted above is aggravated by yet another undesired consequence of the uncritical reading of the interdependence theorists in the Third World. The idea generally prevailing is that global interdependence has increased, and a logical corollary of this idea is that the weaker states' margin of manoeuvre has increased as well. Even sophisticated theoreticians such as Keohane and Nye give the impression that global interdependence has increased: the world has supposedly moved from a system well described by the assumptions of realism, to one better described by the assumptions of complex interdependence, and this implies greater interdependence than before. Moreover, they tell us that their "perspective implies that interdependent relationships will always imply costs, since interdependence restricts autonomy"[14].

The question is, whose autonomy is being restricted? The answer is obvious: in the world context in which Keohane and Nye were writing, it was the industrialized world's autonomy that was suddenly and unexpectedly restricted by the OPEC crises. Who gained bargaining power as a consequence? The OPEC countries, and only them. Additionally, of course, there were (and are) other sources of growing interdependence, among which we can count:

1. The interdependence among the industrialized countries, that had been growing ever since the beginning of postwar European recuperation.

2. An increasingly complex international agenda in which the issues for which the recourse to force is unthinkable has grown relatively to the

total number of issues in the agenda. These issues often require multilateral negotiations, are technically complex, and are difficult to deal with by individual decision-makers, who must refer them to specialized bureaucracies. These issues range from ecological interdependence to monetary stability[15].

3. A trend toward the "transnationalization" of the world (in the sense given to the concept by James N. Rosenau[16]), a phenomenon dramatically illustrated, among other factors, by the quantum changes in communications and transportation technology.

But these trends are of a relatively minor relevance to the life-or-death questions related to the economic development of poor, weak states and their bargaining power. Leaving aside the case of the industrialized countries, most of the interdependent issues that have a growing presence in the international agenda are not directly related to the complex interdependence model and to its conclusions regarding relations between governmental actors and their bargaining power. Even in the case of crucial economic issues that require multilateralization, like the administration of international trade and finance, it is the strong states that dominate the significative inter-governmental institutions like the GATT or the IMF, and it could not be otherwise. In issues of true significance for the development of poor, weak states, the growth of the interdependence of states has not really been global but has been restricted to a certain subset of countries which is certainly not that of the poor and weak ones. Yet, as James N. Rosenau has noted, there have been practically no attempts to measure interdependence: generally, authors only give examples of this phenomenon[17].

In astounding contradiction with the claims of an increased global interdependence, it was a cliché even when Keohane and Nye were writing their book that the so called North-South gap was widening in terms of GNP and trade. For example, a study published in 1977 told us that the share of selected countries and regions of the world in world trade had varied as follows:

COUNTRY	YEAR				
	1953	1963	1972	1973	1974
Industrialized countries	64.9	67.4	71.5	70.7	64.4
EC Nine	27.9	33.7	37.0	36.5	32.6
Japan	1.5	3.5	6.9	6.4	6.6
United States	18.9	14.9	11.7	12.2	11.5
Developing countries	25.5	20.4	18.6	19.3	27.2
Brazil	1.9	0.9	1.0	1.1	0.9
Hong Kong	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.9	0.7
India	1.4	1.1	0.6	0.5	0.5
OPEC	3.7	4.1	5.6	6.1	13.0

Source: H. Hasenpflug, "Developing Countries in World Trade", in K.P. Sauvant and H. Hasenpflug (eds.), The New International Economic Order: Confrontation or Cooperation Between North and South?, Boulder: Westview 1977; page 123.

As can be seen clearly from the table, the total participation of the developing countries in world trade did not grow until 1974: on the contrary, it tended to decline. And what grew dramatically in 1974 was OPEC's share, which had also grown steadily before that date, and distorted the aggregated total for the developing countries even in the previous years. The trade gap between the North and most of the South thus grew while the complex interdependence model (with its optimism about the increasing bargaining power of the "poor, weak states") was being developed.

Generally speaking, North-South interdependence cannot have grown concomitantly with this gap. Significative North-South interdependence, after all, is principally about trade and finance. OPEC (i.e., a specific set of countries) had an important impact upon the trade of petroleum products (i.e., a specific type of products). But the rest of the countries of the "South" certainly did not profit from this situation, and on the contrary, many of them suffered severely. Unfortunately, the wishful thinking of authors like Keohane and Nye, who predicted that other Third World countries would indirectly share in the profits and/or bargaining power of the OPEC countries[18], did not and could not materialize, simply because, as Morgenthau would say, such generosity would be contrary to what is expectable from human nature.

There is an unbelievably ethnocentric quality in Keohane and Nye's book. When they speak of increased interdependence, they are referring specifically to the United States, and in the case of oil, by extension also to other First World states[19]. But these countries became more interdependent among themselves and with a small minority of Third World countries. The rest of the Third World became less interdependent than before, and this via a decrease in the already negligible dependence of the industrialized countries on Third World products, and an increase in Third World dependence on the industrialized world. Therefore, if anything, the margin of manoeuvre of most Third World countries decreased instead of increasing. Nonetheless, optimism about the Third World's increased margin of manoeuvre pervades the book. This optimism has had sad consequences for some Third World countries and for the world at large, insofar as it has served as a justification for policies that were not citizenry-centric but could be disguised as such by arguments like Keohane and Nye's.

The fact that the realist-interdependentist debate later generated a certain questioning of the increased interdependence assumption did not ameliorate the practical side effects of this flawed conception. Scholarly credit is due to Waltz for the important points about the high levels of interdependence that characterized much of the European state system before World War I, which he raised in a 1970 essay[20] reprinted in 1982 in the context of the said debate. And eventually, Keohane himself came to relativize his point of view on this issue when he wrote, in 1989, that

> the notion of "complex interdependence" that Nye and I developed in the 1970s (...) increasingly, it still seems to me, characterizes relationships among democratic industrialized countries, though not necessarily elsewhere in the world[21]. (Be it noticed that the emphasis is mine, not his).

Yet for all that this is worth in the ivory tower of the U.S. academic world, what remains in terms of the rhetoric used politically in the Third World and in terms of the practical consequences that Keohane and Nye pointed to in criticizing realist thought, is the original 1979 formulation.

An example from democratic Argentina

In the specific case of Argentina, interdependence has been-decreasing (via an increase of Argentine dependence and a decrease of the rest of the world's dependence on Argentina) ever since 1929, and most spectacularly since approximately 1948. In 1928-29, Argentina's foreign trade represented approximately 5% of the total of international trade, ranked eleventh in the world in terms of the significance of that trade, and exported about 90 current dollars per capita (compared to Australia's U$S 105). Presently, Argentina's foreign trade represents about 0.43% of the total of international trade, ranks 45 in terms of the magnitude of that trade, and exports about 279 dollars per capita (which compare to Australia's U$S 1476)[22]. Interdependence has hence decreased, and few if any countries depend on Argentine products any more, as the Europeans (especially the British) did in the past.

Notwithstanding these realities that speak for themselves, such is the impact of interdependence rhetoric that Dante Caputo, Alfonsín's foreign minister, criticized Menem's policy of alignment with the United States with the argument that, among other things, it was unnecessary due to the increase of global interdependence.[23] Quite independently of whether Menem's policy was or was not in the best interests of Argentina, the fallaciousness of this sort of criticism is obvious, insofar as interdependence has not increased for Argentina. And this criticism is more than mere opposition politics, insofar as it stands for an alternative policy rationale that was implemented during Alfonsín's administration.

Caputo's argument, of course, comes together with the belief that First World costs of resorting to power mechanisms such as issue linkages have gone up, and therefore Argentina's bargaining power has increased. It also comes together with a lack of sensitivity about a policy's costs to Argentina herself. Foreign policy strategies and tactics are thus distorted in strange ways. For example, with respect to its Falkland/Malvinas policy, this sort of reasoning led the Alfonsín government to:

1. Refuse to declare formally that the Falkland/Malvinas war was over.

> 2. Engage in aggressive patrolling of South Atlantic waters that, among other consequences, led to the sinking in May 1986 of an unarmed Taiwanese fishing vessel in Falkland/Malvinas waters, with loss of life.
>
> 3. Attempt to get the Soviets to fish in Falkland/Malvinas waters with Argentine permission, through a fishing agreement of October 1986.[24]

This policy was formulated without thinking hard about its costs to Argentina, but with a very keen awareness of British costs, almost as if costs to Argentina did not matter, and as if objectively the United Kingdom were not in a situation to withstand much greater costs than Argentina. This policy was pursued despite the fact that the European Economic Community is a crucial trading partner for Argentina, and despite the fact that Britain was in a position to place obstacles to many Argentine initiatives vis-a-vis the EEC. Moreover, the relatively aggressive profile acquired by Argentine foreign policy because of the refusal to acknowledge the cease of hostilities was aggravated by other Argentine polices, such as the refusal to accept nuclear safeguards and the Cóndor 2 missile project. Costs and risks to Argentina did not seem to matter; what mattered was the margin of manoeuvre produced by the costs, to Britain, of continuing with the occupation of the islands.

This comes out clearly from the statements of Alfonsín government officials during his tenure and afterwards. For example, on May 21, 1991, Dante Caputo said in an interview:

> A permanent tension abroad had to be maintained regarding Malvinas. For us, the only method (indeed, a long-term method) of attaining this objective was to permanently keep the United Kingdom's costs of occupation high. If those costs decreased, if those costs went down to nil or almost nil, then British intervention or occupation would continue permanently.[25]

The consequence of these policies was that the British caved in not to Argentine pressures, but to Falkland Islanders' pressures to declare a fishing zone of 150 miles around the islands, where fishing would be permitted only after the purchase of an United Kingdom license. Revenues from the sale of fishing licenses would accrue to the Falkland/Malvinas islands directly. This meant that, thanks to Alfonsín's policy, the income of the Falkland/Malvinas islands increased by a sum that, divided by its inhabitants, is equivalent to five times Argentina's per capita income, making them the "country" with the highest per capita income in the Americas (higher than that of the United States or Canada) and generating the expectation that they could eventually aspire to independence. This was certainly not what the Argentine government

had set out to do, but such is usually the result of playing power politics without an adequate power base. In this case, Argentina's disastrous policy was justified intellectually in terms of interdependence rhetoric, just like the even more disastrous policy of invasion of the Argentine military regime in 1982 had been justified in terms of central realist rhetoric.

The fallacy that international organization will enhance the power of Third World states in a significative measure

If the alleged ineffectiveness of issue-linkages and the prevalence of conditions of complex interdependence supposedly increases the room of manoeuvre of weak states, what is the mechanism through which weak states are to exercise their power and their own issue-linkages vis-a-vis strong states? According to Keohane and Nye, the answer to this question is "international organization". Indeed, they tell us:

> International organizations are frequently congenial institutions for weak states. The one-state-one-vote norm of the United Nations system favors coalitions of the small and powerless. Secretariats are often responsive to Third World demands. Furthermore, the substantive norms of most international organizations, as they have developed over the years, stress social and economic equity as well as the equality of states. Past resolutions expressing Third World positions, sometimes agreed to with reservations by industrialized countries, are used to legitimize other demands. These agreements are rarely binding, but up to a point the norms of the institution make opposition look more harshly self-interested and less defensible. International organizations also allow small and weak states to pursue linkage strategies. In the discussions on a New International Economic Order, Third World states insisted on linking oil prices and availability to other questions on which they had traditionally been unable to achieve their objectives.[26]

This is an extraordinary piece of well-intended wishful thinking, which would be harmless were it not for the fact that some Third World states took it seriously and based dangerous, confrontational policies on this dubious instrument of power. It is true that "in a world of multiple issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions are formed transnationally and transgovernmentally, the potential use of international institutions is greatly increased"[27]. But they do not take into consideration the fact that there inevitably is a hierarchy of international organizations, and that the ones that really set the pace for international affairs are the ones in which the great powers have a prominent role, such as the United Nations' Security

Council, the Organization for International Cooperation and Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Group of Seven, etc. International organizations like the United Nations General Assembly and the Non Aligned Movement are largely ineffective and innocuous, and they could not be otherwise for reasons that Morgenthau understood well. Yet our authors tell us:

> As time passes, the underlying capacities of states will become increasingly poor predictors of the characteristics of international regimes. Power over outcomes will be conferred by organizationally dependent capabilities, such as voting power, ability to form coalitions, and control of elite networks. (...) In the United Nations General Assembly, for instance, one cannot predict resolutions correctly by asserting that the most powerful states in the international system (...) will generally prevail. Instead, one has to examine governments' abilities to influence, and benefit by, the one-state-one-vote system by which the formal decisions of the assembly are made.[28]

But this is precisely the reason why the United Nations General Assembly is largely innocuous and ineffective! It is close to the bottom of the power hierarchy of formal international organizations. And regarding informal networks, it is the networks of the powerful that really matter, insofar as they have an awesome capacity to discriminate among states, bestow favor on some and let others fall out of grace. Yet these arguments will have few chances of convincing presidents and foreign ministers allured by the international protagonism generated by the former fora, especially if the quotations above represent the scientific wisdom of some of the most encumbered specialists in the field. It is no wonder then that "international organizations such as the United Nations (General Assembly), the Organization of American States or the Non Aligned Movement were a crucial factor" for Argentina's strategy vis-a-vis Falkland/Malvinas from the beginning to the end of president Alfonsín administration. According to research conducted on the subject, Caputo and Alfonsín "recurred to these multilateral fora convinced that the votes against the British position represented a real cost to the Foreign Office, which would eventually change its position"[29].

On the other hand, regarding Keohane and Nye's idea that "the substantive norms of most international organizations, as they have developed over the years, stress social and economic equity as well as the equality of states", which they view as an encouraging sign, it is truly discouraging to see how often Third World states counterpoise these values to those of democracy, pluralism, freedom and human rights, in international organizations. Third World influence in international organizations can never be strong enough to

create a new international economic order that significatively helps to generate social and economic equity, but what they are frequently used for is to justify domestic tyranny and social injustice on the grounds that liberal democracy and respect for human rights cannot be achieved until there is a democratization of the relations between states and until the industrialized world transfers a significative portion of its riches to the Third World.[30]

In short, the most important "contribution" of international organization to the Third World has not been to promote social and economic equity and a fairer international economic order, but to legitimize dictators and local oligarchies. Third World power to link issues has not increased significatively. OPEC power did not help non-OPEC Third World states in practically any way, and it hurt many of them severely in economic terms. The power of the industrialized states to link issues formally or informally, directly or indirectly, has instead been consolidated through the multiplication of their own informal networks and international organizations. Power --mainly economic-- still commands, regardless of wishful thinking.

Keohane and Nye were aware of the many pitfalls that lay in the path of their theory, and this is why they were at pains to put in as many caveats as possible, and in this sense they become almost tautological when they remind the reader that everything said about international organization will take place under conditions of complex interdependence, but that under realist conditions the underlying distribution of power is likely to be dominant. Towards the end of that section they reiterate this concept in what is almost a plea:

> Please remember that the international organization model is only likely to apply under complex interdependence conditions, and that even then, its predictions could be rendered invalid by the actions of governments to exercise their underlying power. (...) The validity of the model depends on its assumption that actors will not destroy the regime by attempting to take advantage of one another's vulnerability dependence. (...) Above a certain level of international conflict the international organization model and sensitivity interdependence become largely irrelevant.[31]

What happened in real life is that Third World dominated international organizations became largely irrelevant, while those dominated by the great powers did not. This is consistent with what was said earlier, that what has increased is intra-First World (and to some extent, OPEC-First World) interdependence, and that non-OPEC North-South interdependence has actually decreased, and was decreasing even when our authors were writing their book.

By carefully establishing many caveats regarding their models and assumptions, Keohane and Nye have attempted to divorce themselves from real life, and this is a contradiction because on the other hand they want to talk about real life, and what is more, they want to have a beneficial impact upon real life. But they are too intelligent not to understand that their predictions based on wishful thinking could go wrong, so they want to make them less than predictions, and they call them models.

Indeed, this finely crafted book attempts to cover all possible scenarios and thus avoid being the target of criticisms or falling into errors of judgement about reality. Nonetheless, it is in itself a critique of the classical realist approach, and although it awards model status to complex interdependence and to all previous theories, the effort only makes sense if conditions of complex interdependence do indeed tend to prevail in relevant issue areas, and this does not seem to be the case for non OPEC Third World-First World relations. Thus, most of Keohane and Nye's "non-predictions" about the Third World, its issue linkages, and the role of international organization in the bargaining power of poor and weak states, are invalidated.

Because they have soundly covered themselves with their caveats, they are indeed safe from most academic criticism that could be directed to them. On the other hand, in later works Robert O. Keohane has been much more cautious. In 1982, in the context of a discussion on the "demand" for international regimes, he insisted in predicting that the dominance of the advanced industrial countries in the world political economy would decline[32]. But later he apparently lost part of his optimism about the role of international organization in increasing the Third World's bargaining power. In 1984 he expressed alarm at the fact that international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund or the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs are insensitive to the interests of deprived individuals in the Third World[33]. And in 1989, when listing relevant international organizations, he only mentions those dominated by the great powers (although he attributed their relative effectiveness to the fact that they have few members, and not to the fact that that is where power is concentrated!)[34]. Nonetheless, he never quite stoops to acknowledging the realist principle that international organizations will be relevant only insofar as they represent the interests of the powerful, and that organizations of powerless states, like the Non Aligned Movement, are bound to be relatively irrelevant, not so much because they have too many members or because they are not issue-specific, but simply because they are powerless.

This is illustrated by the Group of Cairns, a small group of middle-sized grain-exporting states that includes countries such as Australia and Canada,

Argentina and Uruguay, which notwithstanding its issue-specific nature and its limited membership can do nothing to prevent the European Community and the United States from exporting subsidized grain. Indeed, if this problem is eventually solved, it will be because of U.S. retaliation against the European Community (using the same weapon of subsidized exports, on a larger scale, which for the time being only aggravates the problem), and not because of the efforts of the Group of Cairns, in which the United States has chosen to have only observer status.

In other words, international organization is a very powerful instrument for the generation of cooperation, but when the weak are pitted against the powerful the results are almost predictable. Realist principles are simply extended to the realm of international organization. Not to understand this, or to understand it but not say it because it is an unpleasant fact, simply generates false expectations. These false expectations are not good for the world at large, they are bad for the Third World, and they are particularly harmful to the most deprived sectors of Third World societies, because these are the sectors that bear the most serious costs of misguided policies based on the premise that, for diverse reasons, the bargaining power of the Third World has tended to increase (or that of the industrialized world to decrease).

Some Third World statesmen and their advisors are all too anxious to have a pseudo-sophisticated justification for foreign policies that are simply not citizenry-centric. Obviously, these statesmen are not usually up-to-date on the evolution of the thought of scholars like Keohane, their subtleties, nuances and caveats, nor do they care to be. Theory is easily converted into ideology; indeed, this is one of its anthropological functions and one of the reasons why there is a market for it. This is one of the reasons why it is direly important that international relations theorists not attempt to play a paradiplomatic game in their writings. Unpleasant facts must be spelled out mercilessly, with full conscience that the ultimate practical objective, in this respect, is to protect the people of the Third World from their elites and leaders.

The main reason why some Third World statesmen and their advisors often do not take carefully-placed caveats into account in their readings and applications of international relations theory (and therefore, do not abide by the real systemic constraints imposed upon them by citizenry-centric rationality), is that (as R.O. Keohane and J.N. Nye know all too well) they are often less limited by domestic constraints (being as they often are the product of less-than-democratic political systems, authoritarian political cultures and dual social structures). Therefore, they often simply prefer to abide by a

statesman or government-centric rationality. Their personal interests are thus frequently better served. But if the general thrust of a theorist's construction is functional to their personal interests, as is the case with Keohane and Nye's 1979 book, they are happy to take advantage of it. This is why it would be so important to have clear theoretical statements on the lapsing of a model, if and when the authors consider that reality has falsified their wishful-thinking hypotheses. Models should not simply fade away inadvertently, because they will sometimes continue to be misused by unscrupulous decision-makers.

To such statesmen and their advisors, there is an attractive ambiguity about Keohane and Nye's model, because it gives them alternatives to choose from and therefore helps to legitimize choices that are often not honestly bound to a citizenry-centric rationality. Ultimately, it is as if after their cataract of fine-sounding words, nothing had been firmly said. Which model is more adequate in a certain situation? Keohane and Nye will not tell you. The Third World statesman's freedom of choice is legitimized theoretically and hence, morally. He is autonomous. He is closer to God.

The problem and the fallacy of "autonomy"

What is autonomy? The concept is used everywhere in the international relations literature, especially in the works that specialize in Latin America and the Third World, but rarely is it explicitly defined. It is taken for granted that "states seek autonomy", and not only is the meaning of "autonomy" not clear; neither is the meaning of "state", a matter that we have already mentioned and shall tackle again in the next chapter. Regarding autonomy, authors sometimes incur in tautology ("to be autonomous is to develop autonomously"), and it is usually implicitly defined in terms of "freedom of choice" or "margin of manoeuvre" (although sometimes this concept implicitly includes a more ambitious and unrealistic "freedom from constraints"). The eminent Brazilian political scientist Helio Jaguaribe, for example, after incurring in a couple of tautological attempts at definition, finally tells us that at a certain level autonomy means a set of conditions that allow free decisions to be taken by persons and agencies that are a part of a national (or regional) system[35].

Whatever the case, the empirical fact is that in Third World countries "autonomy" often becomes an end-in-itself that competes with "national" security and with development as the primary objective of foreign policy. For whatever reasons (social structure, political culture, political system, alliance opportunities, etc.), this is not usually the case in developed

peripheral countries, and this often leads to very different foreign policies. Third World countries are more obsessed with autonomy, and in Argentina particularly I can identify many historical instances in which "to be autonomous" really meant "to appear autonomous".

Not only this, but the idea prevails that "autonomy" leads to development. This notion is complementary to the idea that dependence leads to underdevelopment, and both hypotheses spring from the Latin American tradition of dependency theory, and have become part of the conventional wisdom that is often applied in the formulation of policy. Both notions have been reinforced by the more recent interdependence rhetoric as well, especially through the generation of expectations of an increased margin of manoeuvre for peripheral states, that encourages "autonomous" decisions.

Thus, the fallacy that autonomy produces development has become rooted in Latin American thought. This fallacy is rather paradoxical, insofar as empirically it would appear that the opposite causal relation is much more frequent: it is usually development that tends to generate autonomy.

Notwithstanding, what prevails is the fallacy, sometimes expressed as an allegedly self-evident social scientific hypothesis. In Argentina, for instance, former president Alfonsín would assert that his government sought "an autonomy of position that is absolutely indispensable to formulate its own policies, define its own road to development and consolidate the individual freedom of (Argentina's) inhabitants"[36]. These words were pronounced to justify Alfonsín's trip to and triumphant reception in Havana.

Without making any sort of judgement as to the wisdom of the policy that took him to Havana, the fact is that Cuba is an insignificant trading partner for Argentina, had no possibilities of becoming a more important one in 1986, and Alfonsín's trip was in no way connected to Argentina's development nor --much less-- to the freedom of its inhabitants. Contrariwise, Alfonsín's trip to the U.S.S.R. was connected to Argentine development, for the simple reason that the U.S.S.R. was a major trading partner of Argentina. And likewise, the military regime's decision to challenge Carter's grain embargo against the U.S.S.R. made all the economic sense in the world.

But the symbolic trip to Cuba could not be associated with developmental goals. It was not even associated with the generation of "autonomy". It was an exhibitionist way of using Argentina's autonomy. It was a way of showing the country's autonomy, but not going to Cuba would not have been a "less autonomous" course of action, just as Japan was not less autonomous for not courting Fidel Castro. Not going to Cuba would simply have been a different

way of using an autonomy that is already there no matter how a government chooses to use it.

But the victims of the fallacy of autonomy include not only politicians and statesmen untutored in the strictures of social science, and Latin American social scientists who frequently engage in politics as well as in academia, and thus develop a rhetoric that is contaminated with political and partisan contents. This fallacy is so pervasive that Latinamericanists everywhere, including of course the United States, are also its victims more often than not, and thus in the literature we find countless titles as meaningless as "Between Autonomy and Subordination", or "Between Hegemony and Autonomy"[37]. And not only do these cliches frequently serve as catchy titles for books or articles. The fallacy often inadvertently creeps into the substance, and thus, for example, in a recent and important book, Joseph S. Tulchin candidly states that:

> When special British representative Lord D'Abernon visited Argentina during Yrigoyen's second administration at the end of the 1920s, Yrigoyen chose to strengthen its ties with Britain, thus postponing for another decade any Argentine efforts to effect independent and autonomous decision-making in international affairs[38].

Leaving aside the historical contents of the paragraph, there is a clear logical contradiction between "choosing" to strengthen ties with Britain and abdicating "independent and autonomous decision-making in international affairs". Choosing to strengthen ties with Britain is simply a way of using autonomy. On the other hand, taking on the historical contents, Tulchin, who is the foremost historian of US-Argentine relations, knows and admits that:

> 1. Argentine foreign policy decision-making was not determined by Britain (this comes out clearly from many studies, including his own book).
>
> 2. The D'Abernon agreement was not even ratified in Argentina. It had no direct impact upon Argentine policy, except in paving the way for the Roca-Runciman agreement of 1933, and Tulchin himself admits that "the argument that the tariff and exchange provision of the treaty extended or intensified British imperial control over Argentina simply is not true". He also admits that Argentina had no better choice at the time, which means that all the other choices (which indeed existed) were worse from the point of view of the Argentine interest[39].

It is not that Tulchin has his data wrong or that he presents contradictory data. He simply fell prey to the fallacy of autonomy, a conventional wisdom that holds that the strengthening of ties between a Latin American state and a great power implies in and of itself a loss of autonomy, when the fact is that the decision to strengthen such ties is almost always (as in this case) an autonomous decision, a specific use of autonomy, that hopefully will be better than other, alternative uses of autonomy. Very seldom do we find that a state is absolutely impeded, externally, from opting for autarchy, isolation and radicalization, and this has never been the case of Argentina. Argentina quarreled with Britain when its leaders chose to, she quarreled with the United States as well, she enriched uranium, she did not ratify the Tlatelolco treaty nor sign the Non Proliferation Treaty, she developed the Cóndor 2 missile, and she even invaded the Falkland/Malvinas islands, when her leaders chose to. And she strengthened ties with Britain and/or with the United States, and adopted a cooperative policy vis-a-vis the South Atlantic and non proliferation, when her leaders chose this alternative course. The former decisions were not more "autonomous" than the latter. It is absurd that confrontation should define autonomy.

Indeed, a middle-sized state like Argentina has so much "autonomy" (defined as freedom of choice or of manoeuvre), that it can even destroy itself. In reality, every middle-sized state has an almost limitless freedom of choice: otherwise, the Saddams, Khomeinis, Khadaffys and Galtieris of this world would be harmless and inoffensive. Therefore, it is not theoretically useful to define autonomy in terms of freedom of choice or of manoeuvre. Instead, autonomy should be defined in terms of the costs of using the freedom of choice and manoeuvre that any middle-sized state has almost limitlessly.

As already suggested repeatedly, we should also distinguish between autonomy itself, which is a consequence of power and thereby, to a large extent, of development (insofar as power is insignificant without a minimum economic base), and the use given to that autonomy. And we should distinguish as well between different types of uses of autonomy, principally:

1. Uses geared towards the exhibition of autonomy, that I shall call consumption of autonomy, and

2. Uses geared towards the generation of more development or power, that I shall call investment of autonomy.

Attempts to use concepts developed for the analysis of economic phenomena to international relations and foreign policy are almost without exception pitiful, and it is with great reluctance that I use these analogies, because

in this particular case I consider them truly useful. When it generates confrontation, the use of autonomy erodes a weak state's potential for international cooperation via the loss of confidence, which is registered in the stronger state's "historical memory" (in the terms in which this concept was defined in Chapter 1). Something is being "spent". If the specific use of autonomy in point does not generate, simultaneously with this "expenditure", a material benefit, the analogy with a mere "consumption" is perfect. Through the loss of confidence and of cooperation potential with stronger states generated by confrontation, a measure of power is lost by the weak state. If that loss is not compensated by a power gain, it is mere consumption. But if the confrontation involved has an economic motivation that can generate material benefits or avoid material costs, then the power loss has to be measured against the power gain generated by these benefits, and the operation can be conceptualized as an "investment" with a risk. The analogy, again, is close to perfect.

Thus, in these terms, Alfonsín's trip to Cuba would be a case of consumption of autonomy, whereas Alfonsín's trip to the U.S.S.R., as well as the military government's 1981 challenge of Carter's grain embargo against the Soviet Union, would be cases of investment of autonomy. And Yrigoyen's 1929 decision to strengthen ties with Britain, then Argentina's foremost customer and one that could not be replaced by any other (as Tulchin himself has masterfully demonstrated[40]), was also a wise investment of autonomy[41].

From the point of view of the development goals that in my view should be the priority of any Third World state, well-calculated investments of autonomy are of the "national" or country interest even if they imply generating the wrath of a great power, whereas a mere consumption of autonomy that in any way generates a negative image of that Third World state among powers on whom it is dependent (or could eventually be dependent) is against the national interest, even if there are no immediate tangible costs.

Thus, we can formulate a hypothesis about the contradiction between the consumption of autonomy and the development of autonomy (which, at least for underdeveloped countries, tends to be a function of economic development). Governments with a tendency to consume autonomy will generate costly or risky foreign policies that are not functional to economic development, insofar as they will expose themselves to potential discriminations by the states on which they depend.

And therefore we can formulate a second hypothesis about the paradoxical relation between the development of autonomy and autonomy-obsessed political cultures: the more autonomy-obsessed a culture is, the more likely that the

state that represents it will engage in costly or risky policies of consumption of autonomy, and the more likely therefore that artificial obstacles to the country's development will be generated, which in the long-term will tend to reduce the state's autonomy (defined in terms of the costs of using its freedom of choice or margin of manoeuvre).

These concepts and probable causal links should be self-evident, yet this is not the case in a great part of the Third World generally and in Latin America in particular, partly because of the influence of unsophisticated social science, and partly because patrimonialist political leaders are all too willing to take every advice that widens their personal margin of manoeuvre (and thus, their personal power and international status), even if it runs against the long-term interests of their states and peoples. These leaders are helped by a conventional wisdom that (in its most extreme formulation) makes autonomy an end-in-itself, defines autonomy in terms of doing what we please, and interprets international relations as a sort of sport played by states, a game regarding which one is not rational but emotional, and in which citizenry-centric rationality does not count because the "nation" is perceived in anthropomorphic terms. Of course, there is an important range of difference between the most extreme and the moderate illustrations of this phenomenon. In the most extreme cases, costs are simply not a consideration: fiat justitia, pereat mundus. In moderate cases, such as that of Mexican foreign policy, an autonomist rationale is applied only in issues of secondary importance, where the costs are low.

There is a startling parallel between what has happened in Latin America in general and in Argentina in particular with the symbolism of autonomy, and with what Keohane and Nye claim happened in the United States with respect to "national" security symbolism. Regarding the United States, Keohane and Nye complain that although "national" security symbolism was a product of the Cold War and the severe threat U.S. citizens then perceived, its persuasiveness was increased by (classical) realist analysis, which insisted that "national" security is the primary "national" goal, and that in international politics security threats are permanent. As they put it, in the United States "national" security symbolism, and the realist mode of analysis that supported it, epitomized a certain way of reacting to events and formulating policy[42].

Similarly, I claim that in Latin America in general and in Argentina in particular, autonomy symbolism, fed by both the contemporary interdependence and the previous dependency theoretical frameworks, played the same role with most governments. Concomitantly, an even more naïve and perverted version of the "national" security symbolism, fed by the central realists and by previous

geopolitical theories, was adopted by the recent military regimes of the Southern Cone.

To some extent, these symbolisms were mutually exclusive alternatives that competed against each other. For instance, while the autonomy rationale would advise having good and highly publicized relations with Castro, the "national" security rationale would advise against it (for reasons related to its anti-Communist paranoia, that are completely different from those that stem from my peripheral realist rationale). But in certain other cases, both rationales have not been mutually exclusive and have operated in a complementary way instead, and thus Alfonsín's power politics vis-a-vis Falkland/Malvinas or the Cóndor 2 missile project have been justified with a mixture of the "national" security rationale and of the margin-of-manoeuvre theses that spring both from the interdependence and the autonomist rhetoric. Thus, in Latin America we have had two symbolisms that have sometimes competed among themselves and sometimes complemented each other, **autonomy** and **"national" security**, both of which are ill-adjusted to the needs of developing countries.

This vacuum has to some extent been the product of uncritically importing international relations theory developed in the United States from a perspective that was foreign to Latin American circumstances, even when (as in the case of the interdependentists) there is often a clear sympathy for the Third World. Of course, it would be unfair to forget the previous role of the indigenous dependency theorists in the articulation of autonomy symbolism. Their effect on conventional wisdom and policy has converged with that of the interdependence theorists, and is indeed previous to them. Regarding the perverse role, in Latin America, of the "national" security symbolism, I have briefly treated its effects on foreign policy at the beginning of Chapter 2. As stated then, it incorporates the foreign influence of the central realists, and previously, of German geopolitical thinking, but it also has indigenous roots that can be found in the nationalist literature of the 1930s and 40s[43].

What has not been constructed in terms of international relations theory, strategy, and symbolism, is a **"developmentalist" paradigm.** By this I mean an approach that focuses not on "national" security, not on "autonomy" defined in terms of a government's freedom to do what it pleases, but on the foreign policy constraints imposed by the international system if we assume that the primary "national" interest of a developing country is its economic development. This is what is missing, this is what is wanting, and this is what "peripheral realism" is all about[44].

NOTES

1. Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Little, Brown and Co., Boston 1977, Preface, page vii.

2. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 23. In a later essay Robert O. Keohane states that realism as a descriptive ideal type is not a fair, full characterization of the realist tradition (op.cit. 1986, p. 160) . He does not, however, say that the ideal type that he and Joseph S. Nye outlined is an unfair description of Morgenthau's model. In terms of the present discussion, Keohane and Nye's 1979 outline of the more limited ideal type (that admittedly does not fully characterize the realist tradition) is useful.

3. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 23-24.

4. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 4-5.

5. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. pages 27-29.

6. J.N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalization of World Affairs, London: Frances Pinter Publishers 1980, pages 40-43.

7. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. pages 11-19 and 26-27.

8. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. pages 30-32.

9. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. pages 30-31.

10. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 31.

11. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 37.

12. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. pages 30-32.

13. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. pages 18, 19, and 53.

14. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 9.

15. James N. Rosenau developed some complementary ideas that tend to reinforce what, from the perspective of a peripheral state, is the fallacy of the ineffectiveness of issue-linkages under conditions of complex interdependence. According to this author, "interdependence issues" have some salient characteristics that make them different from the typical foreign policy issues, among which we can count:

> 1. That they encompass highly complex and technical phenomena (like the increase of food production, the use of ocean bottoms, the elimination of pollutants, etc.).
>
> 2. That their management encompasses the participation of non-governmental actors. For example, irrespective of government policy, environmental policies are bound to fail or be less successful if consumers are not cooperative. In the words of Rosenau, these issues tend to be "decentralized".
>
> 3. That the combination of the two characteristics mentioned above leads to a fragmentation of decision-making whereby they cease to be managed by

heads of state and prime ministers through their foreign offices and military establishments, and they cease to be founded on nation-wide constituencies. According to Rosenau, the former officers "do not have the time or expertise to master the knowledge necessary to grasp fully such issues and ordinarily they lack the political fortitude to resist, much less reject, the pressures form the special clienteles that seek to be served by these issues." Thus, the role of expertise grows significatively, even in comparison to military issues, where they have always been important.

It is paradoxical that, under what in Chapter 1 I called conditions of "irrelevance-of-rationality", the latter has always been the case. Countries like Argentina, that are relatively irrelevant to the vital interests of the United States, are the subject matter of experts within the State or Treasury departments, and they are the subject also of special constituencies. The general public knows very little about them, and the top officials of the U.S. government usually abide by the counsel of their specialized staff and by lobby pressures in the formulation of policy, except when the policy that is advised towards such a country contradicts a major U.S. policy of a more general level. Curiously, generally in the case of countries that are relatively irrelevant to the vital interests of the United States, and particularly in the case of Argentina (which is the one that I studied in greater detail), I have the impression that this has led to:

1. greater bureaucratic conflict,

2. a greater impact of personal feuds and idiosyncratic factors in policy-making,

3. more arbitrary decisions,

4. less scruples about the consequences of policy, not only vis-a-vis Argentina but also vis-a-vis the professed objectives of U.S. policy, and hence

5. to even greater vulnerability and less bargaining power for Argentina, a country that in one or two chapters of the history of her relations with the United States was simply "tossed around" mindlessly by U.S. policy-makers, simply because the cost of erring in their policy toward Argentina was very low for the United States.

Thus, it is paradoxical that a set of circumstances that supposedly accompany "interdependent issues" and allegedly enhance interdependence, are very similar to those that have for a long time tended to characterize policy-making towards countries that are relatively irrelevant to the vital interests of the United States, and that in the latter case, these circumstances do not increase but on the contrary, diminish the interdependence of those countries, to the serious detriment of their interests and bargaining power. See J.N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence: Essays on the Transnationalization of World Affairs, London: Frances Pinter Publishers 1980, pages 43-45, and C. Escudé, Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos y la Declinación Argentina 1942-1949, Buenos Aires: Belgrano 1983, especially Chapter 4.

16. J.N. Rosenau, The Study of Global Interdependence..., Chapter 1.

17. J.N. Rosenau, op.cit. pages 18-19.

18. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 36.

19. Even increased interdependence among First World states can be challenged, as does Waltz (1979: 145) when he argues that international economic interdependence is lower since World War II than in the era before World War I, when the great power's external sectors were comparatively larger.

20. K. Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence", in R. Maghroori and B. Ramberg (eds.), Globalism Versus Realism: International Relations' Third Debate, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1982.

21. R. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989; page 9.

22. C. Díaz-Alejandro, Essays on the Economic History of the Argentine Republic, New Haven: Yale University Press 1970, page 56, and UNCTAD, Commodity Yearbook 1987, table 1.28 ("All Merchandise Trade"), valid for 1985, combined with World Bank population figures. Apparently, Argentina's position declined further since 1985.

23. Caputo said this on several occasions, including television broadcasts that focused on Menem's decision to send vessels to the Persian Gulf.

24. The main motivation of this policy was geopolitical, not commercial. This was explicitly said in the Chamber of Deputies, when the agreement was defended by the government for its ratification, and it was later confirmed by Alfonsín, in an interview to journalist María Oliva for her Master's thesis, "Toma de decisiones en política exterior argentina sobre Malvinas durante el gobierno de Alfonsín", FLACSO, Buenos Aires 1991. This interview was signed by the former president.

25. Interview given to journalist María Oliva for her Master's Thesis, already cited.

26. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 36.

27. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 35.

28. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 55.

29. M. Oliva, op.cit., page 107.

30. For example, after paying lip service to liberal democratic values, the final declaration of the September 1991 ministerial meeting of the Non Aligned Movement stated that respect for human rights, pluralism and democracy could not be demanded in the absence of economic development and a more equitable world order. Such a position can easily be used as an excuse for dictators to commit all sorts of abuses. This was the official reason why the Argentine government decided to leave the movement soon afterwards.

31. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. pages 57-58.

32. R.O.Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", first published in International Organization, vol. 36, no.2 (Spring 1982), and then in R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview Press 1989; page 102.

33. R.O. Keohane, After Hegemony, p. 316 of the Spanish-language edition.

34. R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview Press 1989; page 14. My criticism of some of Keohane's concepts does not imply an undervaluation of his important contribution to regime theory. In my opinion, his present "institutionalist" perspective constitutes a powerful insight into some relevant phenomena of world politics, although it would be more precise to call it "neopositivist" rather than "neoliberal". Indeed, his definition of "liberalism" closely recalls Comtian positivism. See ibid., page 10.

35. H. Jaguaribe, "Dependencia y autonomía en América Latina", in H. Jaguaribe et al., La Dependencia Político-Económica de América Latina, México D.F.: Siglo XXI 1974; pages 64-66.

36. Press statement, October 20, 1986.

37. The first title comes from the English translation of H. Muñoz and J.S. Tulchin (eds.), Entre la Autonomía y la Subordinación: Política Exterior de los Países Latinoamericanos, Buenos Aires: GEL 1984. The second title comes from G. Drekonja-Kornat, "The Rise of Latin America's Foreign Policy: Between Hegemony and Autonomy", Latin American Research Review Vol. XXI, No.2, 1986.

38. J.S. Tulchin, Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship, Boston: Twayne Publishers 1990, page 41. My emphasis.

39. J.S. Tulchin, op.cit., page 55.

40. J.S. Tulchin, op.cit., Chapter 4.

41. See P.B. Goodwin, Jr., "Anglo-Argentine Commercial Relations: A Private Sector View, 1922-43", in Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 61, No. 1, February 1981.

42. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 6.

43. See, for example, C. Escudé, El Fracaso del Proyecto Argentino: Educación e Ideología, Buenos Aires: Editorial Tesis/Instituto Di Tella 1990.

44. It should be noted that I do not apply the term "developmentalism" to my foreign policy model, and prefer "peripheral realism" instead, because both in Argentina and in Brazil "developmentalism" is a term associated with the economic policies of specific political parties and presidents: Arturo Frondizi in Argentina and Juscelino Kubistechek in Brazil. An additional function of my choice of "peripheral realism" is as a risky but well-deserved homage to Hans J. Morgenthau.

Chapter 4 - THE ANTHROPOMORPHIC FALLACY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DISCOURSE

Introduction

We speak about the systemic constraints of policy as if the concept were unproblematic. Yet the "systemic constraints" for a state's policy formulation will vary in nature and magnitude according to the nature of the state's priorities, and these priorities will to some degree vary according to our conception of the state. When we say that the priority objective (and "national" or country interest) of a poor, weak state is the promotion of economic development, we are making a value judgement about the nature of the state, about what the relation between the state and the individual citizens should be, and therefore about what the administrations (or governments) in charge of that state should do. As stated in Chapter 1, the implicit assumption is contractarian and democratic: the state's raison-d'etre is the defense of the rights and interests of the individuals who are its citizens. Under this assumption, economic development is the foremost objective of any underdeveloped state, and the "systemic constraints" we speak of are relative to that objective: if we want development, we must avoid this set of policies, and focus on that one.

If our assumptions were different, for instance, that the nation (without quotation marks and possibly with a capital N) is a gestalt comparable to a living organism, where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, that as a consequence the individual should unconditionally be at the service of the state which is the nation's "backbone" (instead of the other way around), and that the rights and interests of the individual can thereby be legitimately sacrificed to the interests of the whole, then we might come to the conclusion that a policy of grandeur is justifiable even if it sacrifices the well-being and the lives of millions of citizens[a]. In this case, the objectives of the state and the "systemic constraints" that place limits to policy might be very different. The yardstick with which we evaluate policy will certainly be different. Our entire attitude with respect to what to study in the "international system" will differ. Our theory will be different.

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[a]. In reality, few would deny that a nation is a whole greater than the sum of its parts. The problem lies in the second assumption: that it therefore follows that the individual should unconditionally be at the service of the nation and/or the state that represents it. For liberal democracy, this is not at all the case: the state can be justified only in terms of the defense of the individual. If the nation is a gestalt greater than the sum of its parts, let it take care of itself and its identity. It is subject to evolution, it was not always what it now is, and will someday become something different, perhaps part of a supranational entity. But the state should be at the service of the individual, its rights and interests, and not of a hypothetical, quasi-metaphysical monster. The country interests (defined, as in Chapter 1, in terms of the interests of the many vis-a-vis those of the few or those of the citizens of other countries) will of course involve the group, but they are in the trust of the state because of its contractual obligations with individuals, and not because they are the interests of the gestalt.

The reader could object to the argument above saying that our methodology should consist of casting aside all a priori regarding what the state's priorities should be, and only address the empirical question of what are the priorities of each specific state. But in this case we cannot speak about systemic constraints, for these will vary enormously from case to case, i.e., from priority to priority. Constraints for what objective? A state, after all, can even destroy its society. Consequently, we could not build a theory of the international system, but only theories of individual foreign policies and their sources. Our study would be limited basically to the understanding, for example, of what makes it possible for Iraq to pursue foreign policy goals not indispensable for "national" survival at the expense of the well-being and indeed the lives of the Iraqis, whereas this is impossible for the United States unless "national" survival is at stake. If we were to build a theory of the international system and the constraints that it imposes upon foreign policy, it would have to be custom-built for Iraq's objectives.

This proves that philosophical assumptions and value judgements are inevitable when we attempt to build an international relations theory or a theory of the international system that pretends to be applicable to more than one country or more than one set of priority objectives. And the idea of a theory of the "international system" that is useful only for Iraq is almost a contradiction in terms, and is certainly not what the theorists of the international system have aspired to constructing. The assumptions and value judgements might be implicit, should be explicit, but they will inevitably be there. The philosophical (and not merely empirical) question of what is the ultimate objective of the state cannot be avoided, for the simple reason that international relations theory is a theory of human action, and no theory of human action can be constructed if we do not address the issue of what it is we act for, i.e., meaning, intention, and their ultimate source, which is human needs[1]. On this score, yet from a different perspective, I strongly endorse E.H. Carr's and Stanley Hoffmann's opinion that empirical facts and values can never be wholly separated in the social sciences, and that an empirical social theory can never be fully separated from normative interests[2].

Rationality revisited

Here we must go back to some concepts already developed in Chapter 2, while treating Morgenthau's concept of rationality. Rationality is always defined in terms of the relation between means and ends. The ends (or objectives), in turn, are related to the interests of an individual or a collective entity.

This being the case, both "rationality" and "interests" are meaningless if we do not define first whose interests we are talking about.

This means that there will always be a wide margin of ambiguity both to the "rationality" of a policy and to the "interests" that it is supposed to serve. Even the interests of an individual are not always self-evident (otherwise individuals would not incur in as many mistakes as they do regarding all sorts of personal strategies). The interests of a government can be identified in an imperfect way only through some sort of technical evaluation. And the "national interest" (which in my terminology is equivalent to the long-term interests of a citizenry) is --as was stated in Chapter 1-- almost a statistical concept. It is clear that what is good for 90% of the population and bad for 10% is almost unambiguously of the "national" interest. It is clear that what is bad for 90% of the population and good for only 10% is almost unambiguously against the "national" interest. But in between there are many shades of gray, and there is also a problem of intensity (just how "good" or "bad" something is for a certain segment of the population).

Nonetheless, despite the ambiguity that is almost constantly present in any discussion about the "national" or country interest, there is a huge distance between specifying whether the rationality of a policy is defined in terms of the "national" interest, a specific government's interests, or an individual statesman's personal interests, and not specifying this at all. In the latter case, nothing makes sense, because the "rationality" will differ according to the type of actor whose interests it is supposed to serve.

The circumvention of value judgements

In Power and Interdependence --one of the very few works dealing with the debate on realism in which the role of the Third World in world politics is even addressed-- Keohane and Nye try to circumvent this problem simply by saying that the states of developed countries face severe domestic constraints in their foreign policy formulation, whereas poor weak states are not similarly inhibited from linking unrelated issues because their domestic interests are "less complex"[3]. This tremendous understatement (also pointed out, from an entirely different theoretical perspective, by both Robert W. Cox and Richard K. Ashley[4]) has two consequences:

> 1. It comes close to putting the entire theoretical construction in the realm of the nonsensical at a logical level, because we cannot talk about the international system and the constraints that it imposes upon policy, if we do not first define the objectives whose achievement can

> be jeopardized by not abiding by the said constraints. This definition of priority objectives will necessarily imply a definition of who is the subject that the state is supposed to serve through the attainment of these objectives, and both these definitions will imply value judgements and philosophical assumptions built into the theoretical discourse.
>
> 2. It avoids the numerous moral problems underlying the personal use that Third World tyrants often make of their foreign policy.

What I have cited above is not simply a slip of the pen. The same concept, with the same consequences, comes up again and again in the book. This is the case, for instance, when Keohane and Nye say that "the smaller state may have greater internal political unity than the larger one"[5]. The same problem is again present when they say that:

> (...) Power measured in terms of resources or potential may look different from power measured in terms of influence over outcomes. We must look at the "translation" in the political bargaining process. One of the most important reasons for this is that the commitment of the weaker state may be much greater than that of its stronger partner. The more dependent actor may be (or appear to be) more willing to suffer.[6]

And the same concept is repeated later on in the text, when the authors say that "states with intense preferences and coherent positions will bargain more effectively than states constrained by domestic and transnational actors"[7].

Quite unwittingly, there is a sinister anthropomorphic connotation in the expressions "stronger commitment" or "intense preferences" when applied to a state (in a conceptual context in which "nation", "country", "state", "government" and "statesman" are all lumped together as if they all meant the same). The same is true regarding the expression that "the more dependent actor may be more willing to suffer": states do not suffer; they have no nervous system; it is the individual people who suffer, and suffering is usually imposed upon them against their wills by a dictator or an oligarchy. And regarding the "greater internal unity" of poor, weak states, our authors prefer to cast aside the fact that "unity" is frequently an euphemism for dictatorship: indeed, most dictators proclaim unity to be their ideal. The question remains, as in the case of "interest": what is meant by "intense preferences"? Whose intense preferences? "Commitment" to the interests of whom? "Unity" to serve whose interests? For Keohane and Nye, the answer appears to be that it does not matter, so long as that someone is in charge of the set of institutions that conform the state. But if we do not define the subject (citizenry, government, statesman) that is theoretically to be served

by the state's foreign policy, we have no yardstick for the evaluation of policy, and we cannot even talk about the constraints on policy imposed by the international system, because we can only talk about constraints when we have at least defined the major evils that we want to avoid, and to do this we must define the subject that foreign policy is supposed to serve. We cannot avoid value judgements. We need value judgements. Value judgements are necessarily a part of the logical structure of a theory of the international system.

In Chapter 2 (and again in the last section) we saw how Morgenthau's theory has this "moral issue" built into it, through the concept of rationality, which is a citizenry-centric rationality. A foreign policy which is against the long-term interests of a country and its citizenry is not "rational" for Morgenthau, even if it is rational from the point of view of the interests of an individual statesman or governing clique. Having defined the subject who is supposed to be served by foreign policy, Morgenthau can evaluate foreign policy and identify the constraints imposed upon it by the international system. Thus, the ideal type of state behavior that Morgenthau constructs (on the basis of which he can evaluate empirical behavior), though war obsessed, has a moral factor built into it. The many strong statements on civic morality made by Morgenthau in his work, on the other hand, show that this was his intention and not simply my deduction (e.g., "both individual and state must judge political action by universal moral principles, such as that of liberty")[8].

Quite the contrary is the case of Keohane and Nye: their good intentions towards the Third World are clear, but their theory does not have a moral factor built into it. For Keohane and Nye's models (though not for them personally), governments have equal moral and conceptual status, irrespective of whether their policy is or is not subject to domestic constraints. Moreover, their sympathy towards the Third World leads them to point to the lack of domestic constraints (which is usually the consequence of injustice or tyranny) as an advantage that gives underdog Third World governments a greater margin of manoeuvre.

But if we think long and hard about what Keohane and Nye have done, we will come to the conclusion that, in the case of the United States, our authors implicitly do define the subject whom foreign policy is supposed to serve: it is clearly the "country", i.e. the people or the citizenry, the long-term interests of the democratic state, and certainly not the self-centered interests of a government or the personal interests of a statesman. Only in the case of "other countries" is this subject truly undefined. Moreover, it may be that the implicit definition of the subject to be served by U.S. foreign policy can be made extensive to the whole of the industrialized West,

in which case only for the Third World and the former Communist bloc would this subject remain undefined.

Obviously, the problem ultimately lies in the fact that what Keohane and Nye have done is to build an ethnocentric theory about the United States and its relation with the international system, in which U.S. vital objectives and priorities are more or less taken for granted and to some extent discussed, there being implicit assumptions and value judgements in this respect, while other countries' set of basic priorities are implicitly taken as empirical facts-of-life not to be discussed, without value judgements. But this double standard is not explicit. It takes a great deal of splitting hairs, logical analysis and hard thinking to get through their unintended fallacies and make this diagnosis about the logical limits of their construction.

I am aware that it is contrary to "scientific" conventional wisdom to say that we cannot think of states as if they were stars or subatomic particles, but the fact is that there is a subtle yet serious conceptual error in this attitude. This error is common to both Kenneth Waltz and Keohane and Nye, among others. Waltz explicitly rejects the contention of Stanley Hoffmann, Raymond Aron and other analysts who claim that international relations theory cannot exclude the meaning that actors give to their behavior from its explanations. Furthermore, Waltz thinks that this can be refuted using his analogy with the market's role in economic theory[9]. In so doing he forgets that human meaning and intention are built into the very concept of the market and the economic man model, in a simplified way: thus, here too, we have assumptions and value judgements about human nature. Hoffmann is right. Waltz is wrong.

Indeed, the fact is that states are not stars or subatomic particles. The constraints imposed upon them by the international system will depend on what their priority objectives are, so that we cannot generalize about such constraints. Each case is unique, unless we are willing (as I am, and indeed, as Morgenthau was) to make a grand value judgement about human nature and about what the relation between the individual and the state should be, and apply this philosophical point of departure for the construction of an ideal type that has two possible and complementary functions:

1. it sets a normative standard, and

2. it establishes the parameter of rationality from which deviations can be identified and "social-scientifically" explained, basically in terms of the "attributes" of specific societies.

Only in this case can we speak generally about the constraints imposed by the international system, because we have defined priority objectives and a "rationality", which in my terms is a citizenry-centric rationality based on liberal democratic and contractarian assumptions. Needless to say, the priority objectives of the states of underdeveloped countries will be different from those of rich, strong states, simply because the material needs of their citizens are different due to the different circumstances in which they live.

It is interesting to note that Morgenthau does not engage in Keohane and Nye's double standard fallacy, because his methodology is so different. Morgenthau built an ideal type of foreign policy. There is a set of assumptions about the way the world works, true, from which one can infer a set of conditions that sums up to an ideal type of world context, the realist world model, but the ideal type he really focused on was not a model of the world but of foreign policy. Contrariwise, Keohane and Nye developed an ideal type of world conditions, not of foreign policy. One can make normative inferences regarding foreign policy from the complex interdependence model of world conditions, but this is up to the reader. Hence, Morgenthau's theory has much more of a normative thrust than Keohane and Nye's. In it the systemic elements (which indeed exist) are subordinated to the theory's normative intention. Keohane and Nye's theory, on the contrary, is much more systemic than Morgenthau's, and in it the normative elements are the subordinated ones. In a normative theory, the state of reference (in Morgenthau's case, the United States; in my case, Argentina) is the center from which all reflection springs, and value judgements are applicable only to that state. Such a theory must of necessity be self-centered; it would be nonsensical to criticize it for applying a double standard. But a theory that hinges on a model of world conditions, and that hence is basically systemic, incurs in fallacy if it applies value judgements to one state or set of states, and deals with the others as if they were subatomic particles.

In the case of Keohane and Nye's book (on which we have focused so much attention because, unlike other works devoted to this debate, it marginally addresses the role of the Third World in international politics) there is a great ambiguity regarding the epistemological status of states. "Other states" are treated like stars or subatomic particles. But the United States and its foreign policy are the object of value judgements that are implicit but indeed obvious. When they say that military force has become too dangerous to use, for instance, they harbor implicit standards of danger and policy objectives in the back of their mind, that they probably take to be self-evident and consensual. "Dangerous" for what? In this undefined "what" lies an implicit policy objective and value judgement. But contrariwise, with respect to poor,

weak states all that they perceive is freedom: freedom of the state from domestic constraints, freedom of the state to sacrifice their populations, etc., in a crude state-as-actor model in which the state is an unproblematic concept. Poor, weak states are like subatomic particles for Keohane and Nye: we simply observe their "behavior" without value judgements. But this is not the case of the United States, nor perhaps of other "rich, strong states".

This double standard is apparently not understood by the authors, but it is there. Value judgements inadvertently creep into the behavior of one set of states, but not into that of the other. As is always the case when assumptions are not explicitly brought out, the implicit value judgements are primitive. So is the underlying model which poses "poor, weak states" against the strong states. Keohane and Nye attempt to be very explicit about the assumptions of their complex interdependence model, but they fall prey to the complexity of their subject matter and the subtleties that it requires.

As I said repeatedly for this and other reasons, this book is markedly ethnocentric, despite its generous sympathy for the Third World. This makes its misreading and ill-usage all the more dangerous, because our authors' empirical observation that Third World states sometimes have a "stronger commitment" or "may be more willing to suffer", divorced as it is from all moral considerations, can lead to the conclusion that these states have a greater margin of manoeuvre than previously thought, and this has sometimes served as an encouragement for tyrants who are all too willing to sacrifice their people in the altar of their personal vanity and ambition[10].

The anthropomorphic fallacy in international relations discourse

The development of international relations as a social science is made ever more difficult because this is a field in which we are the prisoners of language. The structure of language itself often determines modes of thought that condition our theoretical frameworks and their policy implications in diverse ways, to the point of placing a limit to knowledge. For instance, it is difficult to think without metaphors and analogies (like a state's "suffering"), yet thinking with metaphors and analogies can sometimes lead us to fallacies with serious unintended consequences.

As I have mentioned before, in most if not all of the international relations literature we often come across expressions that deal with the country, state, government and/or the nation as if it were an anthropomorphic entity. The very fact that when referring to the international behavior of the "actor", nation, country, state, government and individual statesman and their interests are

all lumped together as if they were the same thing (thus depriving the concept of rationality of all meaning), helps to inadvertently enter into a thinking mode whereby, for example, we differentiate states according to the degree of "suffering" that they are "willing" to stand. Thus we tend to think of state policy as if it were equivalent to an individual's decisions, both in its formulation and, what is worse, in its consequences. In this way we stray far away from Morgenthau's wise words, already cited but worth repeating, when he reminded us that:

> The individual may say for himself: "Fiat justitia, pereat mundus (...)," but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care.[11]

If the state has no right to sacrifice the individual for the sake of justice abroad (this is the issue that Morgenthau had in mind), then much less has it got the right to sacrifice it to satisfy the whims of an official, his vanity or his ambition. As stated in Chapter 1, this is a value judgement based upon an assumption about what the relations between the individual and the state should be. The assumption is a contractarian one and comes from the tradition of Hobbes, Locke, John Stuart Mill, Rousseau, Alberdi and Renan: the state is based on an underlying, implicit social compact, and the only valid justification for the existence of the state lies in the defense of the rights and interests of its individual citizens.

It is not necessary, in strictly logical terms, to incorporate this assumption into a theory of international relations. But if we do not incorporate this assumption, we will probably end up incorporating, inadvertently, the opposite assumption: that the state is an end in itself. Insofar as the state is a set of public institutions that regulate a country's life, the people that are represented by a state that is conceived as an end-in-itself must in turn be conceived not in contractarian terms, but in organicist ones. Thus, the "nation" and the country would be a gestalt that is more than the sum of its parts, and for whose interests it is acceptable to sacrifice the rights of its citizens, when circumstances require it. Logically, there is no middle point. One must accept one or the other. Either the individual is the end-in-itself and the state exits to protect the individual, or the state is the end-in-itself, the "nation" and country are conceived in organicist terms, and the individual lives and dies to serve them. But this is not to deny, of course, that empirically we can find many cases of half-hearted acceptance of one or the other assumption, and all shades of gray as well, with contradictory behaviors whereby the same state sometimes appears to stand by the contractarian assumption and sometimes by its opposite.

The objectives of foreign policy, the available alternatives, the systemic constraints, etc., will all be essentially different according to which assumption we choose as the basis for our theory, contractarian or organicist. It could be objected, of course, that we could attempt to construct a theory that accepted the empirical fact that some states behave according to contractarian assumptions, and some states behave according to organicist assumptions. I think that insofar as only the contractarian assumption imposes restraint upon the behavior of states, in a simplified model in which we had only two sets of states, one that wholeheartedly accepted the contractarian assumption, and another that wholeheartedly accepted the organicist one, the two sets of states would be in a state of latent war between themselves, and all of the states making up the organicist bloc would be in a state of latent war among themselves as well. But such a simplified model would be only a game, of no practical use and of no serious intellectual interest, because reality presents us with all the shades of gray mentioned above in terms of empirical state behavior, and therefore we would end up again in the predicament whereby we would have to custom-build a theory of the international system for each specific state, since the systemic constraints affecting a state's foreign policy would vary according to each of these shades of gray and the different policy objectives that spring from them: logically, this brings us back to the same situation treated in the introductory section to this chapter, which is sterile for theory-building at the systemic level.

So we must again come to the conclusion that certain value judgements and assumptions about what foreign policy is for, and whom it should serve, must be built into a theory of international relations, which cannot but be normative. That being the case, if our basic assumption is democratic and contractarian, then the treatment of the state, country and/or nation as anthropomorphic entities constitutes a fallacy that is conducive to very serious errors of perspective about foreign policy. This is very common in the Third World, but is extensive to the entire planet.

Policy implications of the anthropomorphic fallacy

Indeed, the calls for foreign policies based on national "honor", "pride", "dignity" or "glory" are to be found, in certain conjunctures, in all societies. Obviously, concepts such as honor, pride, dignity or glory refer to emotional values that are connected to an individual's nervous system. One does not <u>have</u> honor; one <u>feels</u> honor. An individual can feel honor, dignity or glory, but a collective entity that is not endowed with a nervous system of its own cannot. There is no such thing as "national" honor; in the best of

cases, there is only the sum of the "honors" of the individuals that make up a "nation" or (more precisely) a country. This may not be true, of course, if our assumption about the "nation" is organicist, but we have explicitly adopted a non-organicist, contractarian assumption as a point of departure for our theory.

This being the case, the sacrifice of material values necessary for the livelihood of a people, to emotional values such as those proposed by the anthropomorphic fallacy, is:

1. Essentially elitist. The distribution of emotional values is usually unequal (Khadaffi probably enjoyed his challenges to the United States more than the average Libyan), and the distribution of the material sacrifices involved is almost sure to be unequal. The distribution of material values is also unequal, of course. The difference lies in the fact that because no one is fed with "dignity", the modest benefit obtained by the poorest sectors of society from, for instance, a better commercial balance, is objectively much more important, for these sectors, than the modest share of nationalistic pride that can accrue to them from a foreign policy that is willing to sacrifice material values for the sake of "dignity". Concomitantly, they will be the ones to suffer most from the material price paid for that "dignity". Honor, dignity, glory and pride are inevitably more important for those whose primary necessities are well covered than for those who are hungry and without shelter, and the state is under the obligation to serve both of these sectors of society fairly. The duels of honor of the days of yore were basically an affair of gentlemen, not of plebeians: generally speaking, and unless they are hypnotized by indoctrination, the great masses had and continue to have other urgencies, and policies designed to promote these emotional values cater to the vanity of the elites. This is not to say that they serve only the vanity of the elite in power. On the contrary, they frequently serve both the government and the opposition elite, and sometimes an aspiring counter-elite as well, and this is what makes it so difficult to expose these policies as just another kind of class exploitation. This sort of elitism is incurred in by elites of both the right and the left, under all sorts of social and economic systems.

2. Consumerist. Such policies lead not to what I have called the "investment of autonomy" but to its "consumption" instead. They often lead, for example, to arms purchases that are made at the expense of development projects, and thus lead to more poverty and less power in

the future. Today's nationalist emotions are tomorrow's additional subordination.

For both reasons given above, policies based on the anthropomorphic fallacy are less justifiable the poorer a country is. Yet empirically, extreme policies based on the anthropomorphic fallacy that lead to great material sacrifices are usually adopted by Third World countries (Libya, Iraq, Iran), and indeed in present days the frequent invocation of this fallacy as a basis for policy is much more frequent in the Third World than in the industrialized West.

This was not always the case, of course. Until recent decades, some of the foreign policies of the countries of Western Europe had a clear prestige orientation (the German expression eine Prestige-frage became a bane of European foreign offices), and such foreign policies were justified with arguments that incurred in the anthropomorphic fallacy. In certain extreme cases, the anthropomorphic fallacy became a metaphysical fallacy: "eternal France", a cliché of educational textbooks and political discourse, is an illustration of the phenomenon.

Ultimately, the anthropomorphic fallacy and associated phenomena are finely-tuned mechanisms used to mobilize irrational energies at the service of a "national" cause (which is frequently only the cause of an elite). By referring to the collective entity to which the individual belongs in language that is identical to that used to refer to the individual's body, the sense of an identity inextricably linked to the collective entity is reinforced in very powerful terms. The collective entity "suffers", "kneels", is "humiliated", is "glorified", "loves" its "children", has "brethren", its provinces are each others' "sisters", and territorial losses are painfully referred to as "dismemberments" (as in the loss of a human arm or leg): these anthropomorphic expressions are typical of the Latin American political discourse, are frequent in Argentine rhetoric, and abounded in nineteenth century European literature. Fed to citizens from earliest childhood, they help to activate nationalistic emotions through the unconscious identification of the collective entity with the individual's own body. Later, when used as a justification for policy, it is psychologically very difficult for the individual not to accept a rationale which would be impeccable if it referred to his own personal body. The mechanism serves therefore to mesh the levels of the individual and of the collective entity into one and the same in the citizens' minds, facilitating mobilization and making opposition to policy based on anthropomorphic rhetoric ignoble and criminal. Thus, the masses can be used for the purposes of the elites, and the state's raison-d'etre (as established by our contractarian assumption) is betrayed.

The conclusion to this argument is, of course, that no foreign policy that sacrifices material values for emotional values of the sort that are usually supported by an anthropomorphic rhetoric is of the "national" or country interest, or corresponds to a citizenry-centric rationality under contractarian assumptions. As already said, the poorer a country is, the greater the relevance of this assertion. Yet this self-evident argument is usually obscured by the very power of the anthropomorphic fallacy, a power that is enhanced by the widespread use that has been made of this fallacy for centuries, everywhere.

The historical origins of the anthropomorphic fallacy

This is interesting and paradoxical, because the fact that "dignity" and other such concepts are not attributes of collective entities but of individual human beings and can at times be at odds with the general interest, is something that became obscure in the Modern Age, but that was clear to some ancient civilizations. For instance, in his essay about private life in the Roman Empire, Paul Veyne tells us that:

> Since public dignity was in truth private property, it was admitted that whoever was elevated to public office should show it off and defend it as legitimately as a king defends his crown. No one thought of reproaching Caesar for crossing the Rubicon, marching against his country and throwing it into civil war. The Senate had attempted to curtail his dignity, and Caesar had made it known that he preferred his dignity to everything, including his life. Nor is it reasonable to blame El Cid for having killed the king's best soldier in duel in order to save his honor.[12]

Likewise, in his essay about late antiquity Peter Brown tells us how, with the advent of Christianity, the elites of the Roman Empire abandoned the old sort of philanthropy that had the objective of elevating the status of their city and thus excluded the very poor from its benefits, and channeled their efforts towards the latter. Christianized, the Roman notable converted from philopatris (a lover of his native city) to philoptôchos (a lover of the poor), in terms of his ethical ideology.[13]

This substitution of a model of urban society that underlined the duty of the well-born towards the status of their city (itself often referred to in anthropomorphic terms), for another based in the solidarity of the richer vis-a-vis the poor, that took place towards the second century A.D., illustrates to what extent the elitism of any discourse centered on the emotional values

related to the status of a collective entity should be obvious. Likewise, the greater compatibility of a more materialistic discourse (such as that of Christianity) with the ideal of social justice should be obvious too. But the private character of the emotional benefits of policies geared towards values such as the "dignity", "glory", "honor", "pride", etc., of collective entities; the essential elitism that underlies such policies; and the incompatibility of these policies with the Christian ideal of social justice (especially in the case of countries with large masses of poor people), were all obscured by the functionality acquired by the discourse based on the anthropomorphic fallacy with the emergence of the "nation-states".

Indeed, the anthropomorphic fallacy would have made no sense in the medieval world. Following John G. Ruggie's able synthesis in the context of a different discussion[14], that was a world in which:

1. There existed multiple titles to the same territory, generating "a patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of government" in the context of chains of lord-vassal relationships[15].

2. Not only were there no clear boundaries between what would later become modern states, but the concept of boundary made little sense. It was in the thirteenth century that it was decided that there would be boundaries between France, England and Spain[16].

3. Its ruling class was continental and was able to travel and take charge of government from one extreme of Europe to another.

4. Property was not absolute but conditional, carrying with it explicit social obligations. On the other hand, authority was private, residing personally in the holder of the fiefdom.

5. There were "common bodies of law, religion and custom that expressed inclusive natural rights pertaining to the social totality formed by the constituent units". They served the function of legitimizing this system of rule[17].

6. The constituent units of the system were considered to be "municipal embodiments of a universal community"[18].

Indeed, the medieval world was not "international" simply because it made no sense to speak of nations in that context, but it was far more inclusive and universal than the state system that followed. In the medieval world it thus made no sense to anthropomorphosize a territorial unit that could one day be

ruled by a prince from Aragón and the next by a Burgundian duke; a territorial unit that might be the fiefdom of a ruler who, in a different territorial setting, was the feoffor of the very prince of which he was feoffee in the former. In such a world it made no sense to engage in such metaphysical metaphors as "eternal France", and it was perfectly logical that the coat of arms of the English crown carry mottos in French or in any other European language. In such a context, soldiers fought for their religion, for their king or prince, or for their very lives and those of their kin, but not for their "fatherland" or "country", which would have been nonsensical concepts.

In contrast, the shift toward the modern state system implied the "rediscovery from Roman law of the concept of absolute property and the simultaneous emergence of mutually exclusive territorial state formations", which gave a new, "modern" meaning to the old concept of sovereignty[19]. Thus, the medieval plural allegiances and asymmetrical suzerainties tended to disappear, as the "patchwork of overlapping and incomplete rights of government" faded. In this way the state, as an unambiguous territorial unit, replaced the fief and the chains of lord-vassal relationships. The concept of "nationhood" --the often fictitious link of culture and kin between the people who inhabit a territorial unit organized as a state-- helped to legitimize the new political realities, to the extent that insofar as it is taken as unproblematic, the very concept of the "nation-state" is, more than a theoretically useful descriptive category, an ideological instrument for legitimization, and to some extent a self-fulfilling prophecy as well.

The modern state system and its main legitimization instrument, the concept of nationhood, became so hegemonic (in Gramscian terms) that "nation-state" status was automatically awarded to almost any existing territorial state, even the newest and most artificial ones. As a consequence, most political scientists today do not ask themselves whether, for instance, Ecuador is or is not a "nation"-state. It is accepted as such if it is a member of the United "Nations", and this is of course what its dominant elite needs and demands. And we speak of a field of "international relations" even though most scholars will agree that it deals mostly with "interstate" relations. It is indeed curious, for example, to read a 1992 article by John C. Garnett in which the author specifies that "scholars have emphasized (...) that the focus of the subject is <u>interstate</u> relations", notwithstanding which this is practically the only place in the paper where such a term is used, and on that very page it is twice replaced as "international society" and "international relations"[20].

"International" gained much wider currency than "interstate", even though "interstate" is (for this analysis) much more accurate a concept than

"international", simply because "international" is more mobilizing and therefore more functional to dominant interests than "interstate". Thus even though a scholar may be conscious of the fact that he or she is not really talking about international relations, usage commands, and the subconscious often plays tricks as well, in such a way as to enmesh us in mental and linguistic traps which lead to the reinforcement of the interstate system under the emotion-activating guise of an international system. On the other hand, this linguistic phenomenon is not limited to the realm of international relations: male supremacy, for example, has been reinforced during centuries by language habits that assume that supremacy.

It should be underlined here that the hegemony of the "nation-state" as an unproblematic concept has policy implications that are the very opposite of what I call "citizenry-centric rationality". As soon as the concepts of the nation, the country, the state and/or the nation-state become unproblematic, are confused with the government and/or the individual statesman, and are meshed together in the state-as-actor model, the possibility of disguising government or statesman-centric policies as "nation"-centric policies arises, and this is what actually happened with the advent of the modern state system. In addition, it is taken for granted (at this level of analysis) that the "nation" represents the citizenry, and that the problems that affect the citizenry fall outside the scope of this type of theory. Thus the "nation" became a motor for mobilization and a justification for demanding the greatest individual sacrifices, which were dressed in the ethically alluring guise of altruism and "patriotism", although they often served the pettiest and most unholy interests. And concomitantly with this ideological phenomenon, political rhetoric became plagued with anthropomorphic and even metaphysical images of the "nation"-state, which became yet another instrument for legitimization and for the generation of an irrationality functional to the mobilization of loyalties.

The anthropomorphization of the "nation"-state was almost an automatic process. While John Locke legitimized the state in the new bourgeois society in terms of the need to protect natural individual property rights (a relatively new concept and phenomenon), Emeric Vattel legitimized the interstate system that acquired a recognizable profile with the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, in terms of the need to preserve the separate existence of states. For Vattel, an international community and international law were necessary precisely for this reason: to protect the sovereign states, just as each state and its domestic law were necessary to protect the rights of individual men (especially proprietors).

Anthropomorphization followed naturally. All that was necessary was to bring back to life an ancient tradition, easily identifiable in, for example, Thucydides, for whom the subject of history was not the individual but the polis, the former being under the obligation of caring for the "honor" of his city[21]. When, in Droit de Gens (1758) Vattel wrote about "the international law of political liberty", he was referring to the "liberty" of states, i.e., he was ascribing to the state an attribute that corresponds to the individual, who has a nervous system, a mind and a will with which to use his/her liberty. "Liberty" was applied to the individual within the state and to the state in the interstate system. Thus, the anthropomorphic fallacy is built into the language of the fields of international law and international relations as a sort of birthmark or original sin. Indeed, the fields themselves were born as an effort to legitimize the modern state-system, and the anthropomorphic fallacy has that functionality. The fact that the fallacious analogy for which the state is to the interstate system what the individual is to the state, ultimately leads to totalitarianism and contradicts the contractarian logic of Locke and others, mattered little and deterred no one from adopting it. After all, those were not precisely democratic times, and even had they been, the need to legitimize the state and to mobilize loyalties has always been greater than the need to avoid logical contradictions and flawed thinking.

It could be argued, of course, that to speak of the "liberty" of states is simply to engage in a metaphor, just as I engaged in one above when I wrote about the field's "original sin". My reply to this is that it is indeed very difficult to write or to speak without metaphors (and this should lead to a reflection on the limits to this type of knowledge), notwithstanding which there are metaphors with identifiable consequences and metaphors without them. The anthropomorphic fallacy in international relations discourse is not "innocent" (another metaphor), is not without consequences, and often has had mobilization effects and therefore, policy consequences and an impact upon the real world.

Theoretical flaws generated by the anthropomorphic fallacy

That Vattel should have spoken of the liberty of states is neither surprising nor outrageous. But that Robert O. Keohane should state that:

> "an actor with intense preferences on an issue may be willing to use more resources to attain a high probability of a favorable result than an actor with more resources but lower intensity (preferences)"[22]

is somewhat more disconcerting. Even more depressing is that Kenneth Waltz should assert that:

> "States, like people, are insecure to the extent of their freedom. If freedom is wanted, insecurity must be accepted".[23]

"Freedom", we must remember, is a term that is always unconsciously endowed with positive and noble qualities. Quite unintendedly, the above quotation is almost a glorification of tyranny, insofar as this "freedom" of states leads to the subjection of masses of individual men and women who, without consultation, are mercilessly thrown into battle and destruction. Finally, that Keohane and Nye should say (as mentioned before) that weak, poor states may be "more willing to suffer" than strong ones is downright astonishing and illustrates to what extent almost the entire field is caught in a linguistic trap with perverse practical and ideological consequences. That an individual be willing to suffer in order to attain an objective is usually the product of virtue. But as said before, states do not suffer. When we say that a state is willing to suffer, what we really mean is that a statesman or government is willing to subject his people to suffering. This is usually not the product of virtue but of vice, and moreover it often happens while the statesman himself is feasting. Yet people, including scholars and specialists in the field, rarely stop to think about what "a country's strong resolve" really means, and stand in admiration of this sort of "willingness to suffer".

It should be underlined that these are not accidental gaffes but rather the conventional language of the field, to be found very often in the literature. John C. Garnett, for example, tells us that "although B may be weaker than A, it may be more determined (...) which may make it more powerful in terms of political effectiveness"[24]. Examples could be cited endlessly in every language. It comes from diplomatic practice and spills over, without critical examination, into this pseudo-scientific field that is caught in numerous language and mental traps.

Thus, even for most scholars, the Vietnam war was a contest between two anthropomorphic entities, the United States and the massively mobilized Vietnamese people, and this tends to generate admiration toward the latter instead of pity, which would surely be the more befitting sentiment if our frame of mind were citizenry-centric instead of government-centric. Likewise, accomplished U.S. Latinamericanists have said to me that they regretted that Argentina "caved in" to Britain under the Menem government. In their minds, Argentina and Britain are two anthropomorphic entities. They generously side with the underdog, but they do not stop to think about the consequences of a continuation of abnormal tension in the South Atlantic in terms, for example,

of Argentina's country risk index, development opportunities and, specifically, economic relations with the European Community. Intuitively, they would have preferred a greater "willingness to suffer", because their mind frame in international affairs is government-centric, and they do not realize that this is contradictory with their liberal democratic convictions and their contractarian political philosophy.

If First World intellectuals fall into this mental trap vis-a-vis contexts that to them are foreign, it goes without saying that, within Third World societies, governments frequently make use of anthropomorphisms to mobilize the masses, and ordinary people (as well as intellectuals) are often deceived by the policy implications of the anthropomorphic fallacy. Indeed, the government-centric frame of mind is so hegemonic that when a government official makes use of anthropomorphic metaphors to generate emotions functional to his policy, he usually does not realize exactly what he is doing, or where the trap lies.

Obviously, these ideological phenomena help to legitimize the state (regardless of how tyrannical) and are functional to the interests of the elites vis-a-vis their manipulation of the masses. They are mechanisms whereby irrationality is generated and put at the service of allegedly "national" interests that are often nothing more than elite interests. They can be traced (at least) to Vattel's time and are built into the fields of international law and international relations. Since Vattel's time, however, the West has evolved ideologically and politically. It has forsworn absolutism and even authoritarianism. Yet at least some significative segments of its language and thought categories have remained unchanged, sometimes leading it unknowingly in such unintended directions as the legitimization of elite manipulation of the masses in foreign, usually Third World contexts.

The mechanisms that contribute to generate this irrationality have seldom been demythified. Although no worthy thinker has ever taken seriously the pretention that his/her "fatherland" was "eternal", this sort of nonsense has been stated shamelessly through the educational systems of most countries during whole centuries, and few mainstream thinkers have publicly rebelled against this type of discourse. And anthropomorphisms are much more frequent and effective linguistic traps than metaphysical ones like that of the example just cited, to the point that sophisticated analysts and theorists of international relations fall unconsciously in their trap.

For most international relations theory developed in the United States (including neorealists and interdependentists) the state is to the international system what, for individualist contractualism, the individual

is to the state. The problem is that in likening the state to the individual, we inadvertently drive into the possibility of legitimizing totalitarianism, which is the very opposite of contractarian individualism. This is so because while for contractualism and liberal democracy the rights of the individual are sacred, the only thing sacred about the state is its duties toward the individuals who are under its care. Furthermore, the perverse analogy between the individual and the state determines that the anthropomorphic fallacy be built into the logical structure of the theory. Morgenthau managed to escape these contradictions because he never forgot that, while the individual is responsible for him or herself, the state is responsible for the individuals whom it must represent and serve.

To put it in another way, Morgenthau avoided falling into the realm of the nonsensical by remembering that in order to speak of "rationality" it is necessary to define what foreign policy is for and whom it is supposed to serve. Thus, despite many imprecisions, he also avoided building the anthropomorphic fallacy into the logical structure of his theory. He was true to contractualism, and he built a normative theory that does not legitimize totalitarianism. Contrariwise, the neorealists and the interdependentists attempted to build a theory that gives the sate the status of an individual. The ultimate logical consequence of this is to fall into an implicit organicism that unknowingly and unintendedly legitimizes totalitarianism. This result is not wholly surprising when we remember what the origins of the field are (as in the case of Vattel) and what the historical context that gave birth to it was.

Once again, as pointed out in chapters 1 and 2, I find it remarkable that my reasoning on this point should converge with that of an interpretive scholar such as Richard K. Ashley. The philosophical assumptions on which the present text is built, which are those of contractarian individualism, are explicitly rejected by Ashley. Yet this difference in our initial assumptions does not interfere with the identification of the serious logical contradictions incurred into by the neorealists and interdependentists. On the other hand, there is no need to recur to critical theory to identify these contradictions: a correct logical analysis leads to their identification from within contractarian individualism. This is much more useful and convincing than doing so from the arguments of a contending radical perspective.

But Ashley's exercise is interesting because it serves as corroboration. Criticizing utilitarianism and contractualism, Ashley tells us that they threaten to fracture the "statist" pillars of neorealist and interdependentist international theory[25]. Departing from contractualism, I would put it the other way around: the "statism" (i.e., the conception of a state-as-actor that

is analogous to the individual) of mainstream international theory betrays liberal democracy itself. Thus, I fully endorse Ashley's conclusion on this score:

> Despite its statism, neorealism can produce no theory of the state capable of satisfying the state-as-actor premises of its international political theory. On the contrary, by adopting a utilitarian theory of action, order, and change, neorealists implicitly give the lie to their idée fixe, the ideal of the state-as-actor upon which their distinctions among "levels" and their whole theory of international politics depend.[26]

And the extent of my convergence with this author reaches what to me are bewildering proportions when he tells us that:

> The history of utilitarian thought is, after all, largely the history of philosophical opposition to the "personalist" concept of state required by neorealism's international political theory.[27]

Indeed, the history of the political philosophy on which liberal democracy hinges is the very opposite of the policy implications of both the statism of mainstream international theory and the policy implications of the anthropomorphic fallacy. Yet despite this philosophical tradition at the level of civil society, the vested interests of the state as an absolute unit and the need to legitimize it and its manipulations of its citizenry, have conspired to make it very difficult to identify these contradictions, and have made a statist theory of international relations functional to the powers that be.

On the other hand, it may be no accident that these phenomena can be more easily identified, exposed, and their contents demythified today, in the dawn of a new age in which the nation-state is increasingly in crisis. As Robert W. Cox would put it, the anthropomorphic fallacy corresponds to a hegemonic structure of a world divided into states. To some extent and for a variety of reasons, the present world order, which is still divided into states, has evolved towards a nonhegemonic structure. The management of power relations is at present more difficult to obscure. And we can, rationally, identify logical flaws in our discourse that are the product of the historical process that led to the present power configuration and frame of mind.

In other words, it has become more feasible to identify the contradictions incurred by ideologies whose function has been to legitimize the nation-state, and it has likewise become possible to identify linguistic traps and thinking-

modes such as the anthropomorphic fallacy that (while functional to the legitimization of the nation-state as an unproblematic concept), are contradictory to foreign policies based on an honest and true (albeit bounded) citizenry-centric rationality under contractarian assumptions.

Nonetheless, in the Third World, where states are indeed often weak, and specifically in Latin America, where states are often more artificial than in some other regions and where nationhood is more a myth than a reality, the anthropomorphic fallacy is still of great functionality to the ruling classes as an instrument for mobilizing loyalties, and it is thus widely used, often affecting foreign and defense policies and contributing to leading them away from a citizenry-centric rationality. Its demythification is therefore all the more relevant and all the more difficult.

Local "nationalisms" and the anthropomorphic fallacy in Hispanic America

Needless to say, "nations" are always artificial to some extent, and commonality has been built intentionally by their states in a measure that is always substantive but varies from case to case. This variation is of great interest and cannot be ignored. In the case of Hispanic America we have a huge contiguous land mass with countries that share elements such as language, a predominant religion, a common Colonial heritage, and to some extent a similar racial mixture, the sum of which would be more than sufficient to define a "nationality" in Europe. Yet continental Hispanic America is divided into fifteen independent states. One major problem faced historically by these states has been to justify their independent existence, when the similarities with their immediate neighbors have been so great. Thus, ever since independence, the states of Hispanic America have dedicated themselves, basically through their educational systems and the draft, to the generation of the perception of differences with their immediate neighbors, generating myths about their essentially ambitious and evil character, which abound in educational texts. Thus, they have devoted themselves to the destruction of a pre-existing commonality.[28]

This commonality had to be replaced by a new one, that had ideally to be limited to the borders of the state. Thus, another problem that these states have had to cope with has been their internal heterogeneity, since the ethnic and cultural differences that do exist many times cut across boundary lines. A state like Ecuador, for instance, is made up of two sharply different regions, the coast and the sierra (or mountain). The second of these regions is inhabited by a state-less nation, the Quechua-speaking Andean Indians, who are basically the same as their cousins in the Peruvian and the Bolivian

Andes. For more than a century and a half, the Ecuatorian state has devoted itself to the task of attempting to convince the Indian population of the Quito region that they have more in common with the mestizo population of the Guayaquil region than with their cousins from Cuzco. Concomitantly, the Peruvian state has devoted itself to attempting to teach the Cuzco Indians that they have more in common with the mestizo population of the coastal Lima region than with the Quito or Bolivian Indians. To some extent, something similar happened in Argentina, where an inhabitant of Buenos Aires has objectively more in common with an Uruguayan than with an inhabitant of the Argentine province of Corrientes; where an inhabitant of Corrientes has more in common with a Paraguayan than with an inhabitant of the Argentine province of Jujuy; where an inhabitant of Jujuy has more in common with a Bolivian than with an inhabitant of the Argentine province of Mendoza; and where an inhabitant of Mendoza has more in common with a person from central Chile than with an inhabitant of Buenos Aires.

Hence, differentiating themselves from their neighbors, and neutralizing perceptions about existing heterogeneities within the territory of each state, have been complementary tasks of artificial nation-building by the Hispanic American states. In this task, the anthropomorphic fallacy has been recurred to continuously. The educational texts of these states have constantly referred to the pseudo-nations that they attempt to consolidate in anthropomorphic terms, thus generating an identity between the individual citizen and the artificial collective entity. The task of local "nationalisms" has been to hide and destroy the realities of larger Hispanic American commonality (which could have been the ground for a less artificial nationhood), and of local heterogeneity.

This has been (and continues to be) functional to the interests of local elites, because of several reasons. The need for independence of one Hispanic American state from another does not emerge so much from the interests of their peoples, but from those of their local elites. Local "nationalisms" are constructed to serve the interests and vanity of these elites, very often at the expense of the people, who as a consequence have suffered the burden of expensive arms races that have deteriorated their already low living standards. Thus, frequent recurrence to anthropomorphic justifications for policy in terms of glory, honor, dignity and pride, supported by myths about the dangers posed by ambitious if not evil immediate neighbors, are not only fallacious in their logical structure but often conceal the very material selfish interests of military corporations that demand huge budgets, sacrificing economic development and the welfare of the masses. Although progress with the contemporary projects of Latin American integration might eventually neutralize these long standing historical phenomena, the

anthropomorphic fallacy continues to be used for these ignoble purposes in Hispanic America, sometimes seriously distorting foreign and defense policies.[29]

Furthermore, there are other, associated and complementary uses to the anthropomorphic fallacy that have been hinted to in the previous section. In Hispanic America, the "nation" is not the only object to be treated anthropomorphically. With considerable frequency, so is the territory, and this takes us to the realm of irredenta, another phenomenon that leads to foreign policy irrationalities, not only in Hispanic America but also in other latitudes, among them, most notably, in the Middle East and in post-Cold War Eastern Europe. This use of the anthropomorphic fallacy is very similar to the one whereby there is a call to material sacrifices for the sake of honor or glory, with the difference that in this case (at least in Latin America) it is the land mass that acquires the attributes of a living organism.

There are many examples of the use of this sort of linguistic mechanism for irredentist mobilization throughout the Argentine literature on foreign relations. For example, one author (who was motivated by geopolitical considerations vis-a-vis Chile, the arch-enemy of Argentine territorial nationalists) said that poor Patagonia "continued being an empty and abandoned land, the perennially cast-aside member of the Argentine family"[30]. This language has the function of rallying support for the geopolitically-inspired Patagonian cause (encouraging population and investment policies), using the emotional trick I have described. As a consequence, few people stop to think that to postpone the development of Patagonia is a grave error if it means underutilizing Argentine resources (that should be used to give the Argentine people the best possible standard of living), but that Patagonia is not an end-in-itself, and that it is the people, and not the territory, that are endowed with rights and interests: the territory is merely a resource of the people and for the people. There is in this discourse a curious (and indeed frequent) inversion of values: the priority is not placed on the individual, and not even on the people (as a collective entity), but on the territory. This is the logical consequence of thinking of the very "nation" in anthropomorphic terms: the territory is like the nation's body, and Patagonia or Falkland/Malvinas become the equivalent of an arm or a leg. Not investing in Patagonia becomes the equivalent of letting a foot gangrene; it thus becomes irrelevant that the investment might happen to be the worst possible allocation of resources from an economic perspective.

Another among many available examples is the corny and sentimental song popularized during the Falkland/Malvinas war, "Las Hermanitas Perdidas" ("The Lost Little Sisters"). For this discourse, the Falkland/Malvinas are "sisters"

of the "great Argentine family". This helps to consolidate a culture in which very few people think seriously and honestly about the people who inhabit the islands, as least as a priority issue. And the human rights (or the right to self-determination) of the Falkland Islanders become a laughable consideration, when what is at stake is the amputation of one of the nation's hands or feet, that one seeks to avoid or recover. One does not abandon a little sister who has been abducted and raped by perfid Albion. The call is to a holy war.

These irrationalities, that sometimes become embodied in foreign policy with disastrous and even criminal consequences, probably would not be avoided if international relations theorists were keenly aware of the fact that their field requires philosophical assumptions and value judgements, that these must be built into the logical structure of their theory, that nations are not organisms, and that states are not ends-in-themselves, but exist instead to serve the most precious creation of nature, the human individual. Interests are usually more powerful than ideology or philosophy, and the sort of criminal irrationality that is encouraged (among many other mechanisms) by the anthropomorphic fallacy would continue to operate in the world. Nonetheless, if theorists were acutely conscious of these issues and explicitly presented these assumptions in their works, Saddam Hussein would at least not be encouraged by brilliant Ivy League professors who give to the world the "empirical, value-free" statement that tells us that "poor, weak states may be more willing to suffer". This could make a difference, a small one maybe, but a very real one in terms of the lives that it might save from time to time, simply because a petty tyrant did not have an available ideological justification for his latest folly.

Conclusions

The identification of the anthropomorphic fallacy is of normative, explicatory, and even epistemological value insofar as it:

1. Is a type of metaphor conducive to flawed thinking and to the generation of irrationality functional to the mobilization of loyalties toward the state, whose identification and policy consequences can and should be the object of empirical study. In this sense its identification and study can help to explain some foreign policies that make use of this mechanism through which support for symbolic objectives linked to a society's collective self-esteem is generated. Concomitantly, its identification can be of normative use, helping to prevent the formulation of policies based on this sort of emotional

manipulation for the sake of objectives that are usually not truly citizenry-centric but are disguised as such by elite interests and by a government-centric frame of mind that mobilizes irrationality through the use of anthropomorphic language.

2. Is related to totalitarian and organicist assumptions about human nature and about the relation between the individual and the state that inadvertently creep into international relations theory. Thus, it must be uncovered by an international relations theory based on contractarian assumptions if that theory is to avoid serious logical contradictions that make it nonsensical.

Nonetheless, although the identification of the anthropomorphic fallacy and of its policy implications are relevant for all of these reasons, it must be pointed out that the use of anthropomorphic language, the unproblematic character of the state for mainstream international relations theory, and the normative implications of these linguistic and conceptual problems, can be said to lead to fallacy only insofar as we adopt contractarian philosophical assumptions. Hence, the very identification of this phenomenon in international relations discourse implies the rejection of scientificism (and positivism) for all attempts at formulating a general theory of international politics (although not necessarily for middle-range theories). Concomitantly, it is an eloquent proof of the fact that philosophical assumptions are of necessity built into the very logic of international relations theory.

If (as I have attempted to demonstrate) the use of the concept of rationality leads necessarily to the incorporation of value judgements into the logical structure of theory; if the absence of an explicit definition of whom it is that foreign policy is supposed to serve (the citizenry or people, the state, the government, the individual statesman) places the concept of rationality in the realm of the nonsensical; if this type of state-as-actor model for which the state is unproblematic necessarily leads to the anthropomorphic fallacy and to a logical contradiction with contractualism and liberal democracy, then we must come to the conclusion that, epistemologically, the field of international relations has nothing in common with the natural sciences at the level of general theory, and that any attempt to turn it into a value-free science will deprive it of all meaning.

Of course, international relations theory never gets to be quite nonsensical, but this is because value judgements and philosophical assumptions inadvertently creep in, and not only through the anthropomorphic fallacy, but also in other, even more contradictory ways, to the point that they can at times even neutralize the totalitarian bias of the anthropomorphic fallacy.

This is the case of the double standard that we observed in Keohane and Nye's book: there are implicit value judgements and normative orientations regarding U.S. foreign policy, and it is only other states, especially Third World states, that they really attempt to treat in a "value-free" way. The paradox is that in this way the anthropomorphic fallacy --that is built into the theory in a deeper substratum than the implicit value-judgements about U.S. policy-- is neutralized for the case of that policy, but remains active vis-a-vis the Third World (the "poor, weak states") partly through the attempt to make the theory "value-free".

Theorists of international relations thus often play a naïve and childish game. They imagine themselves to be akin to the hard scientists, and that the behavior of states can be observed, without value judgements, as if it were the behavior of stars or subatomic particles. But by letting their philosophical assumptions creep in inadvertently, they never get to be quite nonsensical, while maintaining the illusion that they are akin not to preachers or philosophers, but to physicists and chemists. Like children, they have their fun and live out their fantasies. They would cry in outrage if one were to claim that they renounce their principles, which they expect will be served by their value-free science. But they do not understand that, ultimately, the survival of humanity (at a global level) and the pursuit of the interests of the citizenry vis-a-vis other peoples and states (at the "national" society level) are values that must of necessity be built into the logical structure of this metier. Nothing could be more value laden and nothing could be further away from theoretical physics.

On the other hand, from the point of view of the construction of the normative dimension of our theory, the consequence of identifying and rejecting the anthropomorphic fallacy is that all foreign policy objectives that sacrifice material values for the sake of emotional values such as those usually justified with an anthropomorphic discourse, must be eliminated from the agenda of all countries, as contrary to citizenry-centric rationality. Nonetheless, they must especially be eliminated from the agenda of poor, weak states, because there the contradiction between these policies and our contractarian assumptions is most acute. The identification of the anthropomorphic fallacy is thus much more relevant for a peripheral realism than for an international relations theory constructed from the perspective of the central countries.

Peripheral states, and especially poor and weak ones, should abstain from all symbolically-oriented policies that do not produce material benefits, if they generate material costs or risks, even if such values as national "honor", "glory", "pride" or "dignity" are invoked. The fundamentalist policies of

countries such as Iran, Iraq and Libya, that subordinate material calculations to these values and ruthlessly sacrifice their own populations, is (thanks to their extreme character) the best empirical demonstration that an anthropomorphic logic is contrary to contractarian assumptions. Such policies --perhaps justifiable under certain organicist assumptions-- are in reality contrary to both the interests of the individual citizens of these countries and of humanity at large. In foreign policy, private glories are a public vice, and glory is always private, as are all emotional values.

It is of course true that, though most Third World states are far from the extremes represented by Iraq, Iran or Libya, only in very few states do we find a substantial absence of policies based on the anthropomorphic fallacy, and that by and large, most states, rich and poor, sacrifice a certain amount of welfare, that varies from case to case, for the sake of emotional and symbolic values. Nonetheless, as already stated in a previous chapter, and once again following Morgenthau on this score, the fact that foreign policy is never fully adjusted to the ideal type that we have attempted to construct in order to define the citizenry-centric rationality of a peripheral state, is not a valid criticism for our theory. On the contrary: our theory is necessary precisely because states all too often engage in international behaviors that do not fully abide by a citizenry-centric rationality.

On the other hand, we have seen that the anthropomorphic fallacy is not only functional for policies that sacrifice a measure of the welfare of the common people for the sake of vanity, but that it is also used for aggressive nationalistic mobilization which usually is also contrary to citizenry-centric rationality. This fallacy, therefore, must be actively demythified by the community of international relations analysts and theorists. Here lies a categorical imperative for our "scientific" community.

NOTES

1. Regarding human needs as the ultimate determinant for human action, remember Bronislaw Malinowsky, A Scientific Theory of Culture.

2. S. Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva, Spanish-language edition, pages 19 and 82. E.H. Carr, Twenty Year Crisis, London: Macmillan 1939.

3. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 31, already cited in note .

4. See my discussion in the Introduction and in the section on "the level of analysis problem in the definition of rationality" in Chapter 1, for the opinion of Cox and Ashley on the neorealists' unproblematic approach to the state.

5. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 19.

6. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 18. My emphasis.

7. Keohane and Nye, op.cit. page 53,

8. Morgenthau, op.cit. pages 10-11.

9. Waltz, op.cit. 1979, Spanish-language edition pages 69-70.

10. As I stress repeatedly in this section, one cannot build a theory of international relations without addressing the question of what is foreign policy for and who it is supposed-to serve. A theory that circumvents this conceptual and moral issue, and that simply takes Saddam's ample freedom of action to sacrifice the Iraqis and Bush's considerable domestic constraints as facts-of-life is almost senseless; it is full of anarchy in terms of human subjects and intentions. Bush is (boundedly) representing a country. Saddam is representing himself, and using his country and its state for his personal purposes, brutally sacrificing his kinsmen and women. This difference is of course the product of social, economic, political and cultural variables, but the point is that, regardless of the origin of these differences, U.S. policy is based on a (boundedly) citizenry-centered rationality, whereas Iraqi policy is not. From this point of view, Saddam's policy is not a "national" or country policy but an individual's. Thus, in its recent interactions with the world, the Iraqi state does not properly and conceptually represent the Iraqi people, but is the realm of an outlaw. Or to put it another way, Bush is, to some extent, a captive of his country and citizenry. Contrariwise, the Iraqi state and people are captives of Saddam. When the unit Bush-USA interacts with the unit Saddam-Iraq, it is really units of a completely different kind that interact. The Iraqi citizenry is completely out of the picture. It is completely misleading to simply talk about the interaction between the Iraqi state and the American state. It should be noted that Robert W. Cox's contention that international relations theory should consider, as its basic units of interaction, not abstract and unproblematic "states", but "state/society complexes" instead, is conceptually very useful to this discussion. See R.W. Cox, op.cit. page 216.

11. Morgenthau, op.cit. page 10.

12. P. Ariès and G. Duby (eds.), Historia de la Vida Privada, Buenos Aires: Taurus 1990,; Vol. I, page 109.

13. In Ariès and Duby, op.cit. pages 255-256 and 284.

14. J.G. Ruggie, op.cit. p. 141-148.

15. J.R. Strayer and D.C. Munro, The Middle Ages, 4th. edition, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts 1959, p. 115; cf. Ruggie, op.cit. p.142.

16. I. Wallerstein, The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York: Academic Press, 1974, p. 32; cf. J.G. Ruggie op.cit. p. 155, note 22.

17. J.G. Ruggie, op.cit. p. 143.

18. J.G. Ruggie, op.cit. p. 143.

19. J.G. Ruggie, op.cit. p. 144.

20. J.C. Garnett, "States, State-Centric Perspectives, and Interdependence Theory", in J. Baylis and N.J. Rengger, Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1992; page 64.

21. See, for example, Pericles' funeral oration. Thucydides, Historia de la Guerra del Peloponeso, México D.F.: Editorial Porrúa, 1989; page 83 (Book II, Chapter VII).

22. R.O. Keohane op.cit. 1986, p. 186.

23. K. Waltz, op.cit. 1979, Spanish-language edition page 165.

24. J.C. Garnett, op.cit. page 76.

25. R.K. Ashley, op.cit. p. 227.

26. R.K. Ashley, op.cit. p. 279.

27. R.K. Ashley, op.cit. p. 280.

28. For the Argentine myths, see C. Escudé, El Fracaso del Proyecto Argentino: Educación e Ideología, Buenos Aires: Tesis/Instituto Di Tella 1990, and C. Escudé, "Contenido nacionalista de la enseñanza de la geografía en la Argentina, 1879-1986", in A. Borón and J. Faúndez (eds.), Malvinas Hoy: Herencia de un Conflicto, Buenos Aires: Puntosur 1989.

29. Political discourse is particularly affected by this phenomenon, and speeches of leaders are often an anthology of anthropomorphisms,

30. C. Escudé, La Argentina, ¿Paria Internacional?, Buenos Aires: Belgrano 1984, pages 118-119. The author cited is Miguel Angel Scenna, "Argentina-Chile: el secular diferendo", Part I, Todo es Historia, No. 43, Nov. 1970, page 10.

Chapter 5 - CONCLUSIONS TO PART I: THE FAILURE OF MAINSTREAM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Introduction

International relations theory is in a sad state both in the periphery and in the center. The lack of a theory based on the consequences of the absence of power, and the subsequent importation of the mainstream theory developed in the United States, has done some harm. However, theoretical development in the United States itself is also disappointingly poor, and this aggravates the situation. It is not only that a theory that does not correspond to the local circumstances is being imported. The theory being imported also happens to be bad theory. It is extraordinarily naive for many reasons, among others that:

1. It takes the state as unproblematic;

2. It unknowingly operates on double standards;

3. It pitifully attempts to emulate other disciplines, instead of developing a method custom made to its unique subject matter;

4. It inadvertently incorporates philosophical assumptions;

5. It does not acknowledge that philosophical assumptions are not a complement to theory but are of necessity built into theory;

6. It inadvertently incurs in frequent anthropomorphisms.

7. It fails to notice that foreign policy as a subject matter is much more suitable for a "scientific" approach, explicatory attempts and forecasts, than the international system.

In some senses, it is as naïvely justificatory of the state (disguised as a nation) as was Vattel more than two hundred years ago. In this sense, it has an unintended totalitarian bias and --especially in the Third World-- it is particularly functional to the interests of tyrants.

All of these points have been abundantly developed above and I will not engage again in their demonstration. The important point to be made here is that the theory developed in the United States is of a very low quality. In order to do the former, I will engage in what Stanley Hofmann once called a "wrecking operation". Since I cannot take on the entire corpus of mainstream theory and analyze it syllogism after syllogism, I will be forced to be unfair, and

concentrate on a specific author. My victim will be Robert O. Keohane, an admirable scholar, unsurpassed in terms of his intellectual honesty, who has probably made one of the most important theoretical contributions of the 1980s by using realist principles to demonstrate the likelihood, not of conflict, but of cooperation.

This is a conceptual feat from which I do not want to detract. However, no one will dispute that criticism is essential to progress. I will praise Keohane's evolution, but I will expose his contradictions, his fallacies and his flawed thinking. I will begin with the evolution of his opinions regarding the "scientific" character of the field of international relations, and will later move on to some of the cruder logical errors that abound in his work. While engaging in this operation, Keohane will be representing not himself, but the field itself: something similar could be done with most if not all theoreticians.

Keohane and scientificism

The U.S. literature on international relations is plagued by an embarrassment at "being different" from the natural sciences, and Keohane has been but a representative example, although his views have recently evolved considerably, and in what in my opinion is the right direction. It is sad that it be so. The field is intrinsically value-laden. Its main pursuit at a universal level, acknowledged or not, is to save humanity from itself, and this establishes a hierarchy of values. International relations theory has two dimensions, a normative one and an explicatory one, that are complementary (in his most recent writings, Keohane also subscribes this opinion). The analogy with the natural sciences comes from its explicatory dimension. But the most important of the two dimensions is not the explicatory (which is instrumental) but the normative (which is the field's raison d'etre). It is this dimension that makes the field relevant, and it is the intertwining of the two dimensions in the logical structure of the theory itself what makes it epistemologically interesting and, to a limited extent, unique. This is not a weak point of the field, but a strong point instead. And those who cultivate the field are (and indeed should be) closer to philosophers and even to scholarly preachers than to physicists.

Keohane's opinions on this problem, until very recently, have been very different, and he still regards the normative dimension of the field as a complement of theory rather than as a part of its logical structure. In an earlier but recent stage of his thought he, as other U.S. theorists, was very much obsessed with the "hard" sciences. This generated recurrent yet always

frustrating efforts to build international relations theory (as well as other social sciences) on the epistemological model of fields like physics, whose subject-matter is essentially different. This effort led to odd contradictions. For example, in an important essay published in 1986 and reprinted in 1989, Keohane:

> 1. criticizes Morgenthau in particular and classical realism in general on the grounds that much of what it aspires to do is to "make the actions of states understandable (...)" instead of seeking "the goal of arriving at testable generalizations" [1].
>
> 2. adopts the ambitious concepts and criteria for the evaluation of theoretical work developed by philosopher of science Imre Lakatos who (it could hardly be otherwise) had the natural sciences, especially physics, in mind.
>
> 3. yet accepts the validity and the unproblematic character of the concept of "rationality", which as we have seen logically requires the incorporation of value judgements[2].

Indeed, in this work Keohane endorses realism insofar as it "is a necessary component of world politics because its focus on power, interests and rationality is crucial to any understanding of the subject". The problem lies in the fact that realism "is particularly weak in accounting for change, especially where the sources of that change lie in the world political economy or in the domestic structures of states"[3]. And according to our author this problem is linked to the fact that it is not "scientific" enough, at least in its classical (mainly Morgenthau) variant. So he brings in Lakatos, representing "true science", to evaluate the theoretical work, without realizing that the acceptance of "rationality" (or for that matter, "interests") as a concept is contradictory with a scientificist aspiration for the field of international relations, because this brings value judgements, of necessity, into the logical structure of the theory itself, and not merely as a complement with which we make use of "science".

This insistence with a scientificist attitude towards international relations theory and the repeated frustrations generated by this obsession could only lead into confusion and contradiction. By 1988 Keohane (who is a scholar who is constantly learning and hence, changing his mind) seemed to be thinking quite the opposite of what he wrote in 1986, when he brought in Lakatos as the arbiter of the scientific method. Indeed, only two years after he was asserting that this is a field in which "deterministic laws elude us, since we are studying the purposive behavior of a relatively small number of actors

engaged in strategic bargaining. (...) This suggests that no general theory of international relations may be feasible. (...) We must understand that we can aspire only to formulate conditional, context-specific generalizations rather than to discover universal laws (...)." Such an acknowledgement represents an important step forward. Yet the contradiction between this statement and the attempt to apply the criteria of Lakatos goes by unexplained by Keohane, and this is particularly odd considering that he reprinted both the essay in which he recurs to Lakatos and the one in which he makes the 1988 statement in his 1989 volume[4].

In 1989, this dimension of Keohane's thought evolved still further. There are "inherent limitations to scientific prediction" that afflict the field, he tells us in his 1989 autobiographical essay. "The realization that these limitations are inherent to our subject matter should make us humble", he says. "We do not have theories that can fully explain the past, and we certainly cannot predict the future". Although I see no reason why such facts should humble the field's practitioners (it is rather an exciting source of epistemological uniqueness that makes the field more interesting, as well as an unhumbling proof of the complexity of human behavior, who are not humble robots), this resignation is yet another advance. He goes on to concede that "the justification for spending one's professional life studying world politics cannot (...) be a purely scientific one. On the contrary, it is profoundly normative". In this essay, Keohane even confesses that he springs from "a long line of Calvinist ministers", bringing him closer to my definition of a scholarly preacher[5]. But he has not yet realized that the normative dimension, whose importance he now fully accepts, has to be built into the logical structure of the theory itself, and he continues even today to search for epistemological miracles, as we shall see below.

Keohane and economics

When disappointed with the potential of natural science to endow the field of international relations with a theory, the fetichism of the worshiper of science that is to be found in most mainstream theorists is often directed towards economics. We have already mentioned Waltz's attempts in Chapter 2. But he is not the only one to have been tempted in this direction. Keohane's desperate search, for example, led him to attempt to use a theorem by Ronald Coase to isolate the conditions under which there will exist "demand" for international regimes. He tells us that:

> Coase was able to show that the presence of externalities alone does not necessarily prevent Pareto-optimal coordination among independent

> actors: under certain conditions, bargaining among these actors could lead to Pareto-optimal solutions. The key conditions isolated by Coase were (a) a legal framework establishing liability for actions, presumably supported by governmental authority; (b) perfect information; and (c) zero transaction costs (including organization costs and costs of side-payments). If all these conditions were met in world politics, ad hoc agreements would be costless and regimes unnecessary. At least one of them must not be fulfilled if international regimes are to be of value, as facilitators of agreements, to independent utility-maximizing actors in world politics. Inverting the Coase theorem provides us, therefore, with a list of conditions, at least one of which must apply if regimes are to be of value in facilitating agreements among governments:
>
> (a) lack of a clear legal framework establishing liability for actions;
>
> (b) information imperfections (information is costly);
>
> (c) positive transaction costs.
>
> In world politics, of course, all of these conditions are met all of the time: world government does not exist; information is extremely costly and often impossible to obtain; transaction costs, including costs of organization and side-payments, are often very high.[6]

Hence, Keohane tells us, there will be a "demand" for international regimes. If we were to simplify his argument, and limit it to the first and most important condition, that is, the "lack of a clear legal framework establishing liability for actions", we would come to the absolutely tautological conclusion that, because a binding world-wide regime encompassing all relevant issues does not exist, there is a demand for specific international regimes! But of course, it is impressive to speak of the Coase theorem. Having abandoned physics and Lakatos, Keohane's search for an epistemological model for the field, not from within (i.e., from the inherent characteristics of its subject-matter, as have all successful fields) but from another field, is now avowedly directed towards economics. Such is the fetichism of science among international relations theorists.

The methodological confusions of "neoliberal institutionalism"

Similar contradictions and confusions are to be found in Keohane's opinions regarding other dimensions of the field, such as the role of domestic variables in international relations theory, i.e., a most important methodological issue. In 1980 he said that "from a theoretical standpoint (...) explanations of regime change based on domestic politics would encounter

serious problems", and proceeded to explain why he was leaving these factors out of his theory[7]. In 1988 he wrote quite the contrary, advocating for the inclusion of domestic factors in such explanations: "As formulated to date, both rationalistic and what I have called reflective approaches share a common blind spot: neither pays sufficient attention to domestic politics. It is all too obvious that domestic politics is neglected by much game-theoretic strategic analysis and by structural explanations of international regime change."[8] That he should have changed his mind is commendable: he was wrong in 1980; he was right in 1988. But that he should publish both statements in the same 1989 volume in which he reprinted both articles is incomprehensible and again points to confusion. Indeed, what dominates the field seems to be confusion and disarray.

Perhaps one of the foremost examples of this epistemological and methodological confusion lies in Keohane's analysis of the so called "theory of hegemonic stability"[9]. There he set himself to the task of testing "a parsimonious theory of international regime change" that asserts that "strong international economic regimes depend on hegemonic power. Fragmentation of power between competing countries leads to fragmentation of the international economic regime; concentration of power leads to stability."[10] He tests it for the 1967-1977 period, and he adopts a methodology whereby, in order to explain different patterns of regime change in three different issue areas (trade, monetary, and petroleum regimes) he adopts an issue-specific version of the hegemonic stability model. United States resources declined in different degrees according to the issue area. Thus,

> according to this view, declines in resources available to the United States for use in a given issue area should be closely related to the weakening of the international regime (circa 1967) in that area. Specifically, the least evidence of structural change should be found in the trade area, an intermediate amount in international monetary relations, and the most in petroleum. This correspondence between changes in the independent and dependent variable would lend support to the theory. To establish the theory on a firmer basis, however, it would be necessary to develop a plausible causal argument based on the hegemonic stability theory for the issue areas and regimes under scrutiny here.[11]

According to his findings,

> The figures on economic resources provide prima facie support for the economic stability thesis. The U.S. proportion of trade, for the top five market economy countries, fell only slightly between 1960 and 1975

> --much less than its proportion of gross domestic product, reflecting the rapid increases during these years in U.S. trade as a proportion of total product. (...) The international trade regime --already under pressure in 1967-- changed less in the subsequent decade than the regimes for money and oil. U.S. financial resources in the form of reserves fell sharply, reflecting the shift from U.S. dominance in 1960 to the struggles over exchange rates of the 1970s. Finally, the petroleum figures (...) are dramatic: the United States went down from a large positive position in 1956 and a small positive position in 1967 to a very large petroleum deficit by 1973. The hegemonic stability theory accurately predicts from this data that U.S. power in the oil area and the stability of the old international oil regime would decline sharply during the 1970s.[12]

Keohane tells us that these findings lend plausibility to the hegemonic stability theory by not disproving its predictions. But, he warns us,

> they do not (...) establish its validity, even for this limited set of issues over one decade. It is also necessary, before concluding that the theory accounts for the observed changes, to see whether plausible causal sequences can be constructed linking shifts in the international distribution of power to changes in international regimes.

So, in order to do this, Keohane sets out to "consider the most plausible and well-founded particular accounts of changes in our three issue areas, to see whether the causal arguments in these accounts are consistent with the hegemonic stability theory."[13] Hence, Keohane goes on to examine more sophisticated historical explanations of regime change in his three issue areas during the period under scrutiny. His basic conclusions are that in general terms the hegemonic stability theory is not disconfirmed, but that while in the petroleum issue area it performs very well, in the monetary area it is a "highly unsatisfactory explanation of regime change" (because historical analysis brings out the fact that loss of confidence in the dollar was a more important factor in the changes than tangible U.S. resources), and that for trade it is even worse as an explanation, even though it is not disconfirmed. Specifically on the trade regime, he explains that:

> (...) changes in the trade regime between 1967 and 1977 were broadly consistent with changes in potential power resources in the issue area. (...) The causal argument of the hegemonic stability theory, however, implies that the changes we do observe in trade (which are less than those in money and oil but are by no means insignificant) should be ascribable to changes in international political structure. Yet this

> does not appear to be the case. Protectionism is largely a grass roots phenomenon, reflecting the desire of individuals for economic security and of privileged groups for higher incomes than they would command in a free market. (Furthermore) a recent GATT study identifies as a key source of protectionism "structural weaknesses and maladjustments" in the countries of the OECD. (...) Most explanations of increased protectionism also focus on the recession of the 1970s and the rise of manufactured exports from less developed countries.[14]

So Keohane concludes:

> On the whole, the hegemonic stability theory does not explain recent changes in international trade regimes as well as it explains changes in money or oil. The theory is not disconfirmed by the trade evidence, and correctly anticipates less regime change in trade than in money or oil; but it is also not very helpful in interpreting the changes that we do observe. Most major forces affecting the trade regime have little to do with the decline of U.S. power.[15]

Now let us take a look at the mental operations that Keohane has actually performed:

1. He set up a model, the theory of hegemonic stability, which pretends to be a causal model of regime change.

2. He tested the model empirically. The model was not disconfirmed.

3. Yet he asserts that in order to establish the model's validity he must first see "whether plausible causal sequences can be constructed linking shifts in the international distribution of power to changes in international regimes". This assertion is very odd, because the theory of hegemonic stability is in itself a causal model. Yet he proceeds to "consider the most plausible and well-founded particular accounts of change in our three issue areas", which amount to additional causal models.

4. Thus, he proceeds to develop three specific explanations for regime change, which are different from the original timeless model insofar as they have a historical contents, but that nevertheless are in themselves models.

5. Finally, he tests the crude original model with the three additional, more sophisticated ones. Regarding the trade regime, for example, he

> concludes telling us that "most major forces affecting the trade regime have little to do with the decline of U.S. power." In other words, he appears to have "known" beforehand what the causes of regime change were, and he pitted one model against the other.

One is dumbfounded with this sequence of mental operations. If he had better explanations, what did he need the crude hegemonic stability model for? If the better explanations were known prior to the model (as was the case), was it not obvious that the simplified model would be insufficient? What did he engage in the exercise of testing the crude model with empirical data for? Is this learning, or is it a sterile and boring game?

It must be borne in mind that Keohane was not engaging in a discussion addressed to Charles Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner (whom he credits as the chief proponents of the theory of hegemonic stability), attempting to refute their theory with historical data, and showing first that certain empirical tests can be deceptive. Keohane actually likes his crude model of hegemonic stability. In his conclusions he clearly states that the model, differentiated by issue area, "takes us some distance toward a sophisticated understanding of recent changes in the international politics of oil, money, and trade." He had the better and more complete historical explanations at hand, prior to the elaboration of the model (which can never serve any useful purpose, and this is why there is usually no followup on such developments). However, he feels that this sort of model, and its testing, is more sophisticated than traditional historical explanation (indeed, more like "science"). His very last sentence says that "to limit ambitions to (historical) description would be a premature confession of failure"[16]. Yet the ultimate test to which he subjects his "sophisticated" model is traditional historical explanation!

Clearly, Keohane is confused. What is disarming about the man, however, is that he knows it and admits it. In his autobiographical essay he confesses:

> No intellectual journey is smooth, since a necessary condition of discovery is confusion. I have spent much of my intellectual life so confused that I couldn't even describe the questions I wanted to answer.[17]

The problem is, quite frankly, that I do not see how we can ever arrive at discovery through this labyrinth of words which ends in all sorts of fallacies and tautologies. Basically, Robert Gilpin is right when he suggests that twentieth century students of international relations may not know more than Thucydides and his 5th. Century compatriots[18]. We may know more about

relevant but secondary issues which can be successfully studied with a positivist methodology, and which can lead to the formulation of what, in sociology, Robert King Merton called "middle range theories", but in terms of general theory we are no wiser than the Greek historian, and insofar as we do not recognize that this is not a science, we may be even less so.

In the field of international relations, general and/or systemic theory can have only a very modest role. It has achieved just about as much as it can achieve. Further pursuit of research strategies such as those of Waltz or Keohane (among others) will, in all likelihood, lead not to real learning but to fiction and nonsense. As I have stated before, in my modest opinion the key to greater wisdom lies clearly in the development of country-specific foreign policy theories based on Robert Cox's concept of the state-society complex, and rich in historical analysis. This will be our approach to the Argentine case, to be treated in Part II of this volume.

Not only this, but the methodologies and concepts applied in international relations research will have to be custom-built for its subject-matter. Recourse to methodologies and concepts designed for other fields, be it for the physical sciences or for economics, is doomed to failure. And the "scientific" pretensions of the field, that emerge at least in part from an underestimation of the difference between states and molecules (to use Morton A. Kaplan's infelicitous analogy[19]), will have to be replaced by a more avowedly normative approach. As a well known historian of contemporary U.S. foreign policy has recently demonstrated, these pretensions have already suffered a severe setback.

John Lewis Gaddis: a death-blow to scientificism in international relations

Indeed, in a 1992 article in which he tested the post-Morgenthau theoretical production in terms of its forecasting achievements, John Lewis Gaddis comes to very similar conclusions as the ones outlined above[20]. His examination of the failures to predict the end of the Cold War by the three approaches to international relations theory that he analyzed should be devastating, if there were any common sense left within the field. The latter supposition is in doubt, however, if we consider that as early as 1977 Gabriel A. Almond and Stephen J. Genco argued convincingly but to no avail that much of social change has to be explained by accidental conjunctions and low-probability events. "Reality comprises a range of phenomena extending from the determinate to the indeterminate --from predictable clocks to unpredictable clouds, to use Popper's metaphor."[21] Furthermore, the hard scientists themselves have come to grasp the extent of the indeterminate in reality. This is clear in

discoveries ranging from Heisenberg's 1927 finding that certain particles are altered by the mere fact that we observe them, to Edward Lorenz's conclusion that unmeasurable variations in the parameters of a meteorological model can produce momentous effects in the dependent variable. In Gaddis' own words:

> What (...) Lorenz noted in another cloud-related metaphor, was that something as unpredictable as the fluttering of a butterfly's wings over Beijing could produce a hurricane over New York. Thus was born the principle of "sensitive dependence on initial conditions", the "butterfly effect", that makes long-term weather forecasting --the transformation of clouds into clocks, if you will-- impossible. (...) As a consequence, scientists have had to learn to live with the fact that some phenomena can be predicted with great accuracy, but that other phenomena can never be. Regularity and randomness co-exist quite easily in a real world (...). Surely human affairs, and the history they produce, come closer to falling into the unpredictable rather than the predictable category: not only are the potentially relevant variables virtually infinite, but there is the added complication --not found in either clouds or clocks-- of self-awareness, which means that the "variables" themselves can often foresee the consequences of contemplated actions, and reconsider them accordingly.[22]

Gaddis' demolition of the attempts of international relations theory to imitate the epistemological model of the natural sciences is so strong that it is disappointing to see that he does not fully understand the implications of his arguments. In his conclusions, he tells us that:

> This failure of international relations theory arose primarily (...) because of a methodological passing of ships in the night. The social sciences, seeking objectivity, legitimacy, and predictability, set out to embrace the traditional methods of the physical and natural sciences. But they did so at a time when physicists, biologists and mathematicians, concerned about disparities between their theories and the reality they were supposed to characterize, were abandoning old methods in favor of new ones that accommodated indeterminacy, irregularity, and unpredictability, precisely the qualities the social sciences were trying to leave behind.[23]

Apparently then, for Gaddis the problem would be that the social sciences copied the "hard" sciences at the wrong time, or without a full awareness of the latest developments in the latter! This is clearly nonsensical. The problem always lay in copying methodologies from fields that have a different subject-matter, instead of custom-building a methodology according to the

unique characteristics of this field's subject-matter. Was Lorenz's conclusion derived from an imitation of the social sciences, or was it derived from a computer experiment whose logic arose exclusively from a meteorological research program? Lorenz never thought "since history is indeterminate, so must be clouds", but here we have it that the most brilliant, clear minded social scientists (and only them) are beginning to think "since clouds are indeterminate, so must be history". Not even Gaddis has fully broken out of the slavery of the "hard" sciences, that absurd inferiority complex that has led to the waste of huge amounts of talents and moneys.

Testable if-then hypotheses as useful instruments for a normative theory

The downfall of scientificism at the level of a general theory of international relations does not mean, however, that traditional social science methods are to be completely discarded. Having acknowledged the limitations to prediction imposed to the field by the nature of its subject-matter, it is nonetheless possible to put limited, middle-range theories at the service of a general theory of a normative type.

For example, Gaddis is perplexed at the fact that the behavioralist school of international relations (which is the most naïvely scientificist) comes to the apparently contradictory conclusions that, on the one hand, (a) alliances rarely achieve security and (b) preparation for war provides no protection against it, while on the other hand (c) disparities in power correlate with peace. Gaddis asks himself, how is one to reconcile these arguments? "How have power differentials developed in the past, after all, if not through the accumulation of the military strength that alliances and armaments provide?"[24]

With just a trifle of imagination, the three findings are very easy to reconcile. Gaddis' doubts and perplexity here can be resolved simply by adding an evolutionary dimension to the behavioralist findings, leading to a rudimentary theory of the achievement of long-term peace through war-plagued historical process. Alliances rarely achieve security, and have in fact contributed to war. Preparation for war provides no protection against it, but on the contrary has also tended to contribute to war. But this historical process, combined with other factors such as the relative success or failure of different societies, has led to a greater concentration of power. And this, in turn, can eventually contribute to peace, as Waltz correctly perceived when he claimed that bipolar orders are more stable than multipolar ones[25]. Moreover, unipolar systems are even more stable, and thereby desirable from the perspective of humanity's chances for survival. World government, if it

ever comes to be, can only come from a great concentration of power. Although a part of this concentration can be achieved through alliance and concertation, at least in its early and middle stages it can only be the product of a war-ridden process that eliminates most military competitors, as indeed has been happening since the beginning of the Rennaisance.

International relations theorists never predicted the end of the Cold War because, among other reasons, they were not normative enough. They were too obsessed with building a science, an enterprise in which they could never really be successful, and would not risk their prestige at forecasting such an unlikely event. If they would have been more normative, if their commitment to peace had been greater than their commitment to science, those with suggestive findings leading in that direction (whom Gaddis identifies) would have wagered on prophecies that, through thoughtful wishing, might at least to some extent have become forces working in the right direction and thereby tend to become self-fulfilling.

The argument above, that attempts to reconcile three apparently contradictory findings of the behaviorist theorists, is a case in point. I am willing to forecast that global peace will come from a concentration of power that has been the product of a war-ridden process (and to some extent, as in the case of Iraq, continues to be a product of violence) because I am aware that it is the only way in which long-term peace can come to be. Although I have no real certainty that we will prevent a holocaust through these means, this is in my view the only real possibility of avoiding it (credit being hereby acknowledged to Thucydides, Morgenthau and Waltz), and I prefer the risk that a holocaust prove my calculated, quasi-scientific guess to be wrong rather than not attempt to modestly contribute to the prevention of a holocaust because of my fetichism for science. And that is really all we can do, and this contribution, be it accomplished or frustrated, is much more relevant than any scientific development. The role of the scholarly preacher devoted to international relations is a noble one. The role of the would be scientist is a frivolous one.

In the field of the theories of specific foreign policies, however, there is a more fertile ground for "scientific" development, explanation and (risky) forecasting than in global or systemic theories of international relations, and to that enterprise we now turn our attention.

NOTES

1. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1986, p. 162.

2. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1986, p. 159.

3. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1986, p. 159.

4. R.O. Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches", first published in International Studies Quarterly, Vol.32, No.4 (December 1988), and reprinted in International Institutions and State Power. The text cited is in page 158 of the latter volume.

5. "A Personal Intellectual History", first published in J. Kruzel and J.N. Rosenau (eds.), Understanding World Politics, Lexington MA: Lexington Books, 1989. Republished in R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989; page 21-22, his emphasis.

6. R.O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes", in R.O. Keohane op.cit., 1989, pages 110-111. His emphasis.

7. R.O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977", first published in O.Holsti, R.M. Siverson and A.L. George, (eds.), Change in the International System, Boulder CO: Westview Press 1980. Reprinted in R.O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1989; page 77.

8. "International Institutions: Two Approaches", first published in International Organization, vol. 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986). Reprinted in R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989, as chapter 7; page 173.

9. R.O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977", R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989.

10. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989, page 78.

11. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989, page 86.

12. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989, page 86-88.

13. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989, page 88.

14. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989, pages 92-93.

15. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. pages 93-94. My emphasis.

16. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989, page 96.

17. R.O. Keohane, op.cit. 1989, page 29.

18. R. Gilpin, op.cit. 1981, p. 227; cf. R.O. Keohane (ed.) op.cit. 1986, p. 179

19. M.A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New York: Wiley 1964; pages xvii-xviii.

20. J.L. Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992-93).

21. G.A. Almond and S.J. Genco, "Clouds, Clocks, and the Study of Politics", World Politics, Vol. 20., No. 4 (July 1977); cf. Gaddis, op.cit. pages 27-28.

22. J.L. Gaddis, op.cit., pages 28-29.

23. J.L. Gaddis, op.cit., pages 53-54.

24. J.L. Gaddis, op.cit. page 23-24.

25. K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, page 192 of the English-language edition.